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MAX SCHELER AND THE FAITH ¹

The philosopher and the poet are
alike in this: both have to do with
the wonderful.

—St. Thomas, *In I Metaph*, 3, 55.



PHILOSOPHY must be queen or slave; she is queen over science when she is handmaid to faith, but when she has the audacity to pose as mistress to faith, she must become slave to science; this is the thesis of Max Scheler in his essay *On the Nature of Philosophy*. Philosophy lifts the spirit to touch the realm of being; it attempts to pierce the veil that hides the deepest in things, and leads to a loving participation in their essence by the way of knowledge. Philosophy *is* knowing and the philosopher a knower, Scheler writes, but to say,

¹ This essay is a chapter of a book on certain aspects of the philosophical and religious thought of some contemporary philosophers of Jewish origin, which will be published by Devin-Adair under the title of "Walls Are Crumbling."

as is the vogue, that its dealings are merely with the knowledge of things and that their essence is none of its concern, rests on no intellectual ground. It is pride, he asserts, which makes a philosopher maintain that philosophy can never lead into the precincts of essence, for he fears that there he would have to recognize that the nature of the Prime Being may demand another, and a more adequate, way of participation than knowledge. Indeed, it might happen that the strict consequence of his philosophical thinking enjoins upon him a free subordination to this higher way; he may even be bidden to bring himself, with his inquiring reason, a willing sacrifice to this fuller but non-philosophical sharing which the Prime Being, by its very nature, might claim. Only pride can say that, no matter what this nature may prove to be, it will refuse this sacrifice; only prejudice can assert that all being has the character but of an object, and that knowledge alone can partake of it.²

True, for Aristotle God was the "Thought of Thought," and the philosopher therefore the perfect man, his path the highest of human existence. But Christ came, and no longer could God, the Prime Being, be seen as a mere object of thought, for He acts, He loves, His Being is creative and merciful goodness. Hence acting *with* Him, loving *with* Him, became the gate to participation in the Prime Being, and philosophy, loyal to logic, rejoiced to minister to faith in Christ, in whom this participation was perfect, was union. The sage had to move to second place, below the saint, and the philosopher to subject himself to the lover of God. Over and above its ancient dignity as queen of science, philosophy gained a dignity far more excellent, that of willing handmaid to the Saviour, a blessed handmaid, for "blessed are the poor in spirit."³

But today philosophy is no longer seated thus between faith and science. Having broken this true relationship, it has set

² "Vom Wesen der Philosophie und der moralischen Bedingung des philosophischen Erkennens," *Vom Ewigen im Menschen* (3rd ed.; Berlin; Der Neue Geist Verlag, 1933), pp. 66-79.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 74-77; Matt. V, 3.

itself above religious truth only to bow low before scientific hypotheses. This reversal, an instance of a general overturn of values, Scheler calls the "revolt of the slaves in the intellectual realm." It seems a paradox that when philosophy limited itself it was unlimited; now that it admits no confines, it has no territory of its own. When it was preamble to faith, it knew it could penetrate to the roots of being, but now that it is subservient to one or the other science—geometry, physics, psychology—there is nothing it is sure of seeing. This is as it must be, says Scheler, for truth is such that it falls prey to the darkness within man unless it humbles itself before the Primal Light.⁴

In philosophy Plato saw moving the wings of the soul, Scheler recalls, the soaring upward of the whole of the human person. To the great philosophers of antiquity, philosophy was a lifting of the spirit, implying a moral approach: the conquest of merely practical—that is, ultimately, selfish—attention to the world. Scheler's view is close to this when he says that it is always our willing and doing which underlie our mistaken values; that it is always, somehow, wrong practice which drags down our consciousness of values and their ranks to its own level. We must learn to will and to do what is good, more or less blindly, before we can see the good and will and do it with insight.⁵

It is characteristic of man's natural view that he takes his little world for all the world, his immediate milieu for the universe. This milieu may be the particular surroundings of an individual, of his race, of his people, or the general surroundings of natural man as part of his species. That his mind may rise above them and participate in being as it is in itself, says Scheler, the philosopher must relinquish, in principle, all that is merely relative to life or to himself as a living creature. Only by forsaking his milieu, the tangibles and intangibles of everyday, can he reach philosophy's true domain. Scheler insists that there can be no philosophical knowledge without love,

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 78-79.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 66, 88-89.

humility, and self-mastery. The love of the whole spiritual person for the Absolute Value, the Absolute Being, breaks through the shell of his surroundings. The humiliation of his natural ego leads man from accidentals to the whatness of the world. His mastery of the many impulses that go hand-in-hand with his sense-perception looses the fetters of his concupiscence and leads him from mere opinion towards an adequate knowledge.⁶

Scheler's insistence that the purity, measure, strength, and growth of our philosophical knowledge are tied to virtue, that the theoretical and moral worlds are essentially and eternally knit together,⁷ continues the line of Christian philosophy. St. Thomas indicts pride as a hindrance to knowledge, for the man who delights in his own excellence soon tires of the excellence of truth.⁸ And St. Augustine, though speaking of religious knowledge, says that those who do not seek truth with all their hearts can not find it, but that from its lovers it can not hide. They must heed: "Ask and it shall be given you, seek and you shall find, knock and it shall be opened to you," and: "Nothing is covered that shall not be revealed"; in all this quest, it is love that asks, love that seeks, love that knocks, love that unveils the eyes, and love it is that gives perseverance in the truth.⁹ Again he says: "Let love be in you, and the fullness of knowledge must follow."¹⁰

I

Much of Scheler's work shows the love for the Absolute and the humility before the objective world which he demands. His was an unusual mind, to which all things spoke; so awake was it that every and any circumstance served and stimulated his thought. He was a philosopher not only in the study or the classroom but at all times; every remark of his, whether in the

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 102-108.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 99, 108.

⁸ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 162, a. 3 ad 1.

⁹ *De Mor. Eccl. Cath.* XVII, 31 (PL 32:1324). Cf. Matt. vii, 7; x, 26.

¹⁰ *In Ps. LXXIX*, 2 (PL 36:1022).

coffee shop or at a ball, in the theater or on the street, bore a philosophical note, betraying a genius that went directly to the uniqueness of every situation and lifted out its general significance.¹¹

Socrates called himself a "gadfly" and a "midwife"; Scheler, to describe his way of thinking and of presenting his thought, called himself a puppeteer. He had his philosophical equipment—the world and his head—always with him, as a strolling player his cabinet. The vagrant mummer needs no preparation, no atmosphere, none of the appurtenances of the big theater, nor did Scheler require any special setting; given an ear, he became creative and set his ideas dancing. He might be seated with a companion, his head canted to the side, watching on the unfolded stage of his spirit the drama of the world. He looked aslant at his puppets' play, which was his own, and always with half an eye for the listener—or better, the spectator. And again and again, by an interjected *Wie?* or *Nicht wahr?* he assured himself of his companion's attention and of the effect of his play. It was truly magic; in an instant he could transform his surroundings and fill the room with his ideas; he made present the things of which he spoke and visible what is often called "abstract." What he evoked from the realm of spirit came, and now and then there gleamed in his eye an unchastened joy that he was so obeyed.¹²

However, what made Scheler so powerful also made him vulnerable; his genius was his weakness. His spoken word had strength and freshness, the dew of the spirit was on it, but his written style was often clumsy and overladen, so that he said of himself: "I have the word, but not the sentence."¹³ He was indeed lavishly gifted; ideas came to him without labor, flaming in his mind like lightning, and it was this immense fecundity that persuaded him to neglect, even to disdain, intellectual toil. He would not spend the effort to verify his sources, to sift and

¹¹ Dietrich von Hildebrand, "Max Scheler als Persönlichkeit," *Zeitliches im Lichte des Ewigen* (Regensburg: Josef Habbel, 1932), pp. 368-369.

¹² Ernst Kamnitzer, *Erinnerung an Max Scheler* (unpublished memoir).

¹³ *Ibid.*

weigh his thoughts, to examine and test them on every side, but rather moved on to new problems. For instance, some of his intuitions on love were profound, but his presentation is never complete, never rounded, giving always only one aspect, almost to the exclusion of others. He showed little care for his sources; quoting, for example, the words of St. Paul: "Beggars enriching many, paupers possessing all things,"¹⁴ he attributes them to St. Francis of Assisi.¹⁵ He had also little concern for the consistency of his own thought. In his *Formalism in Ethics* he says: "Knowingly to will evil as evil is entirely possible," and adds that he does not "subscribe to the saying of Thomas Aquinas, 'We will all things under an aspect of good' (*Omnia volumus sub specie boni*)."¹⁶ (The pairing of these two sentences suggests that Scheler did not fully understand this principle; indeed, not a few of his objections to St. Thomas are based on misunderstanding.) Some years later, however, in an essay *On the Task of German Catholics after the War* he said, and without accounting for his change of mind: "Evil is but a consequence of a free act of the will performed *sub specie boni*."¹⁷

Here is another example of his inaccuracy. In *Sympathy, its Essence and Forms* he writes: "St. Francis was a sworn enemy of Scholasticism and its doctrine of the aristocratic-hierarchic order of being."¹⁸ Nearly every word in this sentence is wrong. St. Francis' awe for wisdom found expression in his child-like reverence for the written word. Whenever on the road he found a scrap of writing, he picked it from the dust and preserved it with care. Once when he was told, partly in jest, that a paper he had thus saved was from a pagan author, he replied that it

¹⁴ 2 Cor. vi, 10.

¹⁵ *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik* (2nd ed.; Halle a. d. S.: Max Niemeyer, 1921), p. 278.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 608.

¹⁷ "Soziologische-Neuorientierung und die Aufgabe der deutschen Katholischen nach dem Krieg," *Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre*, III/1 (Leipzig: Der Neue Geist Verlag, 1924), p. 204.

¹⁸ *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie* (2nd ed.; Bonn: Friedrich Cohen, 1923), p. 106.

mattered not, for all words, of pagans or of others, stemmed from God's wisdom and spoke of God, from whom are all good things. It was his very love of wisdom that made St. Francis abhor learning for its own sake and the universities of his time as seats of haughtiness and error.¹⁹ This hostility to learning as a ware Scheler distorts into enmity to Scholasticism, to which alone he ascribes a doctrine held in the Church long before Scholasticism was born. Moreover, the context of Scheler's remark seems to indicate that he had in mind Aristotelean thought, which, at the time of St. Francis, had not become part of Scholastic philosophy.

Many a page and many a thought of Scheler are marred by such deficiencies. His want of discipline is all the more startling in its contrast with the virtues he knew necessary for the philosophical act. This discrepancy was rooted in an inner disharmony, a discord not to be understood save through the reverence every soul merits. He saw, and saw again, and saw anew, where others passed blindly; inundated with impressions, he was always tempted to trust them too far, to surrender to them, and it was often their novelty that appealed to him, who in a way stayed always a child. His relationship with the world remained too much one of wonder; it was essentially knowing, learning it. But infinitely more is asked of us—to rest and persevere in the known, to be permeated by truth and given to it lovingly, to mortify ourselves for its sake, to conform our wills and adjust our lives to the light we see. All this was difficult for Scheler, for in his early youth he had been indescribably spoiled; he had, as he said himself, never learned to will. Dietrich von Hildebrand, long a friend of Scheler, applies to him Lessing's word, so telling of modern unrest: If God were to offer him eternal and absolute Truth in one hand, or the everlasting desire for it in the other, he would grasp desire and say, Truth is for Thee alone. Scheler's philosophy at its best totally disavows this choice, and yet, deplorably, it does corre-

¹⁹ Father Cuthbert, O. S. F. C., *Life of St. Francis of Assisi* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1912), pp. 294, 154.

spond to a trait of his character, a deep restlessness which darkened his life.²⁰

Max Scheler was born in Munich on August 22, 1874, the son of a Jewish mother and a Gentile father, who, for the sake of marriage, had adopted Judaism. Thus Scheler was born a Jew, but he grew up with no religious formation. His first acquaintance with the spiritual world was through the Catholic maids who served in his home, but it was not until, at the *Gymnasium*, he met the priest who taught religion, that it gripped his interest. In him he met a world different from the pagan which surrounded him, the world of the Absolute. In his priestly character, his dedication to God, Scheler must have glimpsed, as through an opening door, the world of grace and divined the phenomenon of holiness, of which in later years he was to speak so strongly. And he must also have sensed the motherly arms of the Church, her peace, to which he turned at the age of about fourteen. After completing his work in the Humanities at the *Gymnasium*, he studied in Berlin, where Dilthey, Stumpf, and Simmel set the intellectual tone; from there he went to Heidelberg and later to Jena to study under Eucken, and stayed on as a University lecturer. In 1907 he returned to Munich to teach at the University, where the most significant period of his life was to begin. His constant intellectual communion with the "Munich School"—the followers of Lipps who had attached themselves to Husserl—and later in Goettingen with Husserl himself inspired him to truly productive work and encouraged him, by temperament a teacher, to write and to make his great and specific contribution to the history of thought.

From the time he left the *Gymnasium* until his transfer to the University of Munich, Scheler's life had been under a dark shadow, which seems never to have been entirely lifted from him. He entered a civil marriage with a woman, divorced and much older than he, who tried, first to dominate, then to ruin him. But back in Munich he freed himself from this bond,

²⁰ Von Hildebrand, "Max Schelers Stellung zur katholischen Gedankenwelt," *op. cit.*, p. 352.

which brought him pain and unhappiness from the first moment. A few years later he was to say: The more guilt grows, the more is it hidden from the guilty; but the more humility increases, the more visible becomes even the smallest trespass.²¹ This had been his own experience. Having broken the chain of sin, his remorse grew; stronger became his sorrow for having forfeited the life of grace and greater his longing to regain the mercy of God. In these years, he often visited the Benedictine Abbey in Beuron, which he had known while he was still at Jena, to breathe its peace, and it was there, in 1916, that Scheler returned to the faith of his boyhood. "I have made my confession; I have come back to the bosom of the Church," he rejoiced. "I am infinitely happy, and I know I owe this to the Blessed Virgin." Maerit Furtwaengler, whom he had married a few years before and whose love had borne him, followed him into the Church. Though his desire to be a full member of the Church was at that time genuine, nonetheless he was never more than an enthusiastic and admiring onlooker, to whom the sacramental order, for instance, was an object of the greatest philosophical interest, but nothing he could live for long. With his heart remaining restless and divided, he embodied the ill of modern man. And yet it was Scheler—another sign of the contradiction he was—who was the relentless critic of modern man, who "groaning, walks beneath a burden of his own manufacture, his mechanisms; his limbs heavy and only the earth before his eyes, he has forgotten his God and his world."²²

Unsparingly Scheler castigates him who, having lost the great confidence in being which is part of his wholeness, is by creed a skeptic, meeting the world with *a priori* distrust. He is without boldness and generosity, he makes achievement and usefulness the measure of persons and things and never ending activity disguises the void of his soul, he replaces love of creation and joy in its riches with anxiety to defeat it as his

²¹ "Reue und Wiedergeburt," *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, p. 40.

²² "Versuche einer Philosophie des Lebens," *Vom Umsturz der Werte* (2nd ed.; Leipzig: Der Neue Geist Verlag, 1923), Vol. II, p. 190.

enemy. While the integral man looks at the objective world with undisturbed and love-led devotion, knowing that the human mind, created by God, the fount of wisdom, can grasp the essence of things, modern man doubts the powers of his mind as a matter of principle; driven by a deep-seated hostility to the world, he considers it a terrible "mush," out of which his activity must make sense. He uses it for purposes of his own and determines it quantitatively, never ceasing to compare and striving to surpass. For all that his thinking seems so complex, he has in truth relapsed into the primitive. Never before have his motives been so infantile; the biggest, the fastest, the newest, the most powerful, are his ideals. These are the things a child enjoys: the giant in the fairy tale, the spinning top, shoes shining and conspicuously new, the drum that beats the loudest; and these are also the things the crowd seeks after, for it is a bigger child. With modern man allowing the crowd to shape his soul, the end is a state in which all copy all.²³

Alive to man's integral and rich humanity, Scheler was enraged by the caricature of him that had been rising on the historical scene since the end of the thirteenth century. At times Scheler's speech had a passion almost prophetic, and had he been true to his insight, he would have earned the title "prophet against the times." Every Christian has a prophetic vocation, he said, but the prediction of the true prophet is not absolute, because he will not lose sight of man's freedom. True, he cries: I foresee judgment; come it must, save you repent and turn to God, and He in His mercy turn His judgment from you. The prophet cries out, but it is the historic reality that preaches. In the blood and misery of the times, he hears the warning voice of God, and refuses to predict ease, to hold out dazzling visions of paradise. He is perforce a prophet of grief, of doom, but not of despair. Time and again the prophets of the Old Covenant spoke of a remnant to be spared, from which would spring new

²³ "Die christliche Liebesidee und die gegenwaertige Welt," *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, pp. 180-181; "Der Bourgeois," *Vom Umsturz der Werte*, Vol. II, pp. 271, 276.

life, and this promise of a remnant is rekindled whenever the days of a culture grow short. So St. Benedict, when Christian life was imperiled by the great city, went from Rome to Subiaco; while outside ancient culture was being ground under foot, he preserved within his monasteries its noble fragments, together with the ideal of Christian perfection.²⁵ In his best years it was Scheler's desire—indeed, it was his calling, though fulfilled but in part—to undeceive modern man, who thinks he has fared well in this world; to show that the day of wrath is upon him unless he change heart; and implicitly, to call on the remnant to carry the true values over the abyss into which man is about to throw himself.

II

Strange to say, for his dissection of the modern ethos in his essay on *The Role of Ressentiment in Moral Systems*²⁶ Scheler uses the blade Nietzsche forged: his emphasis on *ressentiment*, which Scheler defines as a self-poisoning of the soul caused by systematic repression, as opposed to moral conquest, of hostile emotions like hate, spite, envy, jealousy and revenge, and leading to a more or less permanent deformation of the sense of values. Only there, says Scheler, will *ressentiment* grow where a violent emotion goes hand-in-hand with a feeling of impotence, deriving from some physical or spiritual weakness, or from fear of those against whom the emotion is directed. It springs up most readily, therefore, in those in subordinate or inferior positions, in those who are dependent, who are ruled, who serve. A virus malignant and most contagious, it may, however, spread widely and infect many others.²⁷ But we must add that every man, dependent on God, is tempted to kick against the goad of His authority and is thus open to the bitterness of *ressentiment*.

If, says Scheler, the resentful man is unable to lift his oppres-

²⁵ "Prophetischer oder marxistischer Sozialismus?" *Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre*, III/2, pp. 17-18, 23-24.

²⁶ 1912, revised 1915.

²⁷ "Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen," *Vom Umsturz der Werte*, Vol. I, pp. 51-52, 55-56.

sive feeling of inferiority by action, he seeks another outlet for his painful tension in falsehood. He drags down the values that depress him in others, or else blinds himself to them; furthermore—and this, Scheler points out, is the main work of *ressentiment*—he either falsifies values as such or pretends they are illusory, for if their validity or existence be denied, there can remain no high qualities to depress him. Or he may come to say that the good is that which he wants, the offspring of desire. The depreciation of values to the level of one's desires or abilities is by no means the normal fulfillment of the sense of values; it is, on the contrary, the chief cause of moral blindness, deception, and illusion. The possibility of resignation—that a man, having lost the power to obtain a good, can yet acknowledge its worth, proves the sense of value independent of ability or desire.²⁸

"There is no refuge from another's excellence save love," Scheler quotes Goethe,²⁹ and takes care to state that it would be utter folly to think that in a given situation an individual is forced to succumb to *ressentiment*, a phenomenon which cannot be understood without understanding the process of repression. For, as Scheler might have said, the further the soul departs from the realm of the spirit, which is the realm of freedom, the more subject it is to laws approaching the purely biological. Strongly felt weakness, depression engendered by impotence, anxiety, and intimidation: these are the repressive forces which make the hostile emotions shun the clear light of day. Having first inhibited their expression, fear and frailty push the emotions from the conscious plane into darkness, so that the individual or group stirred by them is no longer aware of their secret work. The inhibition finally spreads so far that the impulse of hate, envy or revenge is crushed the moment it wishes to arrive at our inner perception. On the other hand, the store of buried emotions draws each fresh emotion, incorporat-

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 70-74.

²⁹ *Wahlverwandschaften*, II, 5.

ing it into its mass, so that each repression eases the way for the next and speeds the whole process.³⁰

In this process of repression, the image of the original object of hostility is, as it were, blotted out. I may hate someone, and know the reason very well: the act that harmed, or the feature that pains me. In the measure that I repress my hate—which is, of course, something totally different from overcoming it by moral energy, in which case my hate and its object are both fully present to my mind and any hostile emotion is checked by virtue of a clear ethical judgment—it detaches itself more and more from its specific ground, and in the end from the person hated. It aims first at any of his qualities and actions, perhaps at his way of walking or laughing, or his taste in music, at anything which expresses his personality, and further, at people, even at things and situations, associated with him. Finally, the impulse may break away altogether from the person who hurt or oppressed me, and become a negative attitude towards certain qualities, no matter who bears them, or where or when, and whether he treats me well or ill. Thus I may come to hate a whole group or class or nation. I may even come to hate or torment myself.³¹

Having thus examined the phenomenon of *ressentiment*, Scheler asks what it can contribute to the understanding of value-judgments, whether those of individuals or of periods, and towards the understanding of entire moral systems. It is evident in itself, he says, that from it there can never spring genuine judgments, but only false and deceived, for true morality rests on an eternal hierarchy of values. There is an *ordre du coeur* (Pascal) which moral genius uncovers in the course of time piece by piece; its grasp and gain are historic, but never the order of moral values itself. Far from being the source of value, *ressentiment* is that of revolt, of the overthrow of the eternal order in man's mind. Nietzsche himself, the skeptic and

³⁰ "Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen," *Vom Umsturz der Werte*, Vol. I, pp. 88-89.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 89-92.

relativist in ethics, implied as much, Scheler asserts, when he spoke of falsification of the tables of value through *ressentiment*, for falsified tables presuppose true ones.³²

With this we return to Nietzsche, who declared *ressentiment* to be at the root of Christianity, which he denounced as the "revolt of the slaves in morals." The Jews, he said, sought revenge on their enemies by overthrowing the "aristocratic" morality, the prerogatives of the "fair" and noble, the strong and aggressive, and exalting in their place the poor and lowly as the good, the mournful and suffering as the blessed. With a contempt that was the cover of his own anxiety, he wrote: "This Jesus of Nazareth, the incarnate gospel of love, this 'Redeemer' bringing salvation and victory to the poor, the sick, the sinful," was Israel's most sublime revenge—it repudiated him before all the world and nailed him to the cross, "so that all the world, that is, all the enemies of Israel, could nibble without suspicion at this very bait."³³ Scheler repelled Nietzsche's assault on the Gospel; at the same time he saw that in pointing to *ressentiment* as the root of a moral system, Nietzsche had made a veritable discovery. His error was in thinking that it was Christian ethics, whereas it was bourgeois morality, which had grown from it.³⁴

Scheler proves him wrong by contrasting Christian love, which Nietzsche called "the triumphant crown of the tree of Jewish revenge and hate,"³⁵ with the love of the Greeks, who were to him superior beings, overflowing with gratitude towards life.³⁶ For all ancient thinkers and poets, love was a movement of the lower to the higher; in it the imperfect tended to the

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 93-94.

³³ Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Genealogy of Morals*, I, 7, 8, 10.

³⁴ "Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen," *Vom Umsturz der Werte*, Vol. I, pp. 106-107. Cf. Yves de Montcheuil, S. J., "Le Ressentiment dans la Vie Morale et Religieuse d'après Max Scheler," *Mélanges Théologiques* (Paris: Aubier, 1946), pp. 187-225; J. M. Oesterreicher, "Ressentiment, Christianity and the Modern Mind," to be published in the Centennial Volume of Manhattanville College of the Sacred Heart, New York.

³⁵ Nietzsche, *op. cit.*, I, 8.

³⁶ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, III, 49.

perfect, the unformed to the formed; in it appearance moved to essence, unknowing to knowing, poverty to possession. Between each pair it was the mean;³⁷ it was only a *methodos*, a way. Even to Plato it remained always on the sensible plane, a form of desire, of want or need, alien to perfect Being. For Aristotle, there was in all things an urge towards the Godhead, the *Nous*, the Thinker blissful in himself, who moves the world, not as one who wills and communicates himself, but rather draws and lures it, as the beloved moves the lover.³⁸

Christ, however, says Scheler, gives love a course entirely new. Rather, should we say, He gives love as desire its full meaning and true goal, but over and above this, He adds to love a new direction. In and after Him, love reveals itself in the bending of the noble to the ignoble, the hale to the sick, the rich to the poor, the fair to the foul, the good and holy to the evil, the Messiah to publicans and sinners. Now it moves boldly, a challenge to Greek thought, and bends without the antique fear thereby to lose nobility, but on the contrary, certain of gaining, in this very losing, the highest: likeness to God. No longer is God seen only as the goal of all things' desire, a goal eternally still like a star—He is One who cares; not merely the Prime Mover, but the Creator who made the world out of an infinity of goodness; but not merely the idea of the good nor perfect order—He is Person. What antique man could not have conceived save as a contradiction in terms, an impudence and sin, is now the joyful message: God is a loving God; and more unthinkable still: He came down to man as a Servant and died on the Cross as if He had not served well.³⁹

From that hour, Scheler declares, to say that one should cherish the good man and despise the bad, love the friend and hate the foe, is hollow and meaningless; all are worthy, for God's love makes them so. Love is of all good things the best, not for what it may achieve but in itself; its achievements are

³⁷ *Symposium*, 202-204.

³⁸ *Physics* VIII; *Metaphysics* XII. Scheler, "Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen," *Vom Umsturz der Werte*, Vol. I, pp. 107-110.

³⁹ Scheler, *ibid.*, pp. 110-111.

merely symbols and proofs of its presence. This also is truly novel—it is not part of the sense-world. Acts of the senses use themselves up in reaching their desired, not so love; love waxes in loving, its deepest reward is in itself and not in what it wins.⁴⁰ Its gifts are rich: it helps us discover great things, it makes us see with the eyes of God, it gives strength and fervor—its gifts are many; there is no term to them. Still, love's greatness is not in them but in itself. Scheler's vision is confirmed by these words of St. Bernard: "Love is sufficient of itself. Of itself it pleases and for its own sake. It is itself its own merit and its own reward. It seeks no motive, no fruit beyond itself. It is its own fruit, its own enjoyment. I love because I love. I love in order that I may love."⁴¹

Such is the tremendous change from the Greek concept to the Christian reality of love, and it was not *ressentiment*, not the revenge of the weak on the strong, that caused it; far from it, it is the mark of a superhuman strength. Scheler distinguishes true condescension and its counterfeit. In the first, the strong bends down to the weak because inner wealth urges him; in the second the hollow man flees his inner dearth. The sources of true condescension, he says, are stability, a strong sense of protection, an unconquerable abundance of life, and hence the consciousness of being able to spend of one's own. He sees it as a spontaneous overflowing of strength, accompanied by joy and peace, for he thinks readiness to love and sacrifice natural to man, and all egotism, even the urge towards self-preservation, signs of obstructed and weakened life, life being essentially growth and unfolding and self-preservation a mere epiphenomenon.⁴² Here as elsewhere, Scheler is like Lot's wife. Led out of Sodom, she could not tear her thoughts away; about to be freed, she could not free her heart. Though Scheler's main thesis is the complete demolition of Nietzsche, still he remained captivated by him. His Christian here bears the features of a

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 111-113.

⁴¹ St. Bernard, *Serm. in Cant.* LXXXIII, 4 (PL 183:1183).

⁴² "Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen," *Vom Umsturz der Werte*, Vol. I, pp. 113-116.

god, but the Christian's bending down is more than a spontaneous overflowing of strength; it may spring from a heart once crushed under a burden of sin or sorrow, for its source is not in itself but in heaven. The Christian is driven by grace; he dwells, in the words of Scheler, in the castle of ultimate being, which Christ called the Kingdom of God,⁴³ and to abide there he must die each day; he must be crucified in order to rise, a mystery and the quintessence of the life of perfection, which Scheler often tends to forget. What exalts the infused virtue of supernatural love over natural love is that its acts may be summoned by the will and yet be unforced, that it is given to all who seek it, can be had for the asking.

If the Christian comes to the aid of the poor, the ailing or the ugly, it is not, Scheler emphasizes, as Nietzsche might have thought, from a desire to plunge into the phenomena of poverty, illness or ugliness, but rather for the sake of what is sane and sound in the afflicted. That St. Francis kissed the festering sores or hospitably suffered vermin to remain on his body might, if viewed from without, appear a perversion. It was nothing of the kind, no lack of natural sensitivity nor pleasure in the loathsome. His was a conquest of loathing by the strength of a fuller life, the entire opposite of the resentful attitude of modern "realism" in art and literature, with its ostentatious preference for the small or its obsessive digging in the sordid. These artists, says Scheler, see in all that lives something bug-like, while St. Francis saw, even in a bug, the sacredness of life.⁴⁴

Love as Jesus meant it, Scheler continues, and sees in it a mark of true condescension, helps and helps energetically; still it does not consist in helpfulness—good will and good deeds are but its fruits, and never can profit be its measure, only the heart of the one who loves. The world might profit greatly and yet there be little or no love, and profit little where love is great. The widow's mite was more in the sight of God, not because her gift was small, nor because the giver was a widow

⁴³ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 118.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 118-119.

and poor, but because her deed betrayed more love. Love is not one among many forces promoting the welfare of society; rather is its excellence the wealth it showers on the person who loves. It is not a means but an end, no philanthropical institute—what truly matters is not the amount of welfare in the world, but that there be the maximum of love among men. The rich young man was bidden to give his goods to the poor, not that the poor might gain, nor that society might fare better through a more equitable distribution of property. He was bidden, not because poverty as such is better than riches, but because the act of relinquishment, with the inner freedom and fullness of love it bespeaks, would enoble him and make him infinitely richer than before.⁴⁵

The primacy of love pervades also the bond between man and God, once a contractual, now a filial. The love of God, says Scheler, ought not rest only on His works, on our gratitude for what He gives us hour by hour; all these should but guide our gaze back to their Author. He ought not be loved for His heaven and His earth, they should be loved for Him; because they are the works of a Lover should they be cherished. Antiquity thought the love in the universe limited, and therefore demanded that it be spent sparingly, on each according to his desert. But when one knows, as does the Christian, that love has its source in God the Infinite, in never ending Bounty, then it must be lavished on every man, just and sinner, kinsman and stranger. Summing up his test of Christian condescension, Scheler exclaims: "There is in it nothing of *ressentiment*, only a blessed courtesy and the power to condescend, flowing from a superabundance of strength and grandeur."⁴⁶

The counterfeit, however, springs from want, and Scheler rightly calls it a euphemism for flight from self. In true love, a man turns away from himself in response to a positive value he has seen, but here the turning away is his original intention. Love of neighbor becomes a guise for self-hatred. Lest he see his own wretchedness and have to face all that is within him,

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 120-122.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 122-124.

he devotes himself to something not himself, to another just because he is another.⁴⁷

If one attends to Scheler's remarks, not to the consonance of words but to their meaning and atmosphere, one breathes at once a different air, one enters an entirely different world, on going from Christian love to modern humanitarianism. The modern love of man is a concept born of protest and suckled on polemic. It protests against the love of God, and with it, against the Christian oneness and harmony of love of God, self, and neighbor; it wishes to love, not the divine in man, not man's full stature in and through Christ, but man only insofar as he is a member of the species. The mankind it dotes on is no spiritual whole, embracing also the dead, and ordered according to an aristocracy of personal values; this mankind is merely a biological phenomenon, something earthly, visible and limited, living for the moment. Hence the modern love of man is without piety for the dead, without reverence for the men of the past, aggressive against tradition, and the place of the individual, who alone represents the personal depth of humanity, is now taken by man as a collective. Characteristically enough, the Christian word is not love for "mankind"; its cardinal concept is love of neighbor.⁴⁸

With the object of love, its essence too has changed. The modern love, Scheler states, is not an act of the spirit, a movement of the soul, as independent of the *physis* as thought, but a feeling caused by the senses' perceiving in others exterior signs of pain or joy, and transmitted by "psychic contagion." Prostrate before the idol of a mankind happier merely in the world of the senses, man's entire experience has changed, and thus philosophical theory has reduced the phenomenon of love more and more to a mechanics of necessary deceptions. Love is wrongly held the outcome of sympathy, and sympathy in turn is traced back to an artificial putting oneself into the state of another; to a reproduction of one's own earlier reactions to circumstances now experienced by others; to a being tugged into

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 150-152.

the feeling of another, a kind of hallucination, as if one suffered within what one saw without; or finally, to the mere psychic accompaniment of impulses having their origin in man's primitive history. These impulses are said to have become fixed because of their usefulness to the species, so that in the end sympathy becomes the consequence of a herd-instinct, existing even in the animal world. The theory of love has thus sunk gradually from its height; what was once sign and symbol of a supernatural order, even the stream of power flowing through the Kingdom of God, has been turned into a refined and intricate development of animal impulse, originating in the sexual sphere.

The changes of object and essence are by no means all; also the esteem accorded modern "love" has changed. Its value is not the salvation it works in the souls of the lover and the beloved but the furtherance of the "general welfare." However, none of its social implications and effects constitute love's worth, and in the best world, not general welfare but love abounds; the greatness of love, says Scheler, is not that it may be useful but that it is blessed.⁴⁹ The modern notion of general welfare is something entirely different from the Christian idea of the common good. Perhaps nowhere is the difference more striking than in their evaluation of a life dedicated wholly to the loving praise of God. Whereas the advocates of general welfare consider the cloistered life selfish and unproductive, a complete waste, St. Thomas says that it belongs to the *bonum commune* that there are men who give themselves to the life of contemplation.^{49a}

That *ressentiment* is the hidden core of humanitarianism is betrayed by the fact that in spite of its protestations, mankind is not at all the immediate object of its affection; it is only played against something else, which is detested. This modern love is above all repressed rejection of God, a guise at times even of hatred—a situation masterfully portrayed by Dosto-

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 153-157.

^{49a} Cf. IV Sent., xxvi, 1, 2; *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 88, a. 8, ad 4.

jevski in *The Brothers Karamazov*. What is most revealing, it often insinuates itself with the plea: There is not enough love in the world to squander on a being other than man; or with the exclamation: When every man is fed and clothed, then will be the time to care for someone else. Its first sentiment is always unwillingness to bear One who sees all things, rebellion against God as the source and unity of all values with their dominion over man, bitterness against the Sovereign Lord; the "loving" condescension to man it parades is secondary. It condescends to him only as a being in whose many sufferings it hopes to find arguments against God's good and wise Government. Even for the unbeliever, all higher values are, through the power of tradition alone, anchored in the idea of God; hence his "love" inevitably turns to what is lowest in man, to what he has in common with the animals.⁵⁰

The name "altruism" given to the modern substitute for love is another proof of its resentful center, Scheler proceeds, for Christian love is devotion, not to the other as other, but to the person in its spiritual essence, be it the person of the lover or that of another, which makes it sinful for the Christian to surrender his soul's salvation for another; "Love God, and thy neighbor as thyself,"⁵¹ is his precept. To this, modern man takes exception; Auguste Comte, the champion of altruism, accused Christianity of supporting "egoistic impulses" by its commandment to have heed for one's own salvation, and wished to substitute for it a new Positivist command to love others more than oneself.⁵² But it is hard to understand how the "other" merits devotion, just because he is another, for if I am not worthy of love, how should the other be, as if he were not an "I" to himself and I an "other" to him.⁵³

Whereas the idea of Christian love is a formative principle

⁵⁰ "Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen," *Vom Umsturz der Werte*, Vol. I, pp. 162-163.

⁵¹ Cf. *Luke* x, 27.

⁵² Auguste Comte, *Catéchisme*, Conversation 10.

⁵³ "Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen," *Vom Umsturz der Werte*, Vol. I, pp. 162-163.

which, little though it claim the advancement of life as its purpose, is nonetheless an expression of "ascending" life, modern love, says Scheler, the soft indiscriminating sympathy for the "other" solely because he is an "other" is, on the contrary, a leveling principle, disintegrating to human life, for all that it expressly claims the advancement of life as its purpose. In degrading itself to a mere means for general welfare, in insisting that it has only a technical value, humanitarianism falsifies to an unprecedented degree the tables of values; it subordinates the excellence and bliss of love to each and any sensuous pleasure, and that divorced from the person who enjoys it. Hence the great men, even the holiest figures in history, those who love the most, in whom is visible the kingdom of God, are no longer the exalted models by whom mankind orients itself ever anew, who give it meaning and dignity, but servants to increase the pleasure of its masses. This, says Scheler, is quite literally the slave-revolt in morals: the lower values have overthrown the higher, those that ought to serve have usurped the places of their masters.⁵⁴

Having stripped humanitarianism of its pretensions, Scheler cites some of its consequences, certain characteristic shiftings of value. His criticism is impulsive, lacking clear distinctions and moderation, but this is, in brief, what is good in it. There is, he says, first the rule, so decisive for the bourgeois ethos, that moral value belongs only to qualities which the individual man acquires and to actions he performs through his own strength and labor. Consequently it recognizes no innate aptitudes to be of moral worth, nor special gifts of grace such as vocations or infused virtues, which place one man on a higher level than another; it knows no original sin, no inherited guilt nor good in any sense.⁵⁵ Ailing from the neglect, even contempt, of the gratuitous and unearned, our time has torn from its heart any understanding for the things that are given. Two phenomena so disparate as the Marxist theory that labor alone produces value and the doctrine of modern Christian sects which divests Baptism of its sacramental character, so that rebirth is no

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 168-169.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 183-185.

longer something that happens to man but something he achieves, corroborate Scheler's observation. They bespeak the same worship of effort, the same *ressentiment* against the bestowed, the communicated, and with it, against rank and hierarchy.

If intolerance rather than unenvying, ungrudging acceptance of the more highly gifted becomes the prevailing attitude, if the gaze at objective values is deflected to the subjective effort with which they are acquired, then moral value, Scheler points out, will be accorded only to what everyone can do, and it will be the lowest common demoninator that is the standard. As a further consequence, the solidarity of man in guilt and merit will be denied, and with it that "all sinned in Adam" and that all who have been "buried with Christ" are "risen with him,"⁵⁶ that the merits of the friends of God are shared in the communion of saints, and that the Poor Souls are helped by the suffrages and works of the living. This denial results from the attitude which, in a common phrase, says: I don't want charity, or: I don't accept gifts. This exclusive esteem for the man-made and the self-acquired leads, according to Scheler, to another principle of modern morality: egalitarianism. Behind the demand for "equality" there often hides *ressentiment* which can not regard superior values cheerfully and would decapitate those who bear them.⁵⁷ Long before Scheler, Kierkegaard, in his *The Present Age*, pointed at envy as its leveling principle.⁵⁸ Indeed, egalitarianism would more and more eliminate the many differences which give the human world color and zest, which make up its riches and beauty, though they mean struggle and sorrow as well—till it creates the robot-man. Men are not "equal" before God and His grace, for God does not love all with an equal affection, but each with an infinite love.

There is another important transposition, that of the useful and the pleasant. Everything that can truly be called "useful"

⁵⁶ *Col.*, ii, 12.

⁵⁷ "Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen," *Vom Umsturz der Werte*, Vol. I, pp. 185-189, 192-193.

⁵⁸ Søren Kierkegaard, *The Present Age*, tr. A. Dru (Oxford: University Press, 1940), pp. 15, 26-47 *passim*.

is so, Scheler says, as a means to something pleasant, or, we should add, something higher than the pleasant. The meaning of every civilization, insofar as it produces what is practical, is at least the enjoyment of what is agreeable. The final worth of useful things depends, in short, on the capacity for enjoyment on the part of their users; if the work needed to produce them lessens this capacity, it is not worth the trouble. One can and ought subordinate enjoyment to higher, above all, to religious values, but to subordinate it to the useful is an absurdity; it is to subordinate the end to the means. Yet it has become a rule of modern morality that useful work is better than the enjoyment of the pleasant. Again it is *ressentiment*, against a keener sense for enjoyment, against a richer life, which drives modern man so to exalt the functional. A vastly complicated mechanism is set up for the production of the pleasant, requiring for its maintenance never-ending toil, but disregarding its final enjoyment.⁵⁹ It may be objected that there has been no other age in which pleasure and enjoyment were so much to the fore, but reflection on the use to which some modern inventions have been put proves Scheler right. The automobile, which was to open the world to man, makes his roads impassable. Radio, which was to bring recreation into every home, pours out a din that deafens the ear and deadens the mind. The printing press, which was to enlighten the many, has blocked their view of the world, their pursuit of truth, and is now a tool that delivers them into the hands of the dictator. Such, says Scheler, is the tendency in modern civilization: to heap up pleasure on pleasure for the benefit, eventually, of no one.⁶⁰ But, to speak in the words of Pius XII in his Christmas message of 1941: "It would be a wrong interpretation of what we have said against materialism to deduce a condemnation of technical progress. No, we do not condemn that which is a gift from God. From the first days of the creation He has hidden in the bowels of the earth treasures which the hand of man must draw forth, both for his needs and for his progress."

⁵⁹ "Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen," *Vom Umsturz der Werte*, Vol. I, pp. 205-207.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 207.

These are some of the shiftings of value, but modern morality has not and could not have stopped with these. The common ground of all modern theories is that values in general and moral values in particular are subjective, and that apart from man's consciousness they have neither meaning nor existence. This denial of objective values has led either to the justification of complete anarchy in moral judgment, in which nothing is certain, nothing lasting, or to the acceptance of one or the other surrogate for stable values, of, for instance, a so-called "mind of the species," which is credited with general validity and allegedly asserts itself to the individual with a commanding "thou shalt."⁶¹

The impulse behind this attitude is again *ressentiment*. A man oppressed and tormented because he does not measure up to the objective order of values will, if he gives in to *ressentiment*, "devalue" the idea of value itself. He says, as it were, to those justified by the objective order of values: Your values matter no more than mine, which are my own creation; yours are no better; down with them—all values are subjective! The man who speaks thus began with the intention, natural to every man, of directing his will to the good, which he deemed, for he was as yet uncorrupted by the wish to deceive himself, objective and eternal, independent of human wit and whim. However, the less successful he is in his pursuit of the good, the more he tends, if he gives way to envy, to divest good of its property, to degrade it to the mere mirror of a momentary desire. Driven by the knowledge of his sinfulness and nothingness, in vengeance against the idea of the good before which he can not stand, he dynamites the beautifully ordered universe of values, and says that they are merely relative to man, race, people, etc. But soon he feels the need of finding norms. For the man of *ressentiment* is a weakling, unable to stand alone with his conviction, the complete contrast to the one who pursues an objective good, although he may be alone in seeing it and against a world of resistance.⁶²

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 194-195.

⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 195-196.

Hence "currency" takes the place of objectivity for the man of *ressentiment* in any age and particularly in our own, when almost everyone breathes in the *ressentiment* of generations. The resentful man does not inquire into what is good, but seeks his support in the question: What do you think? What do people think? What is public opinion, what the general tendency, what the wave of the future? In what direction is evolution moving, so that I may align myself with the current? It is strange indeed: what no single person is able to see is suddenly seen by all; by heaping zero insights on one another, there is achieved a positive insight; what could never be good of itself becomes good because yesterday it was the accepted thing or because it is the wave leading to tomorrow. What the herd thinks, or the class, or the age, takes the place of objective good; what, at any given moment, is generally held, must substitute for truth.⁶³

III

The shifting of values is the work of man, but not the values themselves and their order. There is, says Scheler, in his *Ordo Amoris* a world as spacious, mighty, rich, and harmonious as that of suns and stars, the world of values, which is the most fundamental sphere of reality, and which would continue if man ceased to be, as would: two times two is four. It is fully independent of man, but it is given to him; his heart is a replica, an ordered likeness of the cosmos of goods worthy of love. Our age has come to look on the heart as mute and subjective, without meaning or direction, a chaos of blind sentiments, but this is a consequence of generations who elected to be slovenly in matters of feeling, who lacked seriousness about what is profound. "*Le coeur a ses raisons*," Scheler quotes Pascal; the heart has sure and evident insights not known to reason; it owns a logic in its own right, and laws are inscribed in it—the *Nomos Agraphos*, the unwritten law of the ancients—which derive from the plan by which God built the world.⁶⁴

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 197.

⁶⁴ "*Ordo Amoris*," *Schriften aus dem Nachlass* (Berlin: Der Neue Geist Verlag,

It is not man's preference but God's All-Love that creates what is worthy of love in things; the task assigned to man is to acknowledge their objective challenge, to surrender to the hierarchy of values, through which God's sovereignty speaks. Our inclinations and disinclinations may be in harmony or discord with this hierarchy, one with or divorced from the love with which He loved the universe before He created it and maintains it every instant. It is our perfection to love things, as far as this is possible to man, in the order God loves them, and to know that in our act of love, divine and human love coincide. When, therefore, a man overthrows this order of values, be it in thought or deed, he overthrows, at least intentionally, the divine order, and in overturning it, the world as an object of his knowledge, as a field of will and work, tumbles after.⁶⁵

The scale of worth exists in itself, but it speaks to man and he is ordered to it; who has the *ordo amoris* of a man has the man. It bespeaks him as the crystalline formula tells the secret of the crystal. It makes him transparent, so that his soul can be read, as far as a soul can be; so that its simple lines can be seen through all exterior manifoldness and intricacy. The *ordo amoris* of a man is the hidden source which feeds the rivers of his soul, the great determinant of his life, of his moral milieu, his fate, the sum total of all that can happen to him and to him alone.⁶⁶

That there is an objective hierarchy of values, not to be

1933), Vol. I, p. 244. A mainly negative criticism of Scheler's ethical thought is found in Michael Wittmann, *Max Scheler als Ethiker* (Duesseldorf: L. Schwann, 1923); P. H. Lennerz, S. J., *Scheler's Konformitaetssystem und die Lehre der katholischen Kirche* (Muenster in Westfalen: Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1924); and A. Rohner, "Thomas von Aquin oder Max Scheler," in *Divus Thomas* (1923, 1924, 1925). A markedly positive evaluation is given by Père A.-D. Sertillanges, *Le Christianisme et les Philosophies* (Paris: Aubier [1939]). An attempt to see much of Scheler's thought in the light of Protestantism is made by Harald Eklund in his *Evangelisches und katholisches in Max Scheler's Ethik* (Uppsala: A.-B. Lundequistska Bokhandeln, 1932). The idea of value is clarified and its significance brought into focus by the works of Dietrich von Hildebrand, among others, *Die Idee der sittlichen Handlung* (Halle: Niemeyer, 1916), and *Sittlichkeit und ethische Werterkenntnis* (Halle: Niemeyer, 1921).

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 228, 239.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 228-229.

altered, is an old Christian heritage. Christ said to those who fretted over their material needs: "Is not life itself a greater gift than food, the body than the clothing?"⁶⁷ He warned the Twelve: "Fear not those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul. Rather fear him who has the power to destroy body and soul in hell";⁶⁸ and when the demands of salvation clashed with the strictures of authority, the Apostles replied: "We must obey God rather than men."⁶⁹ Scheler, in his book on *Formalism in Ethics*, in the main a critique of Kant's moral philosophy, attempts to determine the scale of values. The great difference between what is agreeable and what is significant in itself is not brought out. Also some of his other distinctions are not sufficiently precise and elsewhere in his writings vary. His main thought, however, is this.

Lowest in the hierarchy are the large groups of values relating to the senses, to man's comfort, to all that is useful and agreeable, such as wealth, of the individual or of the nation. Trade and industry, the economic and technical worlds with all they produce, have their place here. The next step is biological values, like health, vitality, physical courage, and further, all that serves the welfare of the person or of society. When life is in danger, a man of sound heart will relinquish all exterior possessions to save it, because at that moment, with non-essentials stripped away, his heart clearly senses life to be above any material good. Higher than the realm of life is that of mind, the values proper to man's intelligence, those that specifically constitute culture: politics, pure science, fine art, philosophy; the order of justice and law, the region of the beautiful, the sphere of the true. A scientist who risks his life for the sake of a truth, an artist who prefers hunger to deserting his art, a Socrates—all these exemplify their import. And as material goods serve life, and life is subordinate to mind, so the intellectual ranks below the moral. Plato had no doubt that all ideas submit to the idea of the good, and Kant that the categorical imperative calls for the abandonment of all inferior

⁶⁷ *Matt.*, vi, 25.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, x, 28.

⁶⁹ *Acts*, v, 29.

values; indeed, every man uncorrupted by the betrayal of the good feels and knows that it is of all these values the highest. But towering above it and above all is the domain of religious values, the holy, for in the realm of values, which mounts like a pyramid, God the holy is the summit. Of all things deserving love, He is at once the goal and the source, the beginning and the end, and our hearts are restless till they rest in Him.⁷⁰

The world of values is infinite, but people today often dwell in a narrow realm. This narrowness, however, Scheler stresses, rises not from any subjectivity of values, but in part from a merely instinctive outlook and in part from a certain attitude characteristic of our civilization. The "natural" man is tempted to recognize only values which meet his physical urges. Failing to live the life of a person, he blinds himself; he despoils and impoverishes the world. "Slave to his belly," his vision is confined to those goods which serve, and only insofar as they serve, his vital needs. He is inclined to overlook the beauty of an apple, its harmony and architecture, even more its reflection of a higher beauty; its fragrance and color are nothing more to him than indications of use and pleasure. But not only the dominion of instinct, also the spell of modern civilization renders the world small. Many a man, shadowed by the spirit of competition, values only the rare, that which is held by few or which requires toil for its production. He esteems goods that can be possessed, particularly when they can be possessed in greater quantity by one than by another. Haunted by a need for comparison, he gives less attention to what he has than to what his neighbor has and he has not.⁷¹

If a man but lifts his head above the fog of our times, Scheler exclaims, he will see that values are real, independent of himself. To acknowledge that they are abiding, founded on truth, he must give his attention to the intrinsic worth of things; he must ask not what they mean to *him* but what they *mean*, not what they *yield* but what they *are*. He must not look for hap-

⁷⁰ *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*, pp. 103-109; "Ordo Amoris," *Schriften aus dem Nachlass*, Vol. I, p. 242.

⁷¹ *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*, pp. 275-276.

piness, for it is a free gift, something "thrown in," to be had without asking, and the only way to seek it is not to seek it. He must force envy out of his life; he must esteem most highly those goods which are the least to be possessed, and of those which *can* be owned, those like earth, air and water, which are so abundant that to one's own joy in them is added the joy that others can rejoice in them. As this shared joy opens the soul to the realm of values, so much more thanksgiving. The religious man gives thanks for light and sound, for movement and breath; where others find only indifference, he sees values or their contraries; everything becomes peopled with them, replete with meaning. The universe of values, says Scheler, is unlocked in its entirety to none but those who live St. Paul's antithesis: "Beggars enriching many, paupers possessing all things."⁷²

IV

Scheler was not a thinker who could be coldly indifferent to the modern mutilation of man, and he could not be taken in by the fantastic theories which make of man a machine grinding thoughts and emotions out of the raw materials fed to it, a mixture of chemical compounds that would one day be produced in the laboratory, or at the most an educated animal, for behind them all he saw *ressentiment*. Only eyes shut to reality as a whole could see nothing but nature and still regard man as its crown, observes Scheler in his *Formalism in Ethics* (1913-16). Man is the most dependent of all living forms, and therefore the most vulnerable, the most menaced. Viewed biologically, he is rather an "animal afflicted," and his intelligence, compared with instinct, a poor device for biological progress. He requires elaborate and variegated apparatus merely to keep himself alive. What the animal achieves with its simple equipment, man must do with his complicated nervous system and thereby violate all the rules of economy. Beside an animal, he is like an Alpinist beside a mountain lad, who cuts himself a

⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 259-260, 276-278. Cf. 2 Cor. vi, 10.

wand and walks the mountain lightly and unburdened, while the Alpinist loads himself with spikes and cleats, hooks and ladders, axes, ropes and goggles. But for all this the lad is still the better, and so also would the beast be superior were not man's greater differentiation given him that he might realize values higher than the struggle for existence.⁷³

Biologically, man is inferior, and to see in him the highest beast, the apex of evolution thus far, would be hardly more than infatuated self-worship. Man is superior, but those who admire him as the animal-made-wise presuppose, whether they will or no, other and higher than biological values. He is superior because he sees and embodies values not rooted on earth: the intellectual and the holy; he transcends himself, his life and all life. The newness that bursts out in him is, biologically measured, a superabundance of the spirit. Through him as through a rift, there appears the personal order, whose values excel life and whose bond is justice and love; through him there shines the idea of God and His Kingdom, and save in this light, he cannot be understood. Man is, says Scheler, the movement, the tendency, the transition to the Divine, the corporeal being directed towards God;⁷⁴ and to this he adds, in his essay *On the Idea of Man*, he is the one who prays or the *prayer* of life, through whom the universe reaches towards its Creator; he is the one who seeks God, nay, the one whom God seeks.⁷⁵

St. Thomas Aquinas said: "Man, in a certain sense, contains all things,"⁷⁶ and called man: "a kind of horizon and container of corporal and incorporeal things."⁷⁷ In him are, in a way, all things; he is a limit between two worlds, as it were a horizon in which earth and heaven meet. In its union with the body, his soul is measured by the flux of time; in itself, as a spirit, it is measured by eternity.⁷⁸ In its relation to the body, as its form,

⁷³ *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*, pp. 294-296.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 298-299.

⁷⁵ "Zur Idee des Menschen," *Vom Umsturz der Werte*, Vol. I, pp. 295-296.

⁷⁶ *Sum. Theol.* I, 96, 2c.

⁷⁷ *II Contra Gent.*, 2, 68.

⁷⁸ *De Pot.*, III, 10 ad 8.

it can be defined, but in its relation to God, it is indefinable.⁷⁹ Thus far Scheler parallels St. Thomas, but intoxicated by his vision of the mystery of man, he makes his indefinable character his be-all and end-all. Seeing man *move* towards God, he almost forgets that he *is*. The cut for him is not between man and animal but between the God-seeker and the philistine, between the re-born and the Old Adam. A difference not of kind but of degree separates *homo faber* from the beast; the essential cleavage, he maintains, is between *homo faber* and the child of God.⁸⁰ In this Scheler contradicts his own thought: were the tool-making man and the beast something of the same sort, either the man would have as little chance as the beast, or the beast as much as the man, of moving closer to God. It is true, there is a tremendous chasm between a life confined to the lowest values and one which brings to full fruition the highest. But the quality which marks man out is precisely this: that he can change and be converted, that he is the creature who repents.

A similar discrepancy is found in his early thought on the person.⁸¹ Wishing to stress that the person is not a thing, he defines it, in his *Formalism in Ethics*, as "the concrete unity of all its possible acts," and goes on to say that it "exists only in the accomplishment of its acts."⁸² Later in the same book, however, he says that the essence of the person is the foundation of all its various acts,⁸³ and in its preface he states as its most important thesis that "the ultimate meaning of the universe is to be gauged by the pure existence—not the achievements—of persons, by their unfolding, their highest possible goodness, their beauty and harmony, and towards them all the forces of the cosmos converge."⁸⁴

⁷⁹ *De Anima*, 7 ad 16.

⁸⁰ "Zur Idee des Menschen," *Vom Umsturz der Werte*, Vol. I, p. 302.

⁸¹ Cf. Eckhard J. Koehle, O.S.B., *Personality: A Study according to the Philosophies of Value and Spirit of Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann* (Newton, N. J.: Catholic Protectory Press, 1941).

⁸² *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*, p. 24.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 398.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. xii-xiii.

Man is an "epiphany of God in the stream of life," Scheler exclaims, and adds that calling the idea of God an anthropomorphism is one of the most foolish notions of the modern mind. He finds it amusing that this charge should be leveled by just those who recognize nothing higher than man, for whom meaningful and meaningless, true and false, good and bad, are but accretions laid on in the course of natural evolution, adaptations of man's brain to his milieu. To speak of anthropomorphism is of point only if man is *not* the measure of all things; the very thought can be conceived only by one who has the idea of God at the back of his mind. Nothing could be further from the truth; it is not God who is an anthropomorphism, but man who is a "theomorphism," His image and likeness.⁸⁵

V

A philosophy awake to this dignity of man, to the kingly state and privilege of the person, cannot ignore, says Scheler in *Models and Leaders*, the prime role of the person in the genesis and growth of all human groups. Not Kant's law of reason nor Hegel's person-less Idea, not Marx's economic tools and trends nor the dark power of blood, determine history; no anonymous forces, but great men. Following the "law of the smaller number" (v. Wiesen), the influence not of the many but of the few is weightiest in human affairs; it is always a minority of men, those who lead and those who inspire, who most strongly shape man's personal and social life. But while leaders merely move our wills to act, models raise our souls and mold our inner dispositions even before we come to will. To leaders we submit, but models we love, and in loving, become akin to them.⁸⁶

History is commonly seen as a series of external events, but its soul is rather the ideals of its several ages, and at the center of this soul are the models, the men who embody these ideals, who draw and possess us. To them, personal exemplars, says

⁸⁵ "Zur Idee des Menschen," *Vom Umsturz der Werte*, Vol. I, pp. 296-299.

⁸⁶ "Vorbilder und Fuehrer," *Schriften aus dem Nachlass*, Vol. I, pp. 158-163.

Scheler, must be traced, ultimately, all ideals, norms and laws which men obey and disobey. Corresponding to his five ranks of values, which in this essay he gives, somewhat differently as the agreeable, the useful, the noble, the intellectual and the holy, he lists five kinds of models: the "artist of living," the "civilizer," the "hero," the "genius" and the "saint." There are, of course, men who can claim at once more than a single rank; there is the genius-saint, the civilizer-hero, and others. Moreover, all these types assume different hues and tints in different times and places. The ideal of the man to whom living is an art varies from the English "gentleman" to the French *honnête homme*, from the Japanese *samurai* to the Italian *corregiano*. For the peasant, the townsman and the knight, for the doctor, the engineer and the soldier, the hero wears a different garb. Even the genius and the saint are not fully the same in the East and in the West.⁸⁷

The lower in rank, the more dependent is the model on the social structure; the higher, the freer of outer circumstance. It is highly improbable that one destitute should be a connoisseur of fine things; a slave will scarcely be a hero and rarely a genius—but a saint may be slave or king. There is yet another law which shows the freedom of the *homo religiosus*: all the other models, from genius down, are directly or indirectly dependent on him. For religion is prior to science, art, philosophy; it is at work before a culture is thought of, and still at work when a culture is forgotten. It precedes its birth and outlasts its dying.⁸⁸

Unlike the genius and the hero, the original saint, or what is commonly called the founder of a religion, is, within his train, never one among others; he is, says Scheler, always the *one*. Great minds do not necessarily dislodge one another, playing a part that is not exclusive but supplementary. Homer, Sophocles, Dante, Cervantes, Shakespeare, Goethe—they may all be cherished at once. Within any group, however, an original saint can only dispossess another; he can never admit him as

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 163-169.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 174.

equal. He must say: "He who is not with me is against me,"⁸⁹ for the claim of religion, by its very essence, permits no rival. When the saint's message is his, not by illumination nor by revelation, but by His oneness with God, then His claim is no longer singular merely within certain historic limits, but universal and absolute, true for all the future as for the present and the past. Hence Christianity, says Scheler, is *not* the most perfect, but the absolute, religion.⁹⁰

The uniqueness of the original saint is also manifest in his immediate presence to his posterity. The hero influences future generations through his deeds, which have to be recounted; the genius bears upon them through his individuality, embodied in his work; but the saint himself lives among his descendants. He lives in those who follow after him and reproduce his person ever anew; he is also present through authority and tradition, an authority and tradition determined through this immediate personal link. To tie the "vision" of him to the knowledge of a book means to degrade the founder of a religion to the rank of genius, for the scriptures that speak of him are rather sign and fruit of his indwelling in his followers. He himself leaves behind no writings to make himself known to the world, nothing like the painting of the artist or the score of the composer, no work divorced from its master, making his influence subject to the chances to which all matter is exposed. What he leaves behind is himself; what he carves is not wood or stone but man. The human person is the matrix in which he creates, and he is therefore present in and through persons.⁹¹

The arm of the original saint reaches as far as love. The realm of the hero is a nation or people, that of the genius the earth, but the realm of the saint extends throughout and above the world, as far as the brotherhood of those who love him, and beyond that to God, the origin of all things. Followed after in the freedom of love, the saint is superior to fame. He is not

⁸⁹ *Matt.* xii, 30.

⁹⁰ "Vorbilder und Fuehrer," *Schriften aus dem Nachlass*, Vol. I, p. 176.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 173-183.

admired the way a genius is nor worshipped like a hero, but in his heart all have sanctuary, seeking their and the world's salvation. It is evidence of his presence, Scheler observes, that not to remember him, not to bear him in mind, is impossible. He can be "forgotten," but this "forgetting" is unwillingness, more or less beneath the conscious mind, to acknowledge the presence that is felt; it is an instinctive turning away from its challenge. One can repress the thought of him, but not to think of him at all can not be done, so mighty is his presence.⁹²

Scheler's analysis of the models of man is a purely philosophical attempt, but it is interesting to note that in discussing the religious model, he can speak only in Christian terms. He speaks of the "saint," of "indwelling," "following," and "communion of love," all names of phenomena genuinely Christian; whatever may seem to correspond to them in the non-Christian sphere is a shadow, a faint analogy. Thus he shows that religions can not, as a modern folly would have it, be compared on an equal footing; they can not be appraised without a yardstick. In applying Christian language to all religious models, Scheler proved his assertion that once the voice of Christ is heard, it is remembered.

VI

Man's choice is not between belief and unbelief, but between faith and idolatry. Scheler holds this to be an exactly demonstrable thesis of the philosophy and psychology of religion, and equally the intimate experience of every man. On examining his heart, everyone knows himself to be so closely bound up with some good that in effect he says to it: With thee I shall stand and fall; without thee I can not live, I will not live, I ought not live. The religious act, Scheler says, is a dowry of the soul so essential that the only question which can be raised is whether it finds its adequate object, or crowns a finite and contingent good with the nimbus of the holy, the absolute and divine. Reason and heart so naturally tend to God that if man does not believe in Him, he makes a god of that in which he does believe.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 184.

Thus the agnostic deceives himself when he says there is nothing in which he believes—rather he believes in nothing; the religious act is not lacking from his soul, but the thought of nothingness has captured it. Hand-in-hand with his innermost quest for the One who Is goes an unnatural clinging to the surface of things, to their appearances.⁹³

Religious experience, says Scheler, in his *Problems of Religion*, is original and underived, and calling aseity, infinity, all-efficacy and holiness the formal attributes of the “divine,” those which constitute and demark the sphere of religious objects, he maintains that they are not won from any pre-religious experience by way of abstraction, idealization or analogy, that they are rather known by an immediate intuition. Whether its object be imaginary or real, a fetish, Apollo, or the true God, the religious act belongs to a sphere of reality and value independent of others. There is, no doubt, a rich and manifold religious development, but Scheler emphatically states, it is a development within the religious realm, not an evolution towards religion. It is therefore pointless to investigate the origin of the religious object in man’s soul, and there is as little sense in the search for the historic genesis of religion as in a search for the origin of reason or language. They are given with man; they are part of his nature.⁹⁴

The formal attributes of the “divine” are, according to Scheler, known immediately, but not so the positive attributes of God. Only in the measure that man lives in the spirit and not by the belly can he know that God is spirit, and further, that He is Creator, Omniscience, All-Goodness, Mercy; only in love enlightened by revelation can it be known that He is Person. No man can arrive at the knowledge of the Creator, All-Mighty and All-Good, unless he is guarded by humility and awe. Awe makes us see the secret of things and their depth, preserving horizon and perspective in the world of values; without it, the universe is flat. It is akin to the sense of shame;

⁹³ “Die christliche Liebesidee und die gegenwaertige Welt,” *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, pp. 197-198; “Probleme der Religion,” *ibid.*, pp. 559, 563-564.

⁹⁴ “Problem der Religion,” *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, pp. 396-400.

it is modesty become spirit. Modesty is at once hiding and unfolding, the manifestation of beauty by its very veiling. And so in awe we are suddenly aware that our nature is tremendously inadequate for the knowledge of the highest and yet is called to it; the infinite appears in the midst of our finitude and poverty. The proud man, bound to himself, lives in a darkened, desert world and walks towards hell, which is want of love; the humble, however, has an open soul—humility, a way of love, breaks the walls around the ego and readies the soul to give itself and serve.⁹⁵

What sets off the religious act from all others is: first, it transcends the world, all the world, including oneself; second, it is accompanied by an insight that it cannot, by its very essence, find its fulfillment in the world or in any finite object. In the religious act we think a being different from finite being; we tend towards a good whose place no temporal good, however lovable, can fill; we seek a bliss which, we know clearly, no progress of mankind nor any increase of inner or outer good fortune can give; we experience a fear not related to some concrete danger but to the frailty of contingent being, to its dependence on a power above it; we hope for something which no eye has seen nor can see, a hope, then, not grounded on calculation nor on vital confidence; and in religious thanksgiving we render thanks for a gift of which the favor we have received is but a symbol, and to a Giver beyond our imagination. In all these, in love, fear and hope, thanksgiving and praise, marvel and worship, prayer and adoration, the spirit transcends not only this or that finite good but the very essence of the finite, and seeks an object which, though most positive, can be expressed only in such "negative" terms as incomparable, incomprehensible, indescribable, ineffable.⁹⁶

The third distinction of the religious act is its demand for an answer, a response on the part of the object to which it tends, which shows that religion in the strict sense exists only where

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 401, 415, 681-682, 421-422; "Zur Rehabilitierung der Tugend," *Vom Umsturz der Werte*, Vol. I, pp. 17-32, 32-42 *passim*.

⁹⁶ "Probleme der Religion," *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, pp. 529-535.

the object is personal. It *receives* the truth it intends and the salvation it seeks. The religious act and, in its broadest meaning, revelation, are correlated. Neither God nor even the idea of God can be constructed, for the intellectual power of construction is the greater the more relative an object is to our consciousness; it is null in regard to the Absolute Being, who is dependent on nothing and on whom all else depends. All knowledge of God is necessarily knowledge from God; the object of the religious act is at the same time its cause. This is man's experience in his religious life, and it is the impossibility of accounting in any other way for his religious disposition that is, for Scheler, the surest warrant of God's existence. All rational proofs are to him merely verifications of God already found.⁹⁷

Scheler's philosophy of religion says at times too much and at others too little. It is true that for men as they are, born with the light of reason darkened, the will weakened, and for modern men in particular, bred in an atmosphere of resistance to God and objective truth, the rational proofs of God's existence may often lack force; and that for reborn men they are only another evidence of God already found, possessed and loved. But this in no way detracts from their full validity. The soul is drawn to God, desires the infinite, has an inkling of the absolute; this seed needs the sun and dew of grace but will not spring up and grow unless it is cultivated by the labor of reason, the work of the will—indeed, the whole man is engaged in the assent of faith. Scheler, however, wishing to emphasize the uniqueness of the religious act, claims for it an autonomy which almost isolates it. Furthermore, were he to say that only love can fathom the meaning of "God is Person," he would be right, but *that* God is Person can be known without revelation. On the other hand, the soul may long for God's mercy, but that He who is Mercy seeks the sinner, must be told by Him. To let St. Thomas speak: By nature the soul is *gratiae capax*, able to receive grace, but only by grace is the soul *capax Dei*, able to receive God.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 535-537, 545-547.

⁹⁸ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 113, a. 10; cf. St. Augustine, *De Trin.* XIV, 8:11 (PL 42:1044).

What led Scheler to assign to the metaphysical proofs of God's existence no other role than that of verification were certain faults in his theory of knowledge. He rightly opposes the common notion that love obscures the mind, that genuine knowledge is to be gained by rigid abstinence from all emotions and by indifference to the values of its objects. He quotes Leonardo da Vinci's "Each great love is daughter of a great knowledge," and Goethe's "One comes to know only what one loves." Both, he says, assert the intimate tie of knowledge and love; though for one knowledge is the parent of love and for the other love of knowledge, both defy the specifically bourgeois belief that love blinds, rather than opens the eyes. For Scheler it is love that presents values to us, makes them "flash up" in our minds; love "feels" (*erfühlt*) them, and reason's only part is to verify what love has found. He further holds that "an emotional contact with God in the love of God, a feeling of His presence as the *Summum Bonum*, a stirring of the 'sense of the Divine,' must, as their source material, precede all proofs of His existence."⁹⁹ Scheler is entirely right in that the soul must seek and hearken in order to know truly; it must be animated by interest and concern. But his error is in taking this longing and reverence for full and true love, in giving the disposition the title and power of the fruit. The best expression of the interplay of knowledge and love is perhaps St. Augustine's: "One does not love what one does not in some way know, but when one loves what one in some way knows, love works that one knows it better and more perfectly."¹⁰⁰

The experience that comes with spiritual life, loving contact with God, the feeling of His presence, are, no doubt, often inner evidence of His existence and nearness. They lead to a deep knowledge of God, but they are definitely not the source material for all the knowledge we have of him, as Scheler would

⁹⁹ "Liebe und Erkenntnis," *Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre*, Vol. I, p. 110; *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, pp. 176-177; "Vom Wesen der Philosophie und der moralischen Bedingung des philosophischen Erkennens," *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, p. 93.

¹⁰⁰ St. Augustine, *In Joann.*, 96, 4 (PL 35: 1876).

have it. What in Scheler is confused is ordered in St. Thomas; he often shows an aversion to St. Thomas' theory of knowledge, but he never knew and understood it entirely. At once humble and rich, St. Thomas' thought gives the senses and reason their full due, but at the same time acclaims a knowledge far surpassing all that reason can attain, a wisdom fruit of love. The wealth of his thought is shown by some of the terms he used to designate the various ways in which knowledge is acquired. There is discursive knowledge, knowledge gathered by the use of reason, by rational inquiry, by study and teaching, or by argumentation; and contrasted with these are affective knowledge and experimental awareness, knowledge gained by inclination, by way of the will, by connaturality, or through love. And among the ways in which the soul is led to the knowledge of God, there are knowledge arising from the innermost self or attained in the manner in which we understand first principles, that is, intuitively, or through the contemplation of the soul made God-like by grace, through her affinity with the Divine, by divine instinct or sympathy with divine things, and the knowledge given through the soul's union with God, and, as it were, through touch and through taste.¹⁰¹ In the place of Scheler's over-simplification, there is in St. Thomas a real abundance of life, natural and supernatural.

Père Paul Ortega, S. J., called Scheler's presentation "the most remarkable contribution to the religious problem by the phenomenological school,"¹⁰² and all its flaws do not invalidate

¹⁰¹ Victor White, O. P., "Thomism and 'Affective Knowledge,'" *Blackfriars*, XXIV, 274 (January, 1943), pp. 8-16. Cf. *Blackfriars*, XXIV, 277 (April, 1943), pp. 126-131; XXV, 294 (September, 1944), pp. 321-328. Cf. also Marin-Sola, O. P., *L'Evolution homogène du Dogme catholique* (2nd ed.; Fribourg, 1924), p. 363.

¹⁰² Paul Ortega, S. J., *Intuition et Religion; Le Problème existentialiste* (Louvain: Editions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1947), p. 11. For a thorough analysis of Scheler's religious contribution, see Erich Przywara, S. J., *Religions-Begründung: Max Scheler—J. H. Newman*. For valuations from their own points of view, see Hafkesbrink, "The Meaning of Objectivism and Realism in Max Scheler's Philosophy of Religion: A Contribution to the Understanding of Max Scheler's Catholic Period," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, II, 3 (March, 1942), pp. 292-308; and Josef Wohlgemuth, "Grundgedanken der Religions-Philosophie Max Schelers in juedischer Beleuchtung," *Festschrift fuer Jacob Rosenheim* (Frankfurt am Main: J. Kauffmann Verlag, 1931), pp. 19-76.

this judgment. Amid the mediocrity of contemporary writers on religion, his thought stands out as a testimony to the singularity and absoluteness of religion. Against those who would make of it a means for the adornment of life, for the thrill and enthusiasm of the soul, he affirms that God is the absolute end.¹⁰³ And against those who would make it an adjunct or supplement to culture, a mere aesthetic or moral factor, an educational force or an agent of synthesis working towards the betterment of human relations, he affirms its "independence"; its claim does not derive from the service it renders. The very thought of a Kingdom of Heaven tells that it is the ultimate expectation of the soul and that nothing can rival this Kingdom and its King; compared with them, all human culture, actual and possible, is peripheral and vain.¹⁰⁴ To think "God," the Eternal Being and Supreme Good, existing above all contingent things, is to see that there is no measure to take of Him; He is the Judge, He can not be judged. If a man says "God," if he utters His Name and does not stifle mind and heart, he enters another world; he is, like Moses, on holy ground.

VII

The immortality of the soul, without which the Christian's hope in everlasting life would be vain, is not a problem we need wait for death to solve—now, if ever, we are immortal. Day by day, instant by instant, the answer is offered us. Constantly I feel, I see, I grasp, that I am a being who is master of his body, lord and king in a desert of dead things. I feel, I see, I grasp, behind the few fragments striking my senses, the scraps falling to eye and hand, in each of my brethren a person, center of a whole world, a something extending into depths my love and understanding can never exhaust. How then, asks Scheler, should I, should my brother, not survive death?¹⁰⁵

Philosophical inquiry confirms this common experience that

¹⁰³ "Probleme der Religion," *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, pp. 521-522.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 648-654.

¹⁰⁵ "Lehre von den Drei Tatsachen," *Schriften aus dem Nachlass*, Vol. I, p. 407.

the person, in all his acts, goes beyond the confines imposed by his body, the bonds of space and time and the limited content presented by his senses. Even seeing and hearing surpass the work of eyes and ears, and surely remembrance and expectation, memory and hope, transcend the hour in which the body dwells. My friend and I can feel with one another the same sorrow, the same joy, a thing impossible in merely physical pain and pleasure, which are tied to the body or even to a part of it; in feelings of the spirit, the person leaves the body, as it were, to meet another. If it is proper to the spirit, here and now, to swing out beyond the boundaries of the body, will it not be so in the act of dying? Since the spirit is independent of the body in the body's lifetime, so it will be in the body's decay.¹⁰⁶ With Bergson, to whose argument Scheler's is akin, he asserts that it is the doubter who staggers under the burden of proof.¹⁰⁷

Scheler was not content to assert man's immortality; in his essay on *Death and Survival* he searched out the reasons for the modern waning of faith. The general contention is that cerebral anatomy and physiology have shown the life of the soul so dependent on the nervous system that the conclusion is forced on us: with the death of the tissues, the life of the spirit must end. Modern psychology has done away with the unity and simplicity of the ego, and thus immortality has become past saving. But the facts, or to be exact, the observations of scientists, compel no conclusion, he says. The view which regards the soul as compounded of sensations and needs, and not, like immediate experience, as one and simple, is by no means the fruit of experiment; it is rather a bias which itself conducts the tests. And all discoveries about the brain are well accounted for if the soul is understood as an independent substance, related to the body as the pianist to the piano.¹⁰⁸

The reason for man's failing faith are not scientific, for science says Scheler, is powerless to harm religion; it is a modern superstition to see it at the root of every spiritual change. Far from

¹⁰⁶ "Tod und Fortleben," *ibid.*, pp. 40-43.

¹⁰⁷ "Lehre von den Drei Tatsachen," *ibid.*, p. 404.

¹⁰⁸ "Tod und Fortleben," *ibid.*, pp. 5, 6, 39.

Higher Criticism, for example, shattering the credibility of the Bible as the word of God, it was lack of awe—that is to say, want of depth, a mediocrity which pulls all things to itself—which made Higher Criticism possible. When a religious belief dies, it is not science that caused its death; all it can do is dig its grave. The ultimate reason for modern man's changed attitude towards immortality is not the progress of science but his changed attitude towards death. Because he no longer lives in the sight of death, and because by his way of life he pushes back the inner certainty that he must die, he does not prize immortality.¹⁰⁹

Scheler claims that, quite apart from external events which teach that all living comes to an end, man has an intuitive certainty of death (which, he says, must not be confused with its anticipation in illness, nor with longing or dread). In every moment, we feel something hastening away, something drawing near; past crowds on future, and life already lived grows at the expense of life yet to be lived. This is the phenomenon of aging, not to be found in the inanimate world. Death, he says, is not an accident, not like a wall we run into in darkness; it is part and parcel of life, an act of the living creature itself, whatever may occasion it.¹¹⁰ Indeed, it is—it ought to be—the supreme act of life, for all time embodied in the words: "Father, into Thy hands I commend My Spirit."¹¹¹

Whether we be more impressed by the ephemeral character of life, or by its richness and breadth, this certainty is present, vary though it may from one period of history to another, ignored though it often is in a kind of metaphysical lightness, in a carefree unshouldering of its burden. Altogether different from this more or less normal shelving of the thought that death is sure and grave, is its utter absence in modern man, whom Scheler never tires of describing: His labor is not an answer to his needs; it is an urge, giving him no rest. Where he rules, might follows wealth, not wealth might. He begets children not through desire, let alone love; procreation is rather linked

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 4, 5, 8.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 12, 15, 17, 19.

¹¹¹ *Luke*, xxiii, 46.

with the economic structure. He sees life as a "borderline case," a complication of dead matter, and calls "real" what is calculable. Wares are exchanged for money, no longer money for wares. The world is an object of lasting dread, no longer a chance to be seized boldly and joyfully, no longer contemplated and loved, but merely dealt with.¹¹²

Modern man's unlimited urge to work and profit, says Scheler, is his narcotic against remembering death. He no longer fears it because he has "feared" it away. He has repressed the idea of death in favor of an endless going-on, and found a surrogate for eternal life in progress, progress without meaning or end, progress for its own sake. He can not help but reckon with death, and insures himself against it in a thousand ways, but he can no longer visualize it. Death is no more a youth with lowered torch, no more the grim reaper with hour-glass and scythe, no more the skeleton dancing the living to the grave, nor the bright angel knocking at the door. Modern man has no symbol for death, for he does not experience it, because he never dies *himself*; it is always the *other*, and when his time comes to die, he will die as another in the eyes of others. As an embroiderer lays upon her pattern silk of many colors, so the full man builds his multitude of instants into the entirety of his life, present to his mind; he lives with death before him, that death which forms and judges, outlines and orders his life. But modern man lives for the day, till suddenly, no new day arrives.¹¹³ His repression has robbed him, not of his immortality, but of his faith in it.

VIII

It is sin, not death, that threatens the spiritual life of the person. It is frightening indeed, says Scheler, in his essay *Rue and Rebirth*, that we can re-win life once lost only on a road of pain, the road of contrition, but the glory is that there is a road to life at all. Modern theories on contrition see in it something

¹¹² "Tod und Fortleben," *Schriften aus dem Nachlass*, Vol. I, pp. 21-25.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 25-27.

negative, superfluous, even wasteful. Some say it is a fixation on the completed and unalterable past; others a trickery of the mind which deceives us into thinking that what we could now omit, or so we imagine, we could have omitted in the past. There is the theory that contrition is depression following on indulgence, nothing but a "hangover." (So many modern theories, Scheler remarks, seem to be "nothing-buts.") For Nietzsche it was the inward turning of aggressive impulses whose free flowing society had dammed. It is thought of as a self-inflicted punishment for having acted against one's own interests, or a conditioned reflex: having previously experienced punishment, one expects it always, but if one lacks knowledge of the when, the where, the what, the who, of the punishment, fear becomes vague remorse.¹¹⁴

For most of these explanations, contrition is at the least without meaning or purpose, if not an actual hindrance to life and action. Scheler retorts that the very opposite is true, that even if religion is left aside and contrition seen purely in the moral sphere, it is a means of restoration, the only way in which the soul can regain its lost integrity; in it, the soul is healed. Viewed religiously it is still more: it is a gift God has bestowed on the soul that after straying it might return to Him.¹¹⁵

The chief reason for misconstruing the nature of contrition may be, says Scheler, a false notion of the structure of the life of the spirit. Were our personal existence like a stream, rushing along in the same objective time as the events of nature, it would be quite correct to say that no part of it could turn back and affect the past, that what is done can not be undone. The time of nature is one-dimensioned, one-directioned, and knows no present, past or future; but the human person has, marvelously, present to him at each moment of his life the whole of it, by perception, recollection or expectation. Therefore the meaning and value of his entire life (though not, of course, its events) are, at every instant, within the sphere of his power,

¹¹⁴ "Reue und Wiedergeburt," *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, pp. 52, 6-11.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

and until his death, the past keeps asking him what he will do with it.¹¹⁶

Because something that occurs in objective time becomes our past, it is *ours*, subject to us as persons, and the extent and manner of its effect on our lives is left to us. Every historic event, be it of an individual, a nation or mankind, is therefore incomplete and in a way redeemable. Recollection is the beginning of liberation from the dark night of the recalled, so that history known frees us from the power of history lived. But what recollection faintly foreshadows, contrition fulfills: far from being a futile beating against the immutable, to repent something in the past is to imprint on it a new meaning, to change the unchangeable. Whoever doubts his freedom need but repent and he will experience that it frees him from the onward rush and sweep of guilt, that it breaks the iron link of cause and effect by which an old guilt causes a new. He will find that it makes possible a fresh start, the virginal beginning of a new sequence of events, that it works rejuvenation.¹¹⁷

The readiness for contrition lights up the past, letting us see and remember what would otherwise remain forgotten. Suspending the power of repression, contrition breaks the pride which allows only what satisfies or justifies it to cross the threshold of memory, and so becomes a vehicle of truthfulness. Unrepentant, we are imprisoned in the here and now, but contrite, we look beyond the self. If there were nothing else in all the world from which we could draw the idea of God, contrition alone would suffice, for it is an accusation, but before whom do we accuse ourselves? It is a confession, but to whom do we confess? It is an acknowledgment of guilt, but of guilt before whom? It arraigns us before a law which it senses to be holy, and absolves us from the punishment that law demands, but who is the lawgiver, and who else but he can withhold its penalty? It leads to the awareness that our guilt has been wiped out, but who has taken it away, who has forgiven it? It gives new strength of resolve and, it may be, a new heart out of the

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 13-15.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 15-18.

ashes of the old, but where is the well of this strength, and on what model is this new heart built? Each movement of this great moral process, if not diverted by some glib interpretation, limns before the spirit, says Scheler, the mysterious contours of an Infinite Judge, an Infinite Mercy, and an Infinite Power, and Fountain of Life.¹¹⁸

But all this, he stresses, is the finding of his philosophical inquiry and not a specifically Christian thought, much less a doctrine resting on revelation; it is Christian only in the sense that the soul can be said to be a Christian by nature. He adds, however, that when these findings are compared with Christian doctrine, it is clear that contrition is given its deepest meaning and import only in Christianity, and within it, in the Catholic Church. This new significance he sees in two things: first, that linked to and empowered by the redeeming Passion of Christ, contrition leads man into a communion with God holier than the one he would have enjoyed had he not fallen and been raised, so that the Church can sing: "O truly needful sin of Adam, which was blotted out by the death of Christ! O happy fault, which merited such and so great a Redeemer!"¹¹⁹ And second, Scheler sees its greater significance in the new relationship of contrition and love. It is God's love, ever knocking at the soul, which makes it aware of the ideal life it ought to live and the wretched life it does; and again, after it has repented, it knows that the strength for it came from God, so that what first appeared to be man's love is then seen to be an answer to His.¹²⁰

Contrition is not confined to the faults of the individual soul but has a historic task as well. It was, Scheler says, by its never-drying tears of contrition that young Christianity renewed dying antiquity, hardened in its greed for pleasure, power, and fame, and no other remedy can help our dying age. Too long have we been made fools by the fantasy of continual

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21, 51-52.

¹¹⁹ *Exsultet*, Holy Saturday.

¹²⁰ "Reue und Wiedergeburt," *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, pp. 52-58.

progress, which hides from us the more beautiful law, including all true progress, that in order to live we must die. Too long has modern man allowed the guilt of centuries to grow, till he can not muster the courage to atone, even to feel or face it, until with the aid of a vast scientific apparatus, he ascribes everything to the objective power of "conditions." Would he but tear down the mask of "conditions," guilt would appear and the road to rebirth become free.¹²¹

IX

"As rue bears within it the infant goodness, so," says Scheler, "does disappointment a ray of insight."¹²² We must admit that our civilization has not brought about what it promised, that with the growth of comfort man's happiness would grow, and we must allow our disappointment to unveil idols and false values; we must resolutely return to the very first end of all civilization: freedom from the many things for the one thing necessary. Referring to the ancient Jewish legend that before God created the world, He made, that it might not perish, the turning of the heart, a voice crying: "Return, ye sons of men,"¹²³ Scheler sees in conversion our only hope.¹²⁴

Modern civilization is far from a fount of happiness. To be sure, it has created and constantly creates a wealth of comforts and satisfactions, but they delight the skin rather than the soul, the fringes more than the center of our life. Our sensitive organization, by the aid of things and gadgets, frustrates man's design to reach happiness for it is far lazier when it comes to pleasure than to pain. The range of intensity it allows discomfort is greater than that it accords enjoyment; our sensation of pain mounts more swiftly as the irritant increases than

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 44-49.

¹²² "Vom Sinn des Leides," *Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre*, Vol. I, p. 108.

¹²³ Louis Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1938), Vol. I, p. 3; Vol. V, Note 1, p. 3.

¹²⁴ "Vom Sinn des Leides," *Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre*, Vol. I, p. 60.

does our sensation of pleasure with a growing stimulus. We accustom ourselves more readily to comforts than to miseries. Furthermore, pain is the more stable, not normally turning into pleasure; on the other hand, there ceases to be pleasure where there is pleasure in excess, for it may become tedium and it may even become pain.¹²⁵

The organizations and devices man has contrived for the advance of happiness have so entangled his soul that their goal has often fallen into oblivion. The world of tools he has established was to minimize the elements of chance and surprise, of drudgery and danger, but he has succeeded in weeding out one set of evils only to sow a new crop. The technical world to which he has subjected himself has no regard for the person, but has a logic of its own, overriding man's direction and desires; it has pushed itself between him and his fellow, nature, God, and is in a way more demanding and unpredictable than the world before, so that at bottom he suffers more from the remedy than from the ill. Civilization is worth its woe only if it ends in greater love.¹²⁶

The relation of suffering and civilization is a frequent theme with Scheler, and most specifically in his essay *On the Meaning of Suffering*, in which he first points out the place of pain in the organic world. He has no doubt that pain has an objective meaning. It is commonly said that pleasure and pain are intended as inducement and warning, inviting the organism to certain activities and cautioning it from others. However sound this is, says Scheler, it can not give a full grasp of suffering, a grasp which can be had only in the light of sacrifice. The true sacrifice is personal; in it a person abandons what is truly a good for himself to attain a good more nearly perfect, more significant and sublime. But there is a suggestion and shadow of personal sacrifice wherever a good of higher rank is born of the death or diminution of a lower ranking good or of the sufferance of a lower ranking evil. *Rank* is in question, not *quantity*. Whoever admits no hierarchy of values, whoever knows

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 65, 66, 70.

only degrees of what is welcome and what adverse, can have no vision of sacrifice but merely a "calculus of pleasure and pain." When we prefer a greater pleasure to a smaller, one long-lasting in the future to a brief one now, when we choose a lesser evil rather than a greater, or put a greater pleasure before a smaller pain, we are just counting costs—*sacrifice* allows no such arithmetic. True, it is always for the sake of something, yet it seeks not amount but height, not more but the better; it is the abandonment of a good of lower dignity for one of higher.¹²⁷

The sacrificial pattern is woven into the texture of the universe. We see its trace in the circle of the seasons, of night and day; "unless the grain of wheat falls into the ground and dies, it remains alone, but if it die, it brings forth much fruit."¹²⁸ To Scheler, pain is the subjective reflection of the sacrificial motif, a motif which governs the tie of the part to the whole. An organic whole is before its parts; it lives and works in them. The parts, however, not only live *in* but *for* the whole, as the organs for the body, the members for the group. If the group is a herd of deer or a flock of swallows, then the individual exists that there may be the kind, the species; the human person, however, is *not* absorbed into the life of the group. His personal, that is, his spiritual, existence excels the worth of all human communities, natural or man-made. It is only *qua* member that he serves the group; it is only as citizen, and not as person, that he is subordinate to the state.¹²⁹

In a merely mechanical world, a world of additive constitution, no pain, no suffering would be possible; the parts, without link to the whole, knowing no solidarity, would live for themselves. But in our world, the individual dies for the preservation of the species and the organ ails that the body may be well. Death and pain—a "little death," its image and reminder—are wedded to life, the more so as the whole grows higher and the parts, with their functions, more diverse, as hierarchy sup-

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45, 48-52.

¹²⁸ *John*, xii, 24-25.

¹²⁹ "Vom Sinn des Leides," *Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre*, Vol. I, p. 52.

plants uniformity. The pangs of birth, of growth, of death, are inescapably bound to fellowship and ultimately to love. Throughout the universe, the lower is given for the higher; the part suffers and dies for the whole, that it may be saved, maintained, prospered or enhanced. The suffering of the part, all suffering, is vicarious and anticipates, as it were, the need of the whole, the common weal. All love is sacrificial.¹⁸⁰

One can not, Scheler says, have one without the other: no fellowship, no growth, without pain and death; no sweetness of love without sacrifice—an insight which, learned with the heart, may, more than the thought of pain's purposefulness alone, reconcile us to its existence. In sacrifice life seeks a higher state, greeting the new and taking leave of the old. In it weeping and laughter, pain and joy, are wedded. This is fully evident in the most perfect form: the free sacrifice of the loving person, who experiences at once the bliss of love and the anguish of relinquishment; there, loss and gain are one. Only where our peripheral existence, our sensitive nature and nothing more, is affected, do pain and pleasure greatly diverge, but the more they touch the center of the soul, the deeper do suffering and joy penetrate one another. And this spiritual experience, in which the freedom of the person comes to full fruition, casts its light on the involuntary suffering in nature, so that the pains of all the realms beneath the spirit are pervaded with its splendor.¹⁸¹

Scheler follows his discussion on the meaning of suffering by examining man's various attempts to meet it. The first way is the indifference of Buddha, for whom suffering is anchored in being itself, its cause desire. When things seem to say to us: *We are*; we are as we are, and without your leave; we exist, whether you know us or not! it is, he teaches, a phantom, spawn of our craving. Desire alone invests with discreteness, with individuality, and it is desire that leads us on the road of restless wandering. The circle of our existence is shown by this equation: to desire = to be = to imprint with individuality = to

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 52, 55, 57.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 58-59.

suffer. Hence the first Noble Truth of Buddhism is that existence, even apart from the pleasure and pain it awakens, existence itself, with its rise and fall, with all its mutations, is suffering. "Redemption" is then not the fulfillment of man's deepest yearning but the expulsion of all desire; not the positive bliss of the spirit nor salvation of the person, but submersion in the quiet which annihilates all thirst, all action, all individuality, all suffering. Buddhism and the modern way of life are not so far apart as they appear, Scheler remarks. True, they differ in this: modern man burns to abolish suffering wherever it can be found, whatever its cause, by hygiene, engineering, organization, in brief, by action on the world, while Buddha would annul the misery of existence by an intense interior action that ends man's thirst. But however opposed their methods, both Buddha and modern man, whether he live by Smith or Marx, Freud or Wells, agree on one basic attitude: for them, there is no difference between noble and ignoble suffering; all and any suffering is bad and should be ended.¹³² But a word may have to be added to Scheler's thought. Buddhism prompts kindness and pity but ignores the dignity of suffering because it is blind to the splendor of being.

Spinoza and Goethe also teach a technique of isolation, a setting of suffering outside oneself. What in their opinion pains us are the emotions, to them but confused and hazy thoughts; we must therefore penetrate the world by reason, disentangling our emotions, as a telescope resolves a star-cloud into a mosaic. There is some truth in this second approach; often our distress will be lessened if we look it full in the face. Reason may help us discern a scale of evils, distinguish an annoying trifle from a true grief, see our sorrow in proportion to that of others. On the other hand, Scheler points out, not only is its theoretical basis false, for emotions are *not* thoughts in a tangle, but this way can not lead very far. To see one's sorrow as if it were external may even work harm, for suffering may then accumulate at the bottom of the soul, and from there diffuse throughout

¹³² *Ibid.*, pp. 72, 73, 77, 82.

and poison every hope. Scheler asks whether the growing pessimism of Indian thought is not the outcome of such age-long technique.¹³³

There is a third way—the flight from suffering. Its Greek prototype, Aristippus of Cyrene, says that he strives, not for riches, friends or lovers, but for the pleasure they give; that only a fool seeks things, a wise man seeks satisfaction. He would not ask if his beloved loved him in return, for when he eats fish, he does not ponder on how Aristippus tastes to the fish but only on how the fish tastes to Aristippus. Aristippus is the fool, counters Scheler, for he takes away, never noticing, the soil, from which springs the flower of happiness; free and loving devotion to the realm of values. He transforms the world's abundance, its content and meaning, with its gratuitous accompaniment of happiness, into a makeshift, a wretched stage on which to produce pleasures for his lonely body, unaware that true joy is given only when, not the joy, but its bearer is "intended." He fails to see that the happiness of love rests in turning from one's self and in the abandonment in one's beloved. Happiness, says Scheler, does not come about if it is made our conscious goal, and suffering comes the surer the more it is avoided. In fact, the more we avoid it, the more sensitive we become, the more we are afflicted when it strikes us, for happiness outspeeds its huntsman, while suffering is nearer its fugitive the faster he flees.¹³⁴

The classical attitude of ancient Greece is a fourth way, the stance of the fighter against the suffering sent by the gods and by fate, to which the gods themselves are subject. The antique hero does not flee suffering; he makes a quest for it and woos it amid adventure and peril, searches for it as for a knightly enemy, worthy to measure his strength. In combat and perseverance, he overpowers his foe and asserts his value to himself and to others; his motive is fame, to be known as a conqueror, and the benefits his heroic deeds may bring to others he regards as accidental. As he lives, he likes to die, with calm, composure and firmness, with a declamatory gesture, features of which not

¹³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 88-89.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

even the death of Socrates is free. His fight, Scheler says, must fail before the deeper sufferings which elude the grasp of the will. But out of pride which will not confess his limits, the hero maintains his brave display, pushes his grief to the hidden recesses of his soul, and thus for his renown as a conqueror of external evils, all too often pays the heavy price of a hardened heart. But in any case, he remains altogether dependent on the figure he cuts in the eyes of others, or at least, in his own.¹⁸⁵

Wherever this conquering attitude fails, there appears a fifth way, represented by Epictetus, the asceticism of the blunted heart, which deadens not only the sensibilities but the capacity for joy. The ideal of apathy aims at a shadow, for if ever completely realized, it would founder at once; the man who achieved it would lack that leadership and guidance which the interplay of feelings provides for the soul. Scheler cites a patient at Charcot's clinic who had lost the feelings of time and duration, of hunger and satiety, knowing neither appetite nor loathing, neither fatigue nor sympathy for her own children. She had to look at a clock to tell five minutes from two hours, to know mealtime and bedtime, and not sympathy, but the judgment that her children were her own, moved her to maternal care. She was like a specter dwelling among graves; her consciousness of existence had shrunk almost to a *cogito, ergo sum*, and with a shudder she viewed her being as that of another. This unfortunate woman, who needed all her powers of reason for the simplest task, for the merest continuation of her existence, gives an approximate notion of what the ideal Stoic would be like, could there be one.¹⁸⁶

Still another way known to the Stoics, the denial of suffering, assumes various forms in the course of history. One is a metaphysical optimism, which claims that the image of evil rises from our egocentric and narrow view; we stand too near the world and like one who, too close to a painting, sees no meaning but only daubs of color. A metaphysics in which evils are so blended into harmony that they appear unreal, Scheler criti-

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 92-93.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 93-94.

cizes as wicked because it stifles the initiative to combat them. His criticism, however, ignores that such metaphysical optimism but misreads the truth that evil ultimately serves the good. Others hold that suffering does not exist, save in and through the imagination, and that right and energetic thinking can, by suppressing this fantasy, eliminate pain. Modern Christian Science, as well as the later antiquity, wish by autosuggestion simply to throw out of the world all evils, pains and woes. It is perhaps fear of death and unrest of social conscience that begets this delusion in Christian Science; in ancient Greece it was deep despair. Its symbol, says Scheler, is Laocoon; in him antiquity, encircled by the cold horror of the universe, made its last and futile attempt to free itself from the coils of the serpents.¹⁸⁷

But then Christianity entered the world. The Old Testament, says Scheler, had spoken of suffering as divine retribution, as due punishment for guilt, of a man or of his fathers or of a whole generation heirs to sin. In the *Psalms*, however, and most movingly in the book of *Job*, and anew in *Ecclesiasticus*, the suffering just raise their voice against this dread indictment, which adds to the woe of any suffering, however guiltless, the woe over sin committed, sometime, somewhere. The thought may seem harsh, continues Scheler, to a man of our day, that the Lord chastens the very ones He loves, that He chastens them, not to punish but to cleanse, to lift them out of this world's fray to religious fidelity—to unhappy Job, it was the warm and gentle voice of redemption.¹⁸⁸ Yet it was not this thought from the books of *Wisdom*, which did not unfold its full power till Christian times, that gave Israel strength, says Scheler; it was rather the glow of Israel's Messianic hope, walking before it like a sheaf of fire, which ripened its endurance, so often tried, so often confirmed. Indeed, the Christian answer to suffering begins in the Old Testament, in the love of its saints, in the love with which Job stammered: "The Lord gave, and the Lord hath taken away. As it hath pleased the Lord, so is it done. Blessed be the Name of the Lord."¹⁸⁹ The Christian

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 95-96.

¹⁸⁸ *Heb.*, xii, 6; *Prov.*, iii, 12; *Wis.*, xii, 2; *Ecclus.*, xxx, 1.

¹⁸⁹ *Job*, i, 21.

message is at once the pole, the complete overturn, of the antique genius that would dry the sea of suffering by interpretations, medicines, techniques, narcotics, and the fulfillment of Israel's wonder at the ways of God.¹⁴⁰

The New Way wrought first a release of strain which must in itself have been a redemption: now man could be truthful, simply acknowledge, artlessly express his grief. The New Way banished the antique haughtiness, which boasted of suffering as the measure of a man, and it ousted the pride that concealed suffering from the sufferer and others beneath a facade of equanimity, beneath the rhetoric of the dying sage. The cry of the wounded creature, so long withheld, could once again sound freely through the world. On His Cross, Jesus speaks openly the deepest suffering: "Why hast Thou forsaken Me?"¹⁴¹ No longer was there any evasion: pain was pain and joy was joy; neither positive bliss, nor surcease of sorrow, was the highest good. No longer was the heart dulled, but quickened to compassion and girded for fortitude; its new well of strength was a higher order of things, unveiled to those who love, know, and do the truth. Purification became the new meaning of endurance, God's merciful love sending suffering, not necessarily as punishment but as a friend of the soul. Because it revealed this new source, Christianity could give suffering its true place in the order of the world and of redemption, without either evading its gravity or denying its evil, and still change it from a dreaded foe to a welcome counselor. The great paradox of the Old Testament, the suffering just, disappears before the infinitely greater paradox of the suffering Just One. Here a Man, guiltless, suffers for others' guilt—a Man who is at the same time God, and who calls upon all to follow Him on His Way of the Cross. Through the divinity of the Sufferer, suffering has gained a wondrous dignity.¹⁴²

¹⁴⁰ "Vom Sinn des Leides," *Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre*, Vol. I, pp. 96-97.

¹⁴¹ *Matt.*, xxvii, 46.

¹⁴² "Vom Sinn des Leides," *Schriften zur Sociologie und Weltanschauungslehre*, Vol. I, pp. 97-98.

The purification Christianity extols is, Scheler continues, something higher than mere moral improvement. It disperses the mist that darkens the inner eye to the light and leads the soul where it can be wedded with God. But it is not suffering as such which brings us nearer Him—this is Greek or neo-Platonic rather than Christian. Suffering is not an end but a means; the end is love, and suffering is its cup and its overflowing. The Christian doctrine of suffering demands more than patient bearing; it demands, rather, it reveals, a blessed endurance. Only a blessed and blissful man, a man buried in God, can endure suffering aright, can love and if need be seek it. What makes the martyrs undergo their torments with gladness is not merely a world to come, but the other world *in* them, not only the expectation of a future bliss, but a present bliss in possessing a gracious God. Such tranquillity in the midst of tribulation, such peace in the midst of woe, shows by contrast the shallowness of the hedonist. It is dissatisfaction at the center of his soul, want of bliss, that drives him to seek a substitute in some peripheral pleasure, and so blind is one who lives for his appetites that he does not see his own despair. Conversely, happiness at the soul's foundation makes light and even sweet the burden of outer pain. External affliction offers the soul an opportunity to retreat to its inner castles, where it can welcome a higher world; hence it comes to love suffering as merciful blows of the mallet with which the divine Sculptor carves the ideal self out of an existence lost in the maze of matter.¹⁴³

The hedonist seeks pleasure and finds tears. The disciple of Christ has found bliss and welcomes pain that he may come the nearer to the true good. To the antique man, the outer world was gay and bright, but its core was dark and sad; behind what is called sunny antiquity yawned Moira, eyeless Fate; behind its sparkling shell lay in wait the goddess Chance. To the Christian, the outer world is a dark night full of suffering; its heart, however, is rapture, untainted bliss, and this is the ring of his gladness in suffering: Having renounced the way of

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 98-102.

escape from suffering through his own reason and self-centered will, the way of struggle, of the heroic stand, and the way of Stoic spite, the Christian opens his soul through Christ to the power of God and commends himself to His mercy—joy comes to him, making him bear with gladness suffering as a symbol of the Cross, and while he greets the God-sent guest, the sureness of his joy mounts higher. Thus all power of endurance wells from a deeper happiness, and all suffering seats happiness deeper still. It is love in Christ—not reason nor resolve nor resentment—that leads the Christian to sacrifice, and the bliss of love is ever greater than the suffering to which it leads.¹⁴⁴

X

Christ brought the world, says Scheler, not a new knowledge of God, in the sense that Buddha or Plato did, or even Moses and the Prophets, in whom God spoke. He did not simply say that there is a loving and gracious God; that He is loving and gracious, this new knowledge of Him, is revealed by a loving deed, His Epiphany in Christ. Without losing sight of the differences between the thought of Scheler and St. Thomas on knowledge and love, one is nevertheless reminded of St. Thomas' *Verbum spirans Amorem*; the Son is the Word, not any sort of word, but One who breathes forth Love. Although one of the many gifts of His overflowing presence is the perfecting of the intellect, He is sent, not to bring this or that perfection to the intellect, but to illumine the spirit, so that it breaks forth into love.¹⁴⁵ Christ is Teacher and Law-Giver, the Model of man, says Scheler, because and only because He is the divine Redeemer, the Incarnation of God and of God's loving will. There is no idea, law or reason higher than He against which He can be measured and with which He has to conform in order to be called holy. He does not *possess* the truth, He *is* the Truth; His words and works are true and good because they are His. Christianity is therefore not belief in an idea, such as that Christ

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 102-103.

¹⁴⁵ Cf. *Summa Theol.* I, q. 43, a. 5 ad 2.

is the Son of God; that He is the Son of God is believed because He said so. It is primarily belief in the Person of Christ, who is the Way, the Truth and the Life, and in His lasting and living presence in the world and in history.¹⁴⁶

Confronted with the reproach that Christianity is bankrupt, Scheler says—he is writing at the end of the first World War—first, that Christian ideals, norms and measures no longer govern the soul of Western man, so that what betrays its failure in the anarchy of the times is the modern mind, hostile to Christianity. There has been at all times a wide gap between the world as it is and the Christian ideal, but not only does this not condemn the Christian message, it proves its truth, for Christianity has never lied; rather has it, from its beginning, pointed out the discrepancy between the Gospel and man's fallen nature. But it has at the same time demanded that men not grow weary and that the ideal be not conformed to the "reality," but the "reality" to the ideal. Christianity may appear old compared with other institutions, but it is new and young to those who have understood the lasting and unchanging character of religious values. Only one who has not grasped in faith the stature of Christ, the exalted Model of every heart, can indulge in talk of bankruptcy.¹⁴⁷

Christ lives, He lives forth in the Church. Influenced by Newman's *The Grammar of Assent*, Scheler argues: it is in the nature of things, that is, the infinite distance between finite and infinite that man by himself can never arrive at the knowledge of God's Fullness, can never conceive the personal and spiritual God as He is unless He, in His freedom, reveals Himself. Hence the all-good God can not—or rather, will not—leave man without revelation. But when He manifests Himself through the saint *par excellence*, the saint possesses absolute authority, and the truth he teaches is absolute, invulnerable and open to all

¹⁴⁶ "Liebe und Erkenntnis," *Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre*, Vol. I, pp. 131-133; "Vorbilder und Fuehrer," *Schriften aus dem Nachlass*, Vol. I, p. 177.

¹⁴⁷ "Die christliche Liebesidee und die gegenwaertige Welt," *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, pp. 129-135.

men, whatever their origin or blood, their education or temperament. This being so, he must also have made provision that the goods of faith be preserved, administered, and offered to all. He must have founded an institution, bearing his seal, exercising and perpetuating his authority, an institution able to formulate and dispense the knowledge he brought, so that it may be saved through the ages unharmed by the ever-changing currents of thought, by the intellectual arrogance of, for instance, the lettered and the learned, or by the special interests of other groups. This authoritative ministry, that is, a universal church infallible in matters of salvation, is for Scheler inextricably linked to the idea of an All-Loving God, and he adds: "Who does not believe absolutely does not believe in Absolute Being. Who does not believe in the idea of an all-embracing institution to save men and its lasting possession of truth does not in all earnest believe in the All-Goodness of God." ¹⁴⁸

The Church is the trustee of salvation, not a mere sum of individual believers, says Scheler, and what leads men to obey her are love and confidence, a confidence based on an insight of her dignity. She possesses this dignity not because of the personal qualities of her ministers, but because she and her offices are the creation of the Holy One of God. The absolute confidence in her authority, so essentially different from relative authorities, such as that of the state, is a continuation of the spiritual attitude which the saint *par excellence* demands by his very nature and existence: the readiness to believe simply because it is he who speaks, Truth-made-flesh. Only because he remains the invisible head of his visible foundation and is mystically present in her, may the Church be given such devotion, and only because of this may she demand, and none but she, the highest, most noble and perfect sacrifice a man can offer: the free sacrifice of his intellect.

All that stalks about today under the guise of "autonomy of reason" or "freedom of conscience" cries out in revolt against

¹⁴⁸ "Probleme der Religion," *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, p. 701.

this sacrifice as an "outrageous violation of man's integrity." But what modern man calls (with an eagerness that gives him away) "childish subservience" or "despicable slavishness," the Christian, Scheler writes, considers not at all a grudging act wrested from him by want or fear, nor a necessary evil, but quite the contrary, something kingly. This subordination of his intellect is for him a free and joyful giving up of a good he cherishes; it is a sacrifice higher than that of life or honor, one that could not be offered did he not prize his reason as the *lumen naturale*, the divine light that shines in every soul. He is not led astray by immaturity and consequent submissiveness of mind, nor by a herd-instinct; on the contrary, he is aware that in reason he possesses a precious gift, and he has confidence in its power. He does not abandon its objective principles, the *logos* which informs and penetrates all things; what he surrenders with gladness is the subjective, individual, fallible faculty of grasping this *logos*. Knowing himself capable of error, and that man has fallen, he also knows himself inclined to error and delusion, and this the more the higher in the hierarchy of values the object of his knowledge. He realizes that true knowledge of divine things can be won only within the religious communion, where there is a continuous interflow of love, for the road to God is not that of the single soul, proud of its isolation, but that of the "together-ness" of all men, in knowing, believing, loving, worshipping and adoring Him.¹⁴⁹

Christianity is the true and absolute religion, says Scheler; there can be no new religion, and the man anxious for one errs, as does the heretic, not only because he asserts what is materially wrong, but necessarily, because his formal disposition towards God contradicts the nature of the divine, and therefore the possibility of religious knowledge. He is at fault not only in the end, in his thesis, but in his beginnings, walking as he does not by the bridge of brotherly love but on a solitary road, and even where he appears momentarily to be right, he is and must be wrong, because he has severed himself from the com-

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 696-707.

munity of salvation. It is hard for the modern mind to grasp, much less to accept, Scheler concludes, that in all matters of religion, the Church must be heard and obeyed, that her knowledge must be preferred to what the individual thinks he knows. Her knowledge is supreme because love is supreme.¹⁵⁰

XI

For years, this was Max Scheler's thought. In it, many essential truths were reconquered for our time; values were restored to their objectivity and hierarchical order; man was given his rightful place; contrition, suffering and love were seen in splendor; virtue was welcomed back into philosophy—virtue, which “makes a good deed like a bird moving its wings with full freedom”;¹⁵¹ in it, Christianity was paid the tribute that is its due. Although Scheler's thought was frequently tainted by his temperament, so that Père Yves de Montcheuil, S. J., had to say: “If he possesses ardor and penetration, he lacks serenity. . . . Marvelously exciting, his work is never a sure guide,”¹⁵² it did become a signpost to the Church.¹⁵³ Many, searching for truth, having separated the precious metal of his philosophy from its dross, found that it was the light of the Church it reflected, and a number of Catholic thinkers, like Dietrich von Hildebrand and Romano Guardini, were in various ways inspired by and remain indebted to his thought.

In 1922, however, Scheler completely reversed his philosophical position. Until then, he held the “Roman Church” divine, the unerring guardian of Christ's message, a communion bound by sacrifice and love, in which alone was possible a true knowledge of God and His mysteries; he wrote: “She was above nations and her faith universally valid even when she was still a mustard seed. And now that the mustard seed has become a

¹⁵⁰ “Die christliche Liebesidee und die gegenwaertige Welt,” *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, p. 135.

¹⁵¹ “Zur Rehabilitierung der Tugend,” *Vom Umsturz der Werte*, Vol. I, p. 14.

¹⁵² Yves de Montcheuil, S. J., *Mélanges Théologiques* (Paris: Aubier, 1946), p. 225.

¹⁵³ Pyzywara, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

mighty tree, who dare estimate its powers of life that await the future of history.”¹⁵⁴ He said in 1917: “Only a return to Holy Church and the Christian idea of community, which she alone fully knows and administers, can save Europe.”¹⁵⁵ But after 1922, she was no more to him than one “of the spiritual powers still able to form and direct society . . . the most effective and wholesome in its educational influence.”¹⁵⁶

Before 1922, there was no doubt in Scheler’s mind that nature bears the imprint of its Creator, that the heavens show forth the glory of God;¹⁵⁷ that the person is His highest revelation in the natural order,¹⁵⁸ and that the spiritual nature of man, his freedom and immortality, are so evident that only *ressentiment* could try to blacken them. Before, he hailed as part of “the leaven Christianity brought into the world” the teaching that each and every soul is a subsistent, substantial reality; that it is God’s immediate creation and called to the supernatural and mysterious goal of seeing Him; that each and every soul is responsible to its Creator and is put into this world to praise, love and obey Him.¹⁵⁹ Before, he took the fall of man to be a truth also of the metaphysical order;¹⁶⁰ with Newman, he said: “The world is out of joint with the purposes of its Creator. This is a fact, a fact as true as its existence; and thus the doctrine of what is theologically called original sin becomes to me almost as certain as that the world exists, and as the existence of God,”¹⁶¹ and he added: “The world needs redemption; the world sighs after redemption.”¹⁶² Before, he exclaimed: “O marvelous mystery of condescension—God comes to the wife of

¹⁵⁴ “Soziologische-Neuorientierung und die Aufgabe der deutschen Katholischen nach dem Krieg,” *Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre*, III/1, p. 78.

¹⁵⁵ “Vom Wesen der Philosophie und der moralischen Bedingung des philosophischen Erkennens,” *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, p. 183.

¹⁵⁶ “Vorrede,” *Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre*, III/1, p. vii.

¹⁵⁷ “Probleme der Religion,” *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, pp. 567 ff.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 432.

¹⁵⁹ “Die christliche Liebesidee und die gegenwaertige Welt,” *ibid.*, pp. 167, 125.

¹⁶⁰ “Probleme der Religion,” *ibid.*, p. 504.

¹⁶¹ John Henry Newman, *Apologia pro Vita Sua*, chap. 5.

¹⁶² “Probleme der Religion,” *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, pp. 502-503.

a carpenter, descends into the dark prison of her womb! O marvelous birth of God in a stable! How greatly these mysteries of Christian faith correspond with the expectation of our reason, once God unlocks the deepest secret of His Nature!"¹⁶³ But afterwards, he spoke of the creation of man by a Personal God, of his original justice in Paradise, of his Fall and Redemption, of the personal and spiritual nature, the freedom and immortality of the soul, of resurrection and judgment, as "the well known myth . . . entirely without significance to an autonomous philosophy and science."¹⁶⁴

During the most productive decade of his life, Scheler professed, in terms not to be mistaken, his faith in God as the *Ens a Se*, the One not made, not composed, utterly independent, the One who has not *become* but *is*, whose very Nature is *to be*, who revealed Himself to Moses as "I am who am."¹⁶⁵ He said, for instance: "God is not potentiality, which must realize itself in time, which makes itself explicit in history, but absolute actual being."¹⁶⁶ But afterwards, he denied the existence of an All-Powerful Personal God, who is Spirit. His God was an unfinished, a becoming God, one who rises from the *Urgrund* and becomes aware of himself in man, as man in turn assists in his begetting—to the measure that spirit and urge interpenetrate one another.¹⁶⁷

What could have brought about so catastrophic a change? What made Scheler assume a "becoming God," a concept he had once called "entirely crude," "utter nonsense" and "a contradiction in terms?"¹⁶⁸ What could have driven him to worship a pantheistic God, of which he had said, with such felicity of expression, that "he is amenable to reason, open to

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 690.

¹⁶⁴ "Mensch und Geschichte," *Die Neue Rundschau*, XXXVII, 2 (July-December, 1926), pp. 453-454.

¹⁶⁵ Exod. 3:14.

¹⁶⁶ "Probleme der Religion," *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, pp. 461-462.

¹⁶⁷ *Die Stellung des Menschen in Kosmos* (Munich: Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung, 1947), p. 84; *Bildung und Wissen* (Frankfurt a. M.: Verlag G. Schulte-Bulmke, 1947), p. 37.

¹⁶⁸ "Probleme der Religion," *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, pp. 434, 503.

advice, more than is befitting to a God; he falls in with the changing currents of history"¹⁶⁹—and, we may add, to the shifting tides of personal life?

The answer is not, as Nicolai Hartmann would have it, that "the world is not without contradiction," and that Scheler but mirrored it.¹⁷⁰ True, the world is full of opposites hard to reconcile, full of mysteries difficult to solve, and an honest thinker will acknowledge them. But the world, for all its riddles, does not tell today: God is, and tomorrow: God is not. The answer to Scheler's spectacular contradiction lies rather in his own restive soul, so unwilling to abide in contemplation, so fearful of continuity. In his younger years he expressed this trait when he said that he would like to awaken each morning with fresh images in his mind, knowing nothing of the past. And in his last years he wrote that "compared with the animal, whose existence is philistinism embodied, man is the eternal Faustus, the *bestia cupidissima rerum novarum*, never contenting himself with the reality encompassing him, forever avid to break through the barriers of his here and now and who, forever striving to transcend the reality surrounding him and with it his momentary self."¹⁷¹

This, Scheler's new definition of man, is really a self-analysis. In it his former definition is decapitated, for man no longer tends towards God; in it only movement counts and not the goal, dynamics are everything, avidity for new things is the mainspring of man's intellectual life, and in it is expressed not the desire to be oneself, pure and perfect, but almost the desire to be another. All this corresponds to an unfortunate bent in Scheler's soul. Throughout his life, he was driven by a fearsome force which would not let him hold to the good he had and made him seek ever new experiences. He also found it hard to master his vitality, to withstand its urging and to submit it to God's dominion. In so many ways a genius, in others he remained a child, and was often so rapt in his wishes that he was almost

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 297.

¹⁷⁰ Nicolai Hartmann, "Max Scheler," *Kant-Studien*, XXXIII (1928), p. xv.

¹⁷¹ *Die Stellung des Menschen in Kosmos*, p. 52.

certain facts must conform with them; hence, when in 1921, Scheler wished to remarry, he imagined he could have his marriage declared null. When he saw that he was unable to obtain an annulment, he not only ignored the dogma of the indissolubility of the conjugal bond and married civilly, but, to suit himself, declared that in it the Church misinterpreted Christ's teaching on divorce; he then maintained that this misinterpretation had infiltrated into her thought late in her history, though giving no account of when and how it happened. This was only the beginning of his self-justification. In order to guard his delusion, he had to go further; its logic demanded that he divest of their power first the Church and then God. His new philosophy was a protest against them, against whom he had sinned, before whom he could not stand. Unwilling to endure the feeling of guilt, he tried to do away altogether with sin and repentance, with the Sovereign God, with Christ and the Church, of which, in 1920, he had said: "I want to live and die within the Church, which I love and in which I believe."¹⁷²

As was to be expected, Scheler's pantheism arrayed itself to his eyes as progress and not as retrogression. But at times he must have seen through this self-deception, for he had concluded his book *On the Eternal in Man* with an emphatic "No" to the so common search for a new religion. There can be no new religion, only a renewal of the old, he said; truth has long been found and all that is asked of us is to seize it, ancient and ever new.¹⁷³ It was not, as is sometimes asserted, that he passed through and beyond the thought of his Catholic years; he broke with it—although it is true that he had left loopholes in it, through which he was later to slip out, such as certain of his ideas on the person or his over-stress on vitality, or as his teaching that there is no obligation, in the strict sense, of faith or love, only of preparing oneself for them.¹⁷⁴ Here and elsewhere, he wanted, as it were, the spirit of the New Testament without

¹⁷² Von Hildebrand, "Max Scheler als Persönlichkeit," *op. cit.*, p. 384.

¹⁷³ "Probleme der Religion," *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, p. 723.

¹⁷⁴ *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*, pp. 224 ff.

that of the Old, the freedom of the children of God without the discipline of the Law. He had an aversion to the Law, to the Just God who punishes and rewards, which seems to have been all along a defensive measure, enabling him to reverse himself with a certain plausibility. However this may be, he himself disclosed the secret of his *volte-face* when he said: "It is always our willing and doing which underlie our mistaken values; it is always, somehow, wrong practice which drags down our consciousness of values and their ranks to its own level." There has hardly been another philosopher who refuted himself so effectively beforehand as did Scheler when he described the workings of *ressentiment*.

In 1928, Scheler went to Frankfurt to assume the Chair of Philosophy. For some time, his heart had been failing, under the burden and sorrow, it seems, of the last few years, and on May 19 of the same year, he died suddenly of a coronary stroke. As strange as was his life, so was his end. Although he had not retracted his later disbelief nor given any signs of a change of heart, he was buried with the blessing of the Church, for the priest who imparted it did not know of his lapse. "You know," he said to Dietrich von Hildebrand, in a humble hour years before his death, "I seem to myself like a naughty child who runs again and again to a precipice and whom God, in His infinite mercy, brings back each time just before he falls into the abyss. And still I run away from God's mercy time and again. But I have a terrible premonition that one time God's patience will be exhausted, and He will not draw me back but let me fall." Von Hildebrand, repeating these words, adds that his latter years, as we see them now, seem to justify this premonition, but that we know God's mercy to be infinitely greater than Scheler could imagine or we comprehend, and that we hope it saved him from the eternal abyss.¹⁷⁵ On another occasion he writes: "Thus Scheler departed from us still entangled in the darkness of his flight. His sudden death cut off the peaceless

¹⁷⁵ Von Hildebrand, "Max Schelers Stellung zur katholischen Gedankenwelt," *op. cit.*, p. 363.

and shattered life of this abundantly endowed and noble mind before, as far as we can see, he stopped in his impotent flight from Him who knows our sitting down and our rising up. We trust, however, that the Lord over life and death mercifully halted him and led him into the light which, reflected in this world, he saw so often with such clarity."¹⁷⁶ And the aged Dom Anselm Manser, O.S.B., who in 1916 received Scheler back into the Church and who remembers him daily in his prayers, recalls his gentleness with all and hopes that much will be forgiven him, because he loved much.¹⁷⁷ Max Scheler's judgment, as that of every man, is in the hands of God, and what it is we do not know, but this we know: though in his last years he denied his former thoughts, they remain what they were, for truth is always greater than the man who holds it.

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¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, "Max Scheler als Persoenlichkeit," pp. 386-387.

¹⁷⁷ Private communication from Dom Paulus Gordon, O.S.B., Beuron.

HOPE AND CHARITY IN ST. THOMAS

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DOES the desire of union with God spring from the theological virtue of hope or charity or from neither? We do not intend to speak here of the natural desire of the vision of God and of St. Thomas' classical doctrine on this point. We have in view the love of desire for God traditionally distinguished in Scholasticism from the love of benevolence, the *amor concupiscentiae* as opposed to the *amor benevolentiae*, corresponding broadly to the "interested" and "disinterested" love of modern spirituality, without however understanding "self-interest" in a pejorative sense. We consider this interested love of God as supernatural and theological, that is, as a self-regarding love of God which originates from grace and not from nature alone, and which has as its formal object God Himself and not some created goodness as would be the case for an interested love of God in which the primary moving reason would be man's own happiness. Desire of God, if deprived of this theological character, cannot indeed arise from any of the theological virtues.

Of this theological love or desire for God we ask the question: Is it an act of hope or an act of charity? Or can it exist without either hope or charity?¹ As is well known, all three possible answers have been proposed by Catholic theologians. One school, beginning with Scotus and popularized by Suarez, holds that the interested love of God belongs to hope. This would

¹ The third alternative mentioned, paradoxical though it may seem to say that a theological act would exist without any theological virtue, refers to the imperfect desire of God presupposed in hope, as will be explained presently.—For recent studies on hope and charity we mention especially the following: C. Zimara, *Das Wesen der Hoffnung in Natur und Uebernatur* (Paderborn 1933), and the Article, "Charité" (by various authors) in the *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité* 2, (507-691).

seem to be the more widespread opinion to-day. The hope of possessing God in heaven is the desire of heaven. Another school refers the theological desire of God to charity of which it is an essential though secondary act, the primary act of charity being the love of benevolence for God. In this conception, interested love of God, when it is theological, can not exist without theological charity and without sanctifying grace, nor can charity exist without the desire of union with God. This was the position of St. Augustine, and of the ancient Scholastics down to St. Bonaventure and, it would seem, to St. Thomas; it is Scotus who first made a departure from this traditional view. The third solution, namely, that the desire of God is neither hope nor charity, also has found its advocates. In order to explain that some desire of God is presupposed to hope, as all admit, these theologians conclude that this desire, in its imperfect stage at any rate, can exist before hope or charity and is, therefore, different from both.²

Which of these three answers is the correct one? Which is the answer of St. Thomas and of the Thomistic tradition? Is it correct to say that St. Thomas was an innovator in his conception of charity by restricting charity to the friendship of God and excluding from it the love of desire? In St. Thomas' conception, "there would be no longer room within the structure of charity for that love which seeks God from the motive that He is the supreme Good which appeases man's desire for beatitude; this love can exist along with charity, but it does not originate from charity."³ The question is not without important practical implications. If the desire of union with God is essentially an act of charity, then it necessarily supposes the state of grace. If it is an act of hope, or different from hope or charity, then it can be found without sanctifying grace. From a Thomistic viewpoint the question whether St. Thomas

² Cf. E. Harent, "Espérance," in *Dict. de Théol. Cathol.* 5 (1913) 605-76; and Zimara, *op. cit.*, 201-14.

³ Zimara, *op. cit.* 174.

does or does not include in charity the desire for God has a bearing on his conception of love and of being in general. His answer to our problem characterizes the finalistic tonality of his philosophy and theology.⁴

If we wish to get a true insight into this theological problem and into St. Thomas' answer to it, two points require study: The nature of the act of hope in its relation to the desire of union with God; the nature of charity in connection with this desire.⁵ To illustrate St. Thomas' position, we shall consider it within the history of the doctrine and examine each of the two mentioned points (1) in the Catholic tradition before St. Thomas (2) in St. Thomas, and (3) after St. Thomas.

I. PRE-THOMISTIC TEACHING

1. THE ACT OF HOPE

The Scriptural foundation on which the Catholic conception of hope is built is laid in both the Old and the New Testament. In the Old we may point to the Messianic hope and expectation and to the confident and trustful hope in God expressed in so many Psalms.⁶ As to the New Testament, G. Kittel⁷ summarizes the New Testament concept of hope as follows: "When hope is directed to God, then it comprises in its unity

⁴ For the import of the conception of love for philosophy and theology, cf. M. C. d'Arcy, *The Mind and Heart of Love* (London 1945).

⁵ We restrict our study to this particular question: whether the desire of God is hope or charity. When examining this limited object we shall have to refer to several problems that are raised in connection with hope and charity, but these will be taken into account only insofar as they have a bearing on our particular point.

⁶ On Messianic hope cf. M. J. Lagrange, *Le Messianisme chez les Juifs* (Paris 1909), and *Le Judaïsme avant Jésus-Christ* (Paris 1931). Cf. *Psalms*, vii, 2; xii, 6; xxiv, 20, etc.

⁷ *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*, 2 (Stuttgart 1934) s. v. ἐλπίς, ἔλπις, 515-31, p. 2527. An example of each of these three meanings: expectation, *Hebr.* x, 1; confidence, *1 Cor.* xv, 19; *2 Cor.* i, 10; *1 Pet.* i, 21; patient waiting, *1 Cor.* xiii, 7.

three elements: expectation of something to come, confidence, and patience in the waiting; one or other of these three motives can be stressed or drawn in relief." He finds no trace of a desire in the primeval Christian concept of hope. Zimara draws the same conclusion from a brief survey of Scripture; in both the Old and the New Testament hope is conceived as confidence, reliance on another, not as desire or wish.⁸

Against this Scriptural background it is not surprising to see the early Christian idea of hope develop this same element of trust. One of its manifestations we find in the symbolism of the anchor in which the reality of the Christian hope is expressed. In drawing out the text in the Epistle to the Hebrews (ix, 16), both Christian archeology⁹ and the early Fathers commenting on or alluding to the text, conceived hope as the anchor that fixes us in God, as a *reliance* on God in order to attain the promised reward of eternal life. But not as a *desire* of God; this idea seems foreign to the anchor symbol.

Independently of this symbolism, indications are not lacking in both the Greek and the Latin Fathers to the effect that they see in hope mainly a confident expectation of the eternal reward from God. They do not, naturally, explicitly ask or answer our question, nor can we find in them a treatise on the formal object of hope. But when they speak of the second theological virtue, they do so in such a way as to leave no doubt about their idea. We may mention, among the Greek Fathers, St. Justin, St. Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, St. Basil, St. Cyril of Jerusalem, St. Gregory of Nazianzen, St. John Climacus, St. Cyril of Alexandria, St. Isidore of Peluse, St. Nilus, Theodoret, Procopius of Gaza, St. John Chrysostom, St. Maximus.¹⁰ Their

⁸ *Op. cit.* 236.

⁹ Cf. C. Kirsch, "Ancre," in *Dict. de Liturgie et d'Archéologie*, 1, 2 part. (1907), 1999-2031. Of the Fathers he quotes: St. Ambrose, St. Paulinus of Nola, St. John Chrysostom, Rufinus of Aquila; *op. cit.*, 2001, n. 1.

¹⁰ St. Irenaeus, *Contra Haereses*, 2, 28, 3 (MG 8, 975; cf. *Introduct.*, *Ibid.*, 364, "certa in Deum fiducia"); Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata*, 2, 9, "expectatio bonorum vel absentis boni bona speratio" (MG 8, 975); Origen, *Comment. in Epist.*

passing references and descriptions of the act of hope point to a radically identical idea. Hope is trust, gives confidence for the future, erects the soul, gives courage, strength, steadfastness. "What is hope?" asks St. John Damascene who concludes the Greek patristic tradition. And he answers: "to take heart for the coming things."¹¹ The teaching of the Latin Fathers does not sound differently. St. Hilary, St. Ambrose, St. Zeno, St. Jerome, St. Augustine, St. Prosper of Aquitaine, St. Leo, St. Gregory,¹² when speaking of hope, ignore the idea

ad Rom. 7, 5, "per patientiam expectamus" (MG 14, 1113); St. Basil, *Homil. in Ps.* 45, 2, "toti pendent ex Deo . . . fiduciam" (MG 29, 417); *Epist.* 174, "expecta auxilium Dei" (*Ibid.*, 32, 652); St. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catech.* 2 *de paenit.*, "expectat, sperat" (MG 33, 389); St. Gregory of Nazianzen, *Orat.* 27, 2, "in angustiis rebus medicina . . ." expectabam (MG 35, 966; cf. *ibid.*, 1151); St. John Chrysostom, *Ad Theodorum lapsum*, 2, "anchora sustentaculum, ducem"; (MG 47, 279); St. Cyril of Alexandria, *In Isaiam* 3, 1, "probe turris defensa" (MG 70, 568); St. Isidore of Peluse, *Epist.* I, "turris firmus; spes vitae anchora" (MG 78, 17); St. Nilus, *Epist.* 1, 40, "bona expectatione confirmata" (MG 79, 101); Theodoret, *Epist.* 18, "optatissimam spem praestolemur" (MG 83, 1198); Procopius, *Comm. in Numer.* "hilaritatem in nobis spes efficit" (MG 87, 809); St. John Climacus, *Scala paradisi*, "non apparentium divitiarum divitiae" (MG 88, 1159); St. Maximus, *De Caritate*, "patientia et longanimitas" (MG 90, 961).

¹¹ *In Epist. ad Rom.*, "futuris fidere." (MG 95, 507) It has been pointed out that we find in the Fathers the three degrees of the spiritual life characterized by the attitude of servants, mercenaries and sons, who are guided by fear for punishment, hope of reward and charity or love of God respectively. (Cf. J. Farges, M. Viller, "Charité" in *Dict. de Spir.* 2, 535-36). Would this imply that hope is desire? Some Fathers may seem to have expressed it that way, v.g. Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 4, 7, "desiderare" (MG 8, 1264-65). But it is sufficient to say that they consider as mercenary the degree of perfection that *expects* the reward (which expectation presupposes desire). Moreover these Fathers, Clement of Alexandria for example, have been quoted above as stating that hope is something different from desire.

¹² St. Hilary, *Fragmenta*, 1, "Spes . . . fiducia expectationis suae" (ML 10, 628); St. Zeno, *Tract De spe, fide et caritate*, 2, "possibile hoc spe fit" (ML 11, 269-70); St. Ambrose, *In Ps. 118 Expos.* v. 28, "confidentia" (ML 15, 1419); St. Jerome, *Comment. in Isai.* 14, 51 v. 10, "innitatur super Deum" (ML 24, 481); St. Augustine, *Enchiridion*, 1, 8, "Spes bonarum rerum est, et ad eum pertinentium qui earum spem gerere perhibetur. Spes esse sine amore non potest" (ML 40, 235); St. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Lib. sent. ex August. delib.*, "quaerit Dei auxilium" (ML 51, 439); St. Leo, *Sermo* 74, 1, "spes non fluctuaret" (ML 54, 397); St. Gregory, *Moral.* 6, 21, "aeternae vitae fiduciam" (ML 75, 749).

of desire but bring out the element of confidence. St. Isidore of Seville summarizes the Latin tradition in the formula: "Hope is the expectation of future things," an expectation which "lifts up to higher things and raises to joy."¹³ It would seem well warranted to conclude that, generally speaking, the Fathers, inasfar as they have expressed their views on hope, do not propose its act as a desire of union with God or of life eternal, but as trust in God, reliance on Him from whom we expect the reward of the future life. This trust makes the soul stand up, gives it courage and firmness.

This conclusion is confirmed in the treatment of hope we find in pre- and early Scholasticism. In close connection with the teaching of the Fathers, often merely collecting their pronouncements (*sententiae*), the first and rare teachers of the seventh to the tenth century repeat what they found in the Fathers. St. Taio (end of 7th century), Alcuin, Halitgarus of Cambrai,¹⁴ work in that line. Paschasius Radbertus, who is the first to give us a treatise in three books on Faith, Hope, and Charity, views the second theological virtue as the safe anchor of the soul, and repeatedly identifies hope and trust.¹⁵ In the eleventh century, Othlo the Monk expresses in verse the same idea, and St. Bruno Astensis repeats the traditional definition: "Hope is the expectation of the future things."¹⁶

The twelfth century brings more definite and explicit state-

¹³ *Differentiarum Liber*, 2, 36, 139, "spes est bonorum expectatio futurorum" (ML 83, 92); Cf. *Etymol.* 8, 2, 5, "spes vocata quod sit pes progrediendi" (ML 82, 296); cf. "ad alta subvehit" (ML 83, 363); "ad gaudium erigit" (*ibid.*, 603).

¹⁴ St. Taio, *Sent. libri* 5, 2, 28, "spes ad maiora audenda erigit" (ML 80, 817, 18); Alcuin, *De virtutibus et vitiis*, 4 *De spe*, "spe ad solatium supernae pietatis currendum est" (ML 101, 616); Halitgarus of Cambrai, *De virtutibus et vitiis*. 5, 2, 4, "per patientiam expectemus" (ML 105, 672).

¹⁵ Paschasius Radbertus, *Tractatus de fide, spe et caritate*, 2, 1, anchora animae tuta (ML 120, 1435-36) confidentia (*ibid.*, 1443), 2, 5, confidit, sperat (*ibid.*, 1446), confidentia perveniendi (*ibid.*, 1449).

¹⁶ Othlo the Monk, *De doctrina spirituali*, 6 de spe caelesti; stas confidenter in ipso (Christo) (ML 146, 267); St. Bruno Astensis, *Sent. libri* 6, 2, 2, futurorum bonorum expectatio (ML 165, 906).

ments about the nature of hope, and they all point to the same meaning. We may quote St. Anselm, Hugh of St. Victor, the *Summa Sententiarum*, St. Bernard.¹⁷ Peter Lombard, the *Magister sententiarum*, provides the definition that will be the classical starting point for the great Scholastics: "Hope is the certain expectation of future beatitude, coming from God's grace and from the merits that precede either the hope itself (which in the order of nature comes after charity), or the hoped for thing, that is, the eternal beatitude."¹⁸ Here, as with the Fathers, the idea of a desire of God is absent from the description of hope. This is confident expectation of the happiness to come.

Of the great Scholastic Doctors, contemporaries of St. Thomas, we mention only two, his master St. Albert the Great and his Franciscan friend, St. Bonaventure. St. Albert has an extensive commentary on Peter Lombard's distinction *De Spe*. He endeavours to determine and circumscribe more accurately the act of hope, which, he says, is not fully expressed in the notion of expectation: "Hope does not signify expectation but 'hoping,' and this means something more; because he who hopes, just as he who believes or loves, reaches out in his own way to the hoped for thing, and he possesses it in his own way, just as he who believes or loves."¹⁹ Further, "Hope resides in

¹⁷ St. Anselm, *Monologium* 74, "Spes pertingendi" (ML 178, 1695); Hugh of St. Victor, *De fructibus carnis et spiritus* 17, "Spes est animi motus immobiliter ad ea quae certa ratione expetit accipienda suspensi" (ML 176, 1004); *Summa Sententiarum*, Tr. 1, 2 *De spe*, "Fiducia futurorum bonorum" (ML 176, 43); St. Bernard, *Lib. de modo bene vivendi* 2, "Per patientiam expectamus" (ML 184, 1201). We may note here the particular idea of hope of Abelard who makes of it an intellectual virtue (species generis fidei), v.g. *Epitome Theologiae Christianae* 1, "Spem autem in fide, tamquam speciem in genere, comprehendi existimo. Cf. C. Zimara, "Quelques idées d'Abélard au sujet de l'espérance chrétienne," in, *Revue Thomiste*, 1935, 37-47.

¹⁸ Peter Lombard, *Sententiarum Libri* 4, 3 d. 26 "Est spes certa expectatio futurae beatitudinis, veniens ex Dei gratia et meritis praecedentibus vel ipsam spem quam natura praeit caritas, vel rem speratam, id est, beatitudinem aeternam."

¹⁹ St. Albert the Great, *In 3 Sent.* d. 26, a. 2, ad 8.

the irascible potency of the soul" (and it is therefore not a desire, which arises from the concupiscible power), "and its act is not only to expect, though this is more proper to hope than to any other virtue. . . . Its act is rather to reach out to the hoped for thing through some sort of expansion of the soul."²⁰ Hope, then, is not a mere passive expectation: "Three elements enter into the proper act of hope, that is, the disposition of the agent and this is fixation in the place from where he reaches out, this is called expectation; secondly, that the agent with magnanimity reaches out to the eternal goods; and thirdly, the object of hope which is the obtention of eternal beatitude."²¹ St. Albert, obviously, does not include in hope a desire of union with God. Hope is something different from desire.

St. Bonaventure is still clearer and more explicit. "Hope is a gratuitous virtue, for by making the soul expect what is beyond all human estimation, and what the divine liberality has promised, it causes the soul to trust fully and to rely on that supreme and immeasurable bounty, just as faith makes one assent to the First Truth, and charity makes man adhere to the supreme Goodness."²² Hope, then, is trust, confident expectation. "Hope itself, which trusts in, and relies on the immeasurable and never failing divine liberality, expects all that God promised would be rendered to it in the future."²³ Hope appears still more clearly as trust where its object is explained: "The object of hope is something good, but not under the aspect of goodness, but rather under the aspect of difficulty or greatness. Hope indeed has a double act of which one is the principle and source of the other; hope causes trust,

²⁰ *Op. cit.*, a. 3 ad 1, "Extendere se in rem speratam amplitudine quadam animae."

²¹ *Op. cit.*, a. 3, ad 4: "Tria . . . expectatio . . . , ut extendatur in aeterna . . . obiectum est amplexio aeternitatis et beatitudinis."

²² St. Bonaventure, *In 3 Sent.* d. 26, a. 1, q. 1, ". . . facit omnino confidere et inniti summae et immensae largitati."

²³ *Op. cit.*, a. 1, q. 2, "Ipsa spes confidendo et innitendo immensae et indeficientissimae largitati divinae . . . expectat"

and by making one trust it produces expectation.”²⁴ We find a further confirmation that hope is not desire, when St. Bonaventure indicates its subject or seat: “No doubt, hope resides in the affective power, for it is in the irascible power which is a part of the affective potency”;²⁵ whilst desire is seated in the concupiscible part of the appetitive power.

These scanty historical notes suffice to show that the Catholic tradition prior to St. Thomas did not conceive hope as a desire of God, but as a confident expectation, as a reliance on God with a view to obtain from Him the eternal reward promised to the just. From passing and casual indications in the Fathers of the Church we are gradually led to more developed and more detailed analyses. By the time St. Thomas starts teaching in the thirteenth century this is the accepted traditional doctrine.²⁶

2. CHARITY AND DESIRE OF GOD

If the desire of union with God was not conceived as belonging to hope, was it then included in charity? A cursory glance at the pre-Thomist tradition will reveal the answer.

The biblical notion of charity, rather undefined in the Old Testament, takes on in the New the explicit connotation of a filial love for the heavenly Father. The reward of charity will be to have a place in the Father's house. For St. Paul, the love of Christ and of the Father is inseparable from the desire to be with Him. The Spirit that is given us produces in our hearts the filial spirit, a newness which turns our desires towards union with God. St. John is possibly still more explicit; through charity we enter into communion with the Father and the Son. It seems beyond doubt that Christian charity, or the love for God and for Christ, does not abstract from or neglect union with

²⁴ *Op. cit.*, a. 2, q. 4, “Spes facit confidere, et faciendo confidere facit expectare.”

²⁵ *Op. cit.*, a. 2, a. 5, “Spes . . . est in irascibili.”

²⁶ This conclusion will further be confirmed when it will be shown that the traditional doctrine conceived the desire of union with God as belonging to charity.

Him; it rather lives by this union.²⁷ Could then charity exclude the desire of union?

The Fathers, according to the documented study of F. Farges and M. Viller,²⁸ "if they are agreed that charity is the love of God for His own sake, are also agreed in saying that charity is the desire to see God and to possess Him, to enjoy Him for His sake. Its love stops at God as at its final term, its goal and its motive."²⁹ It is not difficult to substantiate this statement. We could cite here, among the Greek Fathers, St. Clement of Roma, St. Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, St. Basil, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. John Climacus, St. Maximus.³⁰ For all these, to have charity means to possess God; charity is union with God. The pseudo-Dionysian conception of love and charity, which will make its way throughout the medieval tradition includes union with the beloved in the very essence of love; love is essentially a power of union.³¹ The Latin patristic thought, like the Oriental, is explicit both about the disinterested character of the charity for God³² and about the

²⁷ Cf. F. Prat, "Charité dans la Bible," in *Dict. de Spir.* 2, 508-23; and Kittel, *op. cit.*, art. 'Αγάπη, ἀγαπάω. Would St. Paul's wish to be anathema for the sake of his bretheren (Rom. ix, 3) go against this idea of charity? We may refer here to what will be said later on about the "impossible desires" of the Saints, and even grant that St. Paul does not envisage the question we are studying here in any explicit way.

²⁸ "Charité chez Pères," in *Dict. de Spir.* 2, 523-69.

²⁹ *Op. cit.*, 538.

³⁰ St. Clement of Rome, *Epist. ad Cor.* 19, "Deo agglutinat" (MG 1, 309); St. Irenaeus, *Contra Haeres.* 4, 12, "amicitia Dei" (MG 7, 1018); Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 4, 7, "propter suam in Deum dilectionem, propter suam salutem" (MG 1154-55); Origen, *In Cantic. cantic. homil.* 2, 8, "adhaeret Deo" (MG 13, 54); St. Basil Sermo 3 de Charitate, "Qui habet chantatem Deum habet" (MG 32 1152); St. Gregory of Nyssa, *In cantic. cantic. homil.* 4, "per charitatem sponso coniuncta" (MG 44, 847); St. John Climacus, *Scala Paradisi*, 30, "similitudo Dei" (MG 88, 1156); and *passim*: "charitas = desiderium"; St. Maximus, *De caritate*, *centuria* 1, "animi amore et desiderio incessanter incumbit" (MG 90, 961).

³¹ *De divinis nominibus*, 4, Amorem . . . unitivam quamdam et concretivam intelligimus virtutem . . . Cf. A. Stévaux, *La doctrine de la charité dans les commentaires des Sentences de Saint Albert, de Saint Bonaventure et de Saint Thomas*, in *Ephemerides Theologica Lovanienses*, 1948, 59-97; especially 73 and 77.

³² Cf. J. Farges et M. Viller, *op. cit.*, 536-37, particularly about the impossible suppositions of separating love of God and the eternal reward or the union with Him.

necessary reward of charity which is given in the very union with God. We find this idea in St. Ambrose, St. Leo, St. Gregory, Julian Pomerus, St. Caesarius of Arles.³³ But it is St. Augustine, the Doctor of charity, who states most unequivocally that union with God, and desire of this union, are included in charity. Three texts of his, which are classical in the matter, make this position clear. "I define charity as a motion of the soul whose purpose is to enjoy God for His own sake and one's self and one's neighbour for the sake of God."³⁴ (The Augustinian *frui* means "to cling to some object with affection for its own sake," as opposed to *uti* which is "to employ what we have received for our use, (in order) to obtain what we want, provided that it is right for us to want it").³⁵ Further, "Thou art the God of my heart, and the God that is my portion forever" (Ps. 1 xxii, 26). The heart has become chaste, God then is being loved without recompense, no other reward is asked from Him. He who seeks a reward from God and for that reason wishes to serve Him, sets more value on the gift than on the Giver. What then? Is there no reward to be sought from God? No, no reward, except Himself. God's reward is God Himself. That is what the chaste heart loves and cherishes; if it loves anything else, its love will not be chaste."³⁶

³³ St. Ambrose, *De Abraham lib.* 2, 8, 47 ". . . sine aliqua mercedis humanae remuneratione"; *De interpretatione David lib.* 4, 11 (ML 14, 476) "non praemio ducitur ad perfectionem, sed perfectione consummatur praemium (*ibid.*, 849); St. Leo, *Sermo.*, (92.3) "nulla maior expetenda remuneratio quam ipsa dilectio (ML 54, 454-55); St. Gregory, *Homil. 25 in Evang. 2*, "ardere iam ex desiderio coepit . . ." (ML 76, 1191), *Homil. 31, 1*, "Qui ergo mente integra Deum desiderat, profecto iam habet quod amat. Neque enim quisquam potest Deum diligere, si eum quem diligit non habet." (*ibid.*, 1220); Julian Pomerus, *De vita contemplativa*, 3, 15, 1, "concipere fruendae visionis eius (Dei) affectum" (ML 59, 496); St. Caesarius of Arles, *Homil. 16*, "Da ergo Deo in terra ut accipias in vita aeterna," (ML 67, 1077).

³⁴ St. Augustine, *De doctrina christiana*, 3, 10, 16, "Caritatem voco motum animi ad fruendum Deo propter ipsum et se atque proximo propter Deum" (ML 34, 72; transl. J. J. Garrigan, in *The Fathers of the Church, Writings of St. Augustine* vol. 4, p. 130).

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 1.4. "Frui est amore inhaerere alicui propter ipsum."

³⁶ *Enarrat. in Ps. 72, 26, 32*, ". . . gratis amatur Deus, non ab illo petitur aliud praemium. . . . Praemium Dei ipse Deus est" (ML. 36, 928); Cf. *Sermo* 33, 3, "Hoc est Deum gratis amare, de Deo Deum sperare" (ML 38, 1469).

And finally: "If then God is man's supreme Good, and this you can not deny, it follows without doubt that to seek this supreme Good is to live well; thus to live well is nothing else but to love God with one's whole heart, one's whole soul, one's whole mind."³⁷ For St. Augustine, then, charity is the love of God as man's supreme Good sought for God's sake. In other words, the volition of God as man's last End is identical with charity. To love God for His own sake, *propter ipsum*, means, to look for no other reward than God Himself. To seek to enjoy God, *frui Deo*, is the proper act of charity. It could not be more explicitly said that the desire of union with God belongs to charity.

This Augustinian conception makes its way through the Middle Ages down to the great century of Scholasticism. In the early medieval times the *florilegia Patrum* merely repeat and collect St. Augustine's or St. Gregory's texts.³⁸ Paschasius Radbertus, in his treatise *De fide spe et caritate*, bases his teaching about charity on St. Augustine's idea: God, the supreme Good, is the only one we may love with a view to enjoy Him.³⁹ Other names to be mentioned are, St. Benedict of Aniane, St. Bede the Venerable, Halitgarus of Cambrai, Raban Maurus, St. Peter Damian.⁴⁰ The twelfth century⁴¹ witnesses in early

³⁷ *De moribus Ecclesiae*, 1, 25, 46 ". . . summum bonum appetere est bene vivere." Cf. *Confess.* 13, 9, 10, "Pondus meum amor meus . . ." (ML 32, 849).

³⁸ Cf. M. Viller, "Charité: le Haut Moyen-Age, in *Dict. de Spir.*, 2, 569-70, with detailed references to the pre-Scholastics.

³⁹ Paschasius Radbertus, *De fide, spe et caritate*, 3, 7, "Illae quibus fruendum est, Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus est" (ML 120, 1470).

⁴⁰ St. Benedict of Aniane, *Admonitio ad filium spirituale*, 3, ". . . dilige Deum . . . semper in nobis inhabitet, et nos permaneamus in illo" (ML 103, 686-87); St. Bede the Venerable, *Expos. in S. Joann. evang.* 16, ". . . Dei donum est diligere Deum. Diffundit enim charitatem in cordibus nostris amborum Spiritus . . ." (ML 92, 867); Halitgarus of Cambrai, *De paenitentia*, lib. 25, "charitas est recta voluntas . . . iuncta Deo inseparabiliter . . ." (ML 105, 673); Raban Maurus, *Homil.* 45, "in ipsa (charitate) beatitudinem veram habituros vos esse sciatis" (ML 110, 84); St. Peter Damian, *Sermo* 26, ". . . amemus dulciter, sapienter et fortiter, ut ad Magistrum Petri intercessionem pervenire valeamus" (ML 144, 647-49).

⁴¹ Cf. F. Werner, "Charité, le XII^e siècle," in *Dict. de Spir.* 2, 670-72.

Scholasticism an abundant speculation on charity and in it a double current, later developing into the physical and ecstatic theory of love. The first, which is by far the predominant one, continues St. Augustine's conception of charity, "a motion of the soul whose purpose is to enjoy God. . . ." ⁴² We find it active in William of St. Thierry, the school of Anselm of Laon, St. Bernard of Clairvaux, Hugh of St. Victor, Peter Lombard, Peter of Capua, Odo of Tournai, Ralph the Ardent, William of Auxerre, Philip the Chancellor. ⁴³ Perhaps the most representative of this traditional theory or, at any rate, the one exerting most influence on the speculation of the great Scholastics is here again Peter Lombard. In his *dictinctiones* on charity St. Augustine's text is his constant guide, and with the Doctor of grace he excludes from charity only the desire or intention of a temporal reward. "He who takes charity for his goal, takes God Himself as his goal." "Here (Augustine) says openly that we should not fix unto ourselves two goals, but one only, namely the kingdom of God." ⁴⁴ Next to this traditional doctrine an ecstatic theory of love and of charity, which tends to exclude from the third theological virtue all self-regard, originates with Peter Abelard, and finds passing expressions in the words of some medieval mystics, as St. Bernard of Clairvaux and William of St. Thierry. ⁴⁵ But it will have to wait for a

⁴² Cf. A. Landgraf, "Charité, Conception physique et extatique de la charité," in *Dict. de Spir.* 2, 578-79.

⁴³ William of St. Thierry, cf. M. Davy, "L'amour de Dieu d'après Guillaume de Saint-Thierry," in *Revue des Sciences Religieuses*, 1938, 319-46; *Epistola ad fratres de Monte Dei*, 2. 2. 10, "cum fruitur, caritas est" (ML 184, 343); Anselm of Laon, *Enarrat. in Cantica*, 2; St. Bernard of Clairvaux, *De diligendo Deo*, 7. 17, "Non sine praemio diligitur Deus, etsi absque praemii intuitu diligendus sit . . . Habet praemium, sed id quod amatur" (ML 182, 984); Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis*, 2, 13, 8, "Quid est enim diligere nisi ipsum velle habere? Non aliud ab ipso sed ipsum, hoc est gratis" (ML 176, 534); Peter of Capua, *Summa aurea*, 2, 30 (cf. *Dict. de Spir.*, "Charité," 579); Odo of Tournai, *ibid.*; Ralph the Ardent, *homil.* 26, "toto desiderio ad coelestia tendunt" (ML 155, 1760); William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea*, 2. tr., 1, 4, "caritas, sive sit concupiscentia sive amicitia" (cit. *Dict. de Spir.*, "Charité," 577); Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, cit. *Dict. de Spir.* 579, "diligit Deum et se diligit."

⁴⁴ Peter Lombard, 3 *Sent.* dist., 38, 4, "Qui ergo caritatem sibi finem ponit, Deum sibi ponit finem . . ."

⁴⁵ Abelard, *Exposit. in Epist. Pauli ad Rom.*, 3, 7, "Si Deus qui me diligit

systematic exposition until much later, after St. Thomas' lifetime.

The common Scholastic teaching of the pre-Thomist Middle Ages, then, seems to have remained faithful to the Augustinian idea that the desire of union with God is included in charity. We find it also in the thirteenth century, with St. Albert the Great. "There is a reward," he says, "which is nothing else than God Himself and what unites us with Him; charity does not exclude the intention of this reward, but it does not envisage it under the aspect of reward, but as the beloved whom it desires to enjoy."⁴⁶ St. Bonaventure's answer to the same objection that charity does not look for a reward, reads as follows: "If you object that charity does not look for a reward, we must answer that this is to be understood of a created reward; of the uncreated reward it can not be said in truth, because the greater the charity, the more ardently it desires to be united with God and to possess God."⁴⁷ And further he states clearly that, "the love of friendship includes in some way a love of desire; . . . charity adheres and makes one adhere to the supreme Goodness; this is its first and only act, from which spring and in which are involved both love of desire and love of friendship. . . . That charity's chief act is to adhere to God, Augustine says explicitly enough in his book *De moribus Ecclesiae* (1, 14, 24)."⁴⁸ St. Bonaventure gives us what is perhaps his most expressive and unequivocal definition of charity in the phrase, "In charity man wishes the same supreme Good now to God, then to himself, then to his

diligam, et non potius quidquid mihi faciat, talis est qui super omnia diligendus est, dicitur de me illa Veritatis sententia: Si enim diligitis qui vos diligunt, quam mercedem habebitis?" (ML 178, 892); St. Bernard, *De diligendo Deo*, 10, 27, "Te enim quodammodo perdere . . ."; William of St. Thierry, *Epist. ad fratres de Monte Dei*, 2, 18, "columiliari summae maiestati, compauperari Filio Dei" (ML 184, 350).

⁴⁶ St. Albert the Great, *In 3 Sent. d. 29, a. 4*, "Est merces quae nihil aliud est quam ipse Deus . . ."

⁴⁷ St. Bonaventure, *In 3 Sent. d. 26, a. 1, q. 1, ad 5*, "... maxima caritas maxime desiderat uniri Deo et habere Deum."

⁴⁸ *In 3 Sent. d. 27, a. 1, q. 2, ad 6*, "amor amicitiae quodammodo includit amorem concupiscentiae . . ."

neighbour.”⁴⁹ Could we find a clearer expression than this to say that the desire for union with God is charity? Both the Seraphic Doctor and St. Albert agree that the disinterestedness required for charity does not exclude from it the wish to possess God or the desire of the uncreated reward. Rather the opposite: this desire grows with charity. The *propter ipsum*, for His own sake, required for charity, means for them what it meant for St. Augustine: *non propter aliud*, that is, not to gain from charity another reward than God Himself. From this rapid survey of the Catholic tradition on hope and charity it seems certain that the desire of union with God was not considered as hope but as charity. As to the third position, that it would be neither hope nor charity, no traces of it seem to be found.

II. THE TEACHING OF ST. THOMAS

1. HOPE ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS

St. Thomas dealt with the nature of hope in several of his writings and at different times of his life. His conception of hope we can clearly discern where he treats of the two main questions: 1° the deduction of the three theological virtues: here we see which role he assigns to hope; 2° the definition or description of the formal object of hope. Bearing in mind that the precise problem we are studying is whether the desire of union with God belongs to hope or to charity, we have to study the texts that expose the answer to these two questions.

The deduction of the three theological virtues occurs twice in the *Commentary on the Sentences*: first (III, d. XXIII, q. 1, a. 5) where he proves that there are three and only three theological virtues; secondly (III, d. XXVI, q. 2, a. 3), when he refutes the opinion that “hope is not a virtue distinct from the other theological virtues.”⁵⁰ The first text reads as follows: “The answer is, as we have said, that the theological virtues

⁴⁹ *In 3 Sent.* d. 27, a. 1, q. 2, “Istud summum bonum aliquando homo per caritatem optat Deo, aliquando sibi, aliquando proximo.”

⁵⁰ Cf. Abelard’s opinion noted above and the Opinions alluded to by Scotus, below.

produce in us an inclination towards the end, that is, towards God. Now, in every agent who is acting through his will in view of an end, two conditions are required in his attitude towards the end before he acts for it, namely, the knowledge of the end and the intention to reach it. . . . But to make this intention possible, two conditions again are necessary, namely, that the end is attainable, for no agent moves himself towards what is impossible; and that it is good, because we strive only after what is good. And for this reason faith is necessary which causes the end to be known; and hope which inspires trust in the obtention of the last end as in a thing which is possible for the agent; and charity which makes the end appear as a good for the agent who strives after it, inasmuch as it causes man to desire it; otherwise he would never strive after it."⁵¹ The idea seems to be clear and unmistakable. From the very nature of the theological virtues which adapt us to the supernatural end, it follows that there must be three of them: one to give the knowledge of this end, faith; and two more to make the tendency to this end a reality, of which the first makes the end attainable and inspires trust that its obtention is possible, hope; and the second makes the end desired, charity. In this light hope appears to be trust, and not desire.⁵²

When he has to show that hope is a virtue distinct from faith and charity, St. Thomas repeats the deduction of the theological virtues as follows: "The answer to the first question is, as we have said above, that the role of the theological virtues is to direct us towards the last end. Now, if any one is to start acting in view of some end, he must first know that end, and secondly desire it. But because the will can desire possible and impossible objects, and because no one really strives after what is not attainable for him even though he may desire it, for these reasons it is necessary for the will, if it is to begin to act, that it should tend towards its object as to something possible. And

⁵¹ *3 Sent.* d. 23, q. 1, a. 1, *III Sent.*, d. XXIII, q. 1, a. 1, "Etideo requiritur . . . spes, secundum quam inest fiducia de assecutione finis ultimi quasi de re possibili sibi."

⁵² Cf. *loc. cit.* ad 5, ". . . habeat fiduciam de consecutione finis."

this inclination of the will which tends to the eternal good as made attainable for the will by grace is precisely the act of hope. Hope, therefore, is something distinct from faith and charity, because faith produces knowledge of the end, in as far as it shows the end to be good, and in this manner the act of charity arises; but inasfar as it shows that the end is possible, it is the act of hope that originates, because faith is the foundation of all virtues, preceding them all in the natural order of their acts.”⁵³ Hope, then, is the inclination of the will towards the last end as towards an attainable object. It is the victory by grace over the difficulty inherent in the attainment of the final end. Hope makes the arduous object attainable. And in this it differs from charity, that it views its object under the aspect of arduousness, not as charity does, under the aspect of goodness.⁵⁴

The *Summa* also gives twice the deduction of the theological virtues, in a similar context and without any essential difference from the teaching of the Sentences. In the first place, the only new element is the explicit parallelism between man's natural potencies and the supernatural quasi-potencies by which he strives after the end whose obtention is bliss. “I answer that, as stated above, the theological virtues direct man to supernatural happiness in the same way as by natural inclination man is directed to his connatural end. Now the latter happens in respect of two things. First in respect of the reason or intellect. . . . Secondly, through the rectitude of the will. . . . Consequently in respect to both the above things man needed to receive in addition something supernatural to direct him to the supernatural end. First . . . faith. Secondly, the will is directed to this end, both as to the movement of intention, which tends to that end as to something attainable—and this pertains to hope—and as to a certain spiritual union, whereby the will is, so to speak, transformed into that

⁵³ *Ibid.*, d. XVI, a. 2, a. 3, ad 1 um. “. . . Ideo oportet quod voluntas ad hoc quod operari incipiat tendat in illud sicut in possibile. Et haec inclinatio voluntatis tendentis in bonum aeternum quasi possibile sibi per gratiam est actus spei.”

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, “. . . inquantum est altissimum arduum, est obiectum spei.”

end, and this belongs to charity.”⁵⁵ Hope, therefore, is the movement of the will towards the supernatural end as to an attainable object, whilst charity bespeaks union with, or transformation into, the end.

In the second place, where St. Thomas again answers the question whether hope is distinct from the other theological virtues, he proves a real distinction between them by proposing a deduction of the three virtues which at first sight is different from his previous ones: “I answer that, a virtue is said to be theological from having God for the object to which it adheres. Now one may adhere to a thing in two ways: first, for its own sake, secondly, because something else is attained thereby. Accordingly charity makes man adhere to God for His own sake, uniting his mind to God by the emotion of love. On the other hand, hope and faith make man adhere to God as to a principle wherefrom certain things accrue to us. Now we derive from God both knowledge of truth and the attainment of perfect goodness. Accordingly faith makes us adhere to God, as to the source whence we derive the knowledge of truth, while hope makes us adhere to God, as to the source whence we derive perfect goodness, i. e., insofar as, by hope, we rely on the divine assistance for obtaining happiness.”⁵⁶ Charity unites man to God for His own sake, not to obtain something else from Him; faith and hope unite to God as to the principle of truth and happiness. What does this mean for hope? Not that hope is the obtention of this happiness or the desire of it. It is said explicitly, hope is the *reliance* on God’s help to attain this beatitude. Hope is essentially trust in God, and the union with God it produces is exactly this confidence in God’s helping power.⁵⁷ But, as will be explained further, hope is connected

⁵⁵ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 62, a. 3, “Secundo vero est voluntas quae ordinatur in illum finem et quantum ad motum intentionis in ipsum tendentem sicut in id quod est possibile consequi quod pertinet ad spem.”

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 17, a. 6, “Spes autem facit adhaerere Deo prout est nobis principium perfectae bonitatis, inquantum scilicet per spem divino auxilio innititur ad beatitudinem consequendam.”

⁵⁷ Cf. *loc. cit.*, ad 3, “Spes facit tendere in Deum sicut in quodam bonum finale adipiscendum, et sicut in quodam adiutorium efficax ad subveniendum.” That is,

with a love of desire for God, yet it is not itself a desire. The notion of hope has not changed.

In his last deduction of the theological virtues, St. Thomas answers the question whether the virtues are distinguished among themselves. Of the theological virtues he says: "In order that we may be led to the End in the right way, the End must be both known and desired. But the desire of the End requires two things: namely, confidence in the obtention of the End, because no wise man strives after what he can not attain, and love of the End, because only what is loved is desired. For this reason there are three theological virtues, namely, faith by which we know God; hope, by which we hope to attain Him; and charity by which we love Him."⁵⁸ Here again hope is conceived as the virtue which makes God, the last end, attainable. It is trust in God who makes it possible for us to attain Him as our final Goal. It is not desire.

The study of the *formal object of hope* will confirm and explicate this conclusion. St. Thomas dealt with this subject in four different works which we must examine in their chronological order and see what he answers to the question: What is the formal aspect under which God, the supernatural End (Object of all three theological virtues), is viewed and attained in hope?

In the *Commentary on the Sentences*, the question about the formal object of hope is not asked *ex professo*, but many fragmentary considerations about the proper act of hope are given which clearly point to its formal object. In one place St. Thomas treats of hope, first as a passion of the sensitive appetite, then as a virtue. As a passion, he says, "Hope relates

hope regards the obtention of the last supernatural End (its material object; this it has in common with the other theological virtues); and its proper characteristic as a theological virtue, or its own way of uniting to God, is to rely on God's help in order to attain the last End.

⁵⁸ *Q. Disp. De Virtutibus*, a. 12, "Desiderium autem finis duo exigit, scilicet fiduciam de fine obtinendo, quia nullus sapiens movetur ad id quod obtinere non potest . . . et ideo . . . est spes qua ipsum nos obtenturos speramus." It may be noted that *desire* is taken here to designate the complex attitude of the will before the last End, a broader meaning than that which will be examined below of the desire presupposed to hope.

to a good that is attainable and yet is hard to attain; for that reason it is called arduous.”⁵⁹ It resides in what is called the irascible power of the sensitive appetite. On a higher level, in the intellective appetitive power, hope designates “a simple operation of the will striving spiritually after some arduous object.”⁶⁰ When considered as a virtue, hope is the infused habit which regards eternal life, an arduous object that is above the power of nature.⁶¹ Its act is not mercenary, for, “though hope expects a reward, it does so, not in so far as it is a reward, but as some supreme arduous object.”⁶² Hope is a theological virtue, for it is the gratuitous gift which inclines the will “towards the arduous Object that is beyond the power of nature but which man is able to attain through grace, namely, God Himself, as He is our beatitude.”⁶³ The act of hope is not desire or love, but it mediates between desire and love: “Hope presupposes a desire and is intermediate between love and desire.”⁶⁴ Hope is certain, that is, “because hope supposes the power to reach the End, which originates from God’s liberality and man’s merits . . . the certitude of hope is caused by God’s liberality who directs us towards the End, and also by the inclination given by the other virtues, and further by the inclination of the habit (of hope) itself.”⁶⁵ The object of hope, as theological virtue, is therefore God considered as the supreme arduous Object, attainable through the God-given power of this virtue.

The *Summa* states the formal object of hope explicitly. In the study of the passion, we read that, “in the object of

⁵⁹ *III Sent.*, d. XXVI, a. 1, a. 2, “Spes secundum quod est passio est in irascibili.”

⁶⁰ *Loc. cit.*, a. 5.

⁶¹ *Loc. cit.*, a. 2, a. 1, ad 2.

⁶² *Ibid.*, ad 5.

⁶³ *Loc. cit.*, a. 2.

⁶⁴ *Loc. cit.*, a. 3, ad 12^{um}, “Spes praesupponit desiderium et est media inter amorem et desiderium.” The desire of which this text speaks is evidently taken in a narrower sense than as noted above (fn. 9). There, the desire, as a complex attitude, was said to comprise both hope and charity; here it is presupposed in hope and love. What this desire is, will be examined later.

⁶⁵ *Loc. cit.*, a. 4.

hope, we may note four conditions. First that it is something good. . . . Secondly, that it is future. . . . Thirdly that it must be something arduous and difficult to obtain . . . in this respect, hope differs from desire or cupidity, which regards the future good absolutely; wherefore it belongs to the concupiscible, while hope belongs to the irascible faculty. Fourthly, that this difficult thing is something possible to obtain. . . . It is therefore evident that hope differs from desire, as the irascible passions differ from the concupiscible.”⁶⁶ This fourfold formality of the object of hope will be found also in the virtue. When answering the question “whether hope is in the apprehensive or in the appetitive power” and refusing the opinion, noted above in Abelard,⁶⁷ which placed it in the cognitive faculties, St. Thomas explains, “Hope is a movement of the appetitive power ensuing from the apprehension of a future good, difficult but possible to obtain; namely a stretching forth of the appetite to such a good.”⁶⁸ Consequently, he grants that hope is confidence, when answering a difficulty based on this assumption: “When a man desires a thing and reckons that he can get it, he believes that he will get it; and from this belief (*fides*) which precedes in the cognitive power, the ensuing movement is called confidence.”⁶⁹ He explains in what sense hope is expectation: “properly speaking (a man) is said to await that which he hopes to get by another’s help as though to await (*expectare*) implied keeping one’s eyes on another (*ex alio spectare*), insofar as the apprehensive power which precedes, not only keeps its eye on the good which a man intends to get, but also on the thing by whose power he hopes to get it.”⁷⁰ Keeping in mind these indications about the passion of hope, we can now

⁶⁶ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 40, a. 1, “bonum . . . futurum . . . arduum . . . adipiscibile. Sic ergo patet quod spes differt a desiderio, sicut differunt passionēs irascibilis a passionibus concupiscibilis.”

⁶⁷ Cf. fn. 17.

⁶⁸ *Loc. cit.*, a. 2, “. . . extensio appetitus in huiusmodi (i.e. bonum futurum arduum possibile adipisci) obiectum.”

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, ad 2 . . . “et ex tali fide in cognitiva praecedente, motus sequens in appetitu fiducia nominatur.”

⁷⁰ *Loc. cit.*, a. 1, ad 2.

read what St. Thomas says about the formal object of the theological virtue of hope.

We read: "The hope of which we speak now attains God by leaning on His help in order to attain the hoped for good. Now an effect must be proportionate to its cause. Wherefore the good which we ought to hope from God properly and chiefly is the infinite Good. . . . Such a good is eternal life, which consists in the enjoyment of God Himself. For we should hope from Him for nothing less than Himself, since His goodness whereby He imparts good things to His creatures, is no less than His essence."⁷¹ That is, hope attains God as its material object, since it is a theological virtue. The aspect under which it regards this object is reliance on His help in order to attain eternal life or the enjoyment of God Himself. This reliance on God's help makes us lay hold of God in the way proper to hope: "Wherefore, insofar as we hope for anything as being made possible to us by means of the divine assistance, our hope attains God Himself, on whose help it leans."⁷² Because of this particular way of attaining its Object, hope is different from love: ". . . love and hope differ in this that love denotes union between lover and beloved, while hope denotes a movement or a stretching forth of the appetite towards an arduous good."⁷³ It is in the very victory over the arduousness of its object that hope unites with God. Hence follows its theological character. St. Thomas explains this: ". . . hope has the character of virtue from the fact that it attains the supreme rule of human actions: and this it attains both as its first efficient cause, inasmuch as it leans on its assistance, and as its final cause, inasmuch as it expects happiness in the enjoyment thereof."⁷⁴

This looking up to God's help explains the element of expectation proper to hope: "The expectation which is mentioned in the definition of hope does not imply delay, as

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, q. 17, a. 2, "Spes . . . attingit Deum innitens eius auxilio ad consequendum bonum speratum."

⁷² *Ibid.*, a. 1, "spes nostra attingit ipsum Deum, cuius auxilio innitimur."

⁷³ *Loc. cit.*, a. 4, "spes autem importat quemdam motum sive protensionem appetitus in aliquod bonum arduum."

⁷⁴ *Loc. cit.*, a. 5.

does the expectation which belongs to longanimity. It implies a reference to the divine assistance, whether that which we hope for be delayed or not.”⁷⁵ It also throws light on the proper arduousness of the object of hope: “. . . hope, as a theological virtue, regards something arduous, to be obtained by another’s help, as stated above.”⁷⁶ Hope presupposes an imperfect love or desire, but it is not itself a love or a desire: “. . . Hope and all movements of the appetite flow from love. . . . Now there is a perfect and an imperfect love. (Perfect love . . . as a man loves a friend; imperfect love, . . . as a man loves what he desires) Hope pertains to the second love, since he that hopes, intends to obtain possession of something for himself.”⁷⁷ We shall consider later the apparent difficulty suggested in this text; we only note here that hope is not said to be a love or a desire, but only to flow from it. Its specifying object is the following: “Now hope takes its species from its principal object, even as other virtues do . . . and its principal object is eternal happiness as being possible to obtain by the assistance of God. . . . Since then the arduous possible good cannot be an object of hope except insofar as it is something future, it follows that when happiness is no longer future, but present, it is incompatible with the virtue of hope.”⁷⁸ For that reason hope is voided in heaven. For another reason, because its object is no longer attainable, hope is also absent from hell: “(The damned) cannot apprehend happiness as a possible good. . . . Consequently there is no hope . . . in the damned.”⁷⁹ God’s help is needed to overcome the special difficulty inherent

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, ad 5. “Expectatio quae ponitur in definitione spei . . . importat respectum ad auxilium divinum.”

⁷⁶ *Ibid.* ad 4.

⁷⁷ *Loc. cit.*, a. 8, “Spes, et omnis appetitivus motus, ex amore derivatur . . . Spes pertinet ad secundum amorem (imperfectum).” We must note here already which relation St. Thomas places between hope and the imperfect love, or love of desire, that precedes hope. As will be remarked still later, neither here nor elsewhere does he consider desire as identical with hope. From this text it is clear that, “*spes pertinet ad secundum amorem ex amore derivatur.*”

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 18, a. 2, “Obiectum principale eius (spei) est beatitudo aeterna secundum quod est possibilis haberi ex auxilio divino.”

⁷⁹ *Loc. cit.*, a. 3.

in the object of hope. What is this help? "Hope does not trust chiefly in grace already received, but in God's omnipotence and mercy, whereby even he that has not grace, can obtain it, so as to come to eternal life."⁸⁰ This precision was needed to explain that hope can exist without charity.

From these different aspects of the formal object of hope, no mistake seems possible in concluding: Hope *relies* on God to make the attainment of man's final end possible; His help brings into play His omnipotence and mercy. Hope itself does not regard this end under the aspect of goodness, although this goodness is presupposed to it. It *is* not a desire of God, although it presupposes a desire.

This teaching of the *Summa* is taught elsewhere by St. Thomas. We read: "The hope of attaining eternal life has a double object, namely, eternal life itself for which man hopes, and the divine help from which he hopes. . . . Hope has the character of virtue from the very fact that man relies on the help of the divine power in order to attain eternal life." And further: "Thus also is the formal object of hope the help of the divine power and loving kindness, on account of which the act of hope strives after the hoped for goods which are the material object of hope."⁸¹ That is, eternal life or union with God is the material object of hope; its formal object is the divine help. It is this reliance on God's assistance which makes of hope a virtue: "Insofar as hope regards its formal object, that is, the divine help, that far it is a disposition of the perfect man, for man's perfection consists in this, that he adheres to God."⁸² If hope is a virtue, it can not be desire, because, "desire is no name for any virtue."⁸³ Because of its formal object, hope, as the other theological virtues, does not consist

⁸⁰ *Loc. cit.*, a. 4, ad 2, "Spes . . . innititur principaliter . . . divinae omnipotentiae et misericordiae."

⁸¹ *Q. Disp. De Spe*, a. 1, "Spes habet rationem virtutis ex hoc ipso quod homo inhaeret auxilio divinae potestatis ad consequendum vitam aeternam . . . ita formale obiectum spei est auxilium divinae potestatis et pietatis, propter quod tendit motus spei in bona sperata, quae sunt materiale obiectum spei."

⁸² *Ibid.*, ad 4.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, ad 6, "Nec desiderium nominat virtutem aliquam."

in a mean; "... from the side of its formal object, which is the divine help, (hope) does not consist in a mean, for no one can rely too much on the divine help."⁸⁴ The trust that is hope already possesses God in a way; "... hope causes the hoped for thing to be present in a way, that is, through the confidence that it will be obtained."⁸⁵

With this clear and explicit teaching on the formal object of hope there may seem to be a difficulty in reconciling what he states about the love and desire which precedes hope. Before entering into this we must recall what St. Thomas teaches about the relation of hope as a passion to love and desire. About the passion of hope he notes that "... hope presupposes desire; just as all the irascible passions presuppose the passions of the concupiscible faculty."⁸⁶ And when answering the question, "whether hope is the cause of love," St. Thomas speaks of a mutual causality between hope and love, in one aspect, that is—"as hope regards the good we hope to get, it is caused by love, since we do not hope except for that which we desire and love." But in another aspect, that is, "insofar as hope regards one through whom something becomes possible to us, love is caused by hope and not vice-versa." Which is the love that is caused by hope? Which is the one that causes hope? We read in the same article: "Because by the very fact that we hope that good will accrue to us through some one, we are moved towards him as to our own good, and thus we begin to love him." This is to say that hope causes love of the person from whom we hope or on whom we rely to obtain something. "Whereas from the fact that we love someone we do not hope in him, except accidentally, that is, insofar as we think that he returns our love,"⁸⁷ in other words, it is not the love of a person, but the love or desire of some good that may come from him, which is cause of hope.

These two kinds of love, namely, love of a thing which is cause of hope and love of a person which is caused by hope,

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, ad 7.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, ad 13.

⁸⁶ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 40, a. 1.

⁸⁷ *Loc. cit.*, a. 8.

he treats again, but transposed to a higher level. In answering the question, "whether hope precedes charity" (as in the *Summa*,⁸⁸ where a similar question was asked, "whether charity precedes hope"), St. Thomas distinguishes a double love, one perfect the other imperfect. Love is imperfect, "when some one loves a thing not so as to wish it good in itself, but so as to wish the good of the thing for himself"; it is perfect, "when the good of another is loved in itself; . . . this is the love of friendship whereby some one is loved for his own sake."⁸⁹ Of the perfect love it is said that it is charity: "Charity is not any love of God, but perfect love by which God is loved in Himself."⁹⁰ And the imperfect love is placed in relation with hope but, characteristically enough and consistently with what the *Summa* and the *Sentences* taught, it is not identified with hope: ". . . as for the attainment of some goods, hope belongs to the love of self which is a movement tending to acquire something, as we said."⁹¹ This is very nearly textually the teaching of the *Summa*. There also, the imperfect love of God was said to be the one to which hope pertains, that is, in the context, from which hope springs.⁹² Both here and in the *Summa*, hope pertains to the imperfect love of God because it is derived from it. In the order of generation of the virtues, what is imperfect precedes what is perfect. Hope is imperfect compared with charity because it originates from an interested love (not because it *is* an interested love, for hope is not love), whilst charity is a disinterested love of God. Hope precedes and prepares charity: ". . . hope leads up to charity by the very fact that some one who hopes to obtain some good from God

⁸⁸ II-II, q. 17, a. 8.

⁸⁹ *Q. Disp. De Spe*, a. 3, "Duplex amor, unus quidem imperfectus . . . alius perfectus."

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, "Caritas non est quicumque amor Dei, sed amor perfectus, quo Deus secundum seipsum diligitur." What this *secundum seipsum* means, and in what sense the *amor imperfectus* is excluded from charity, will be examined later in the study on charity.

⁹¹ *Loc. cit.*, "Pertinet ad amorem sui spes, qui est motus tendens in aliquid adipiscendum." Cf. fn. 77.

⁹² Cf. II-II, q. 17, a. 8.

is led to love God for His own sake.”⁹³ What the first article of the question *De Spe* taught about the formal object of hope indicates how we have to understand here in the third article that “hope . . . is a movement tending towards the acquisition of something, as we have said”; namely that hope tends to attain its object, “relying on the divine help which is the formal object of hope.”⁹⁴

St. Thomas’s last treatment of hope, in the *Compendium Theologiae*, adds no new elements to his teaching on its formal object. Perhaps more unmistakably still he brings out that hope is above all trust in God’s help in view of the attainment of eternal life. Faith follows hope: “the act of hope by which man enlightened by faith can attain with God’s help the good that he naturally desires.”⁹⁵ The reasons for the certitude of the confidence that our hope is we find exposed in the fourth chapter: Because we are God’s handiwork, “man must have hope in God that he may be governed by Him rightly. . . . But this trust ought to be most certain . . . , since no deficiency can affect God . . . and for that reason the hope by which man has confidence in God does not disappoint him who hopes.” God takes special care of His rational creatures, “which are marked out with the dignity of His image and are able to arrive at knowing and loving Him. . . . They therefore ought to have confidence in God . . . that they can also acquire merit before Him.” A last reason of their confidence: grace has made men sharers in the divine nature and sons of God, “but having been made sons, they may rightly hope for the inheritance.”⁹⁶ No danger that our trust will be disappointed. It is true, “for the

⁹³ *Q. Disp. De Spe*, a. 3 “... dum aliquis per hoc quod sperat se aliquid bonum a Deo consequi, ad hoc deducitur ut Deum propter se amet.” Cf. I-II, q. 40, a. 8, on the relation between the passion of hope and love.

⁹⁴ *Loc. cit.* a. 1 and 2, “Innixa auxilio divino quod est obiectum formale spei.” The above solution will be further completed in what follows on the love of desire that belongs to charity.

⁹⁵ *Comp. Theol.*, P. II, c. 1. We need not enter here on the question of the natural desire (quae naturaliter desiderat) of the supernatural goods. This accidental mention would leave the meaning of our text unaltered if left out.

⁹⁶ *Op. cit.*, c. 4. fiducia.

confidence of hope it is not enough that he on whom our hope relies be willing to help, if he has not the power to do so.”⁹⁷ But God is all-powerful. Finally, “hope presupposes a desire,” for, “three conditions are required that something may be hoped for: first, that it is desired . . . secondly, that what is hoped for, is considered as attainable; this is what hope adds to desire . . . thirdly, that what is to be hoped for is arduous. . . .”⁹⁸

This analytical survey of St. Thomas’ texts on hope places beyond doubt that for him, as for the common Catholic tradition before, hope is essentially trust, or reliance on God’s help. It does not include, but it presupposes, the desire of union with God. What this desire exactly is, will be examined later. Nowhere do we find hope identified with the imperfect love of God, or with the love of desire for God, though it has a necessary relation to this. The desire of God, for St. Thomas, is not an act of hope.

2. DESIRE OF GOD AND CHARITY

Is, then, the desire of union with God an act of charity? To find St. Thomas’ answer to this question, we shall examine the following five points: (1) the role and the place he assigns to charity in the deduction of the three theological virtues; (2) the formal object of charity; (3) charity considered as love of friendship: does it or not exclude the love of desire for God? (4) charity and its reward: may charity have a reward in view? (5) how does St. Thomas understand the phrase *propter seipsum* (for His own sake), when it is said that in charity God is loved for His own sake? From all this it should appear what is for St. Thomas the disinterested character of charity, and thus what he answers to the problem we are studying: Is desire of union with God, if not hope, then charity?

1. *The Role of Charity Among the Three Theological Virtues.* We briefly recall, in their chronological order, the texts wherein St. Thomas deduces the three theological virtues. The common role of the three is to adapt man to the super-

⁹⁷ *Op. cit.*, c. 6.

⁹⁸ *Op. cit.*, c. 7, “*Spes desiderium praesupponit . . .*”

natural end, God, to whose possession he has been called. Faith makes this end known; hope makes it attainable. What of charity?

According to the *Commentary on the Sentences*, "charity (is necessary) which makes the end appear as good for the agent who strives after it, in the sense that it causes man to desire it: otherwise he would never strive after it."⁹⁹ Charity produces desire and love of the end. And further, "faith produces knowledge of the end inasfar as it shows the end to be good and in this manner the act of charity arises,"¹⁰⁰ that is, the act of charity is the movement of the will tending towards the end that appears as good.

In the *Summa*, charity is said to be a union with God: "the will is directed to this end . . . as to a certain spiritual union, whereby the will is, so to speak, transformed into that end—and this belongs to charity."¹⁰¹ Charity is union with God for His own sake: ". . . charity makes us adhere to God for His own sake, uniting our minds to God by the emotion of love."¹⁰² What does this mean? Without anticipating what will follow about the phrase *propter ipsum*, we may add: ". . . Charity attains God Himself that it may rest in Him, but not that something may accrue to us from Him."¹⁰³ It is then clear that charity unites with God and finds rest in this union; it does not seek for something other than God Himself, but it does seek God Himself.

The *Quaestiones Disputatae* teach the same idea of charity.

⁹⁹ *III Sent.*, d. 23, q. 1, a. 3, "Et caritas (requiritur) per quam finis reputatur bonus ipsi tendenti in quantum facit quod homo afficiatur ad finem: alioquin numquam tenderet in ipsum." As will be pointed out later, the desire here said to belong to charity, is not the same as the imperfect desire presupposed in hope; though even this, in a way, comes from an inchoate charity.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 3, sol. 1, "Fides facit cognitionem de fine, in quantum ostendit finem bonum esse, et sic insurgit motus caritatis."

¹⁰¹ I-II, q. 62, a. 3, "In quantum est summum bonum, est obiectum caritatis."

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, q. 17, a. 6, "Caritas facit hominem Deo inhaerere propter seipsum, mentem hominis uniens Deo per affectum amoris." The meaning of the *propter seipsum* will be studied below.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, q. 23, a. 6, caritas attingit ipsum Deum ut in eo sistat, non ut ex eo aliquid nobis proveniat.

"The desire of the end requires . . . love of the end, because only what is loved is desired, and for that reason (there is) charity by which we love Him."¹⁰⁴ Charity is the love of the end that we desire. And this love is a perfect love, or love of friendship, by which He is loved for His own sake: "Charity is not any love of God, but perfect love by which God is loved in Himself. . . . This is a love of friendship whereby some one is loved for himself."¹⁰⁵ In a word, charity is the right disposition before the last end, God: "through charity man is placed in the proper disposition towards the last end. . . ."¹⁰⁶ Whilst, therefore, faith makes the last end known, and hope makes it attainable, charity constitutes the actual striving after or union with the last end. To unite man to God as to his last goal, actually possessed or longed for is, for St. Thomas, the essential function of the third theological virtue.

2. *The Formal Object of Charity.* Under which aspect does charity view and attain God, the last supernatural end? The divine or infinite goodness, which is last end, is the formal aspect under which charity attains God, according to the *Commentary on the Sentences*. "Since charity loves principally God and all other objects only insofar as they are God's, it is clear that charity receives its unity from the unity of the divine goodness which it considers primarily: it is one virtue."¹⁰⁷ This goodness, "which is the last end,"¹⁰⁸ "is the proper and principal object of charity,"¹⁰⁹ for, "the reason for loving God is the divine goodness."¹¹⁰

The *Summa* views the same formal object of charity from different angles. God's goodness or the last end possessed in the beatitude is the aspect under which charity attains God.

¹⁰⁴ *Q. Disp. De Virtut.*, a. 12.

¹⁰⁵ *Q. Disp. De Spe*, a. 3.

¹⁰⁶ *Q. Disp. De Caritate*, a. 4, "Cum per caritatem homo disponatur ut bene se habeat ad ultimum finem."

¹⁰⁷ *III Sent.*, d. 27, q. 2, a. 4, sol. 1.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, ad 2.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, sol. 2. "Obiectum enim caritatis proprium et principale est bonitas divina."

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, q. 3, a. 4, "Causa . . . diligendi Deum divina bonitas est."

"Charity is not any kind of love of God, but that love of God by which He is loved as the object of bliss."¹¹¹ Further, "The divine good, inasmuch as it is the object of happiness, has a special aspect of good, wherefore the love of charity, which is the love of that good, is a special kind of love."¹¹² Still, "Charity tends towards the last end considered as last end: and this does not apply to any other virtue."¹¹³ If this is so, and if charity seeks God as man's last end, union with God and fruition of Him are essential features of charity's formal object. This appears in what St. Thomas says of the third and highest degree of charity: "Man's third pursuit is to aim chiefly at union with and enjoyment of God: this belongs to the perfect who desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ."¹¹⁴ Again, when the formal object of the charity of the neighbour is pointed out, this essential desire for union with God appears: "Now, the aspect under which our neighbour is to be loved, is God, since what we ought to love in our neighbour is that he may be in God."¹¹⁵ Or, "Charity extends only to such things as have a natural capacity for everlasting life."¹¹⁶ Or, "... Now fellowship in the full participation of happiness . . . is the reason of loving one's neighbour."¹¹⁷ If charity is friendship, as we shall see it is, it seeks union, for "the friendship of charity is based on the fellowship of happiness."¹¹⁸ "The love of charity tends to God as to the principle of happiness in the fellowship of which the friendship of charity is based."¹¹⁹

Lastly, St. Thomas calls the formal object of charity the divine good, to be possessed in the beatitude; "Charity con-

¹¹¹ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 65, a. 5, ad 1, "Caritas non est qualiscumque amor Dei, sed amor Dei quo diligitur ut beatitudinis obiectum."

¹¹² *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 23, a. 4.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, q. 26, a. 1, ad 1, "Caritas tendit in ultimum finem sub ratione finis ultimi; quod non convenit alicui alii virtuti."

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, q. 24, a. 9, "Ut Deo inhaereat et Deo fruatur."

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, q. 25, a. 1.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, a. 3, ad 3.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, q. 26, a. 5.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, q. 25, a. 12, "Amicitia caritatis super communicatione beatitudinis fundatur."

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, q. 26, a. 1.

siders as its formal object the divine good.”¹²⁰ Charity is “the love of the supreme Good . . . insofar as it is the object of the beatitude which surpasses the whole capacity of the created nature.”¹²¹ “Charity therefore has some special good as its proper object, namely, the good of the divine beatitude.”¹²² And “to love that good (which is shared by the blessed) for itself, that it may be lasting and be spread, and that nothing be done against it, this manner of acting places a man in the right disposition towards the fellowship of the blessed, and that is charity.”¹²³ In the *De Spe*, St. Thomas speaks of the object of charity thus: “(Man) can love God above all things in another way, insofar as God is object of the beatitude and as a kind of rational fellowship of the mind with God is established through some spiritual unity; this love is the act of charity.”¹²⁴ We may conclude: St. Thomas consistently taught that the formal object of charity is God as man’s last end or supreme good, union with Whom is essential to the very life of charity.

3. *Love of Friendship and Love of Desire.* St. Thomas conceives charity as a love of friendship for God, as others did before Him, for example, St. Bonaventure. Does this mean that he excludes from charity the love of desire for God?¹²⁵ His analysis of friendship and of its connection with the desire of God, gives, it would seem, an unequivocal answer.

We read in the *Sentences*, “The love (of charity) includes the desire of the Beloved by which his presence is longed for . . . Charity is a friendship of man with God whereby man loves God and God loves man.”¹²⁶ Or, “Every friendship includes a

¹²⁰ *Q. Disp. De Caritate*, a. 2, ad 5 “Caritas respicit ut formale obiectum bonum divinum.”

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, a. 1, ad 16, “Amor summi boni . . . prout est obiectum illius beatitudinis.”

¹²² *Ibid.*, a. 7; cf. a. 10, “Obiectum caritatis est summum bonum.”

¹²³ *Ibid.*, a. 1.

¹²⁴ *Q. Disp. De Spe*, a. 1, ad 9, “. . . diligere Deum super omnia, secundum quod Deus est obiectum beatitudinis, et secundum quod fit quaedam societas rationalis mentis ad Deum quadam spirituali unitate.”

¹²⁵ As stated by Zimara, *Das Wesen der Hoffnung*.

¹²⁶ *III Sent.*, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1, “Amor (caritatis) includit concupiscentiam amati qua desideratur eius praesentia.”

desire or concupiscence, and speaks of something additional to this desire.”¹²⁷ And again, “True friendship desires to see the friend and to enjoy his conversation; friendship exists chiefly for the friend, but not in such a manner that the pleasure derived from the friend’s presence and enjoyment be considered as the end of the friendship, as is the case in a friendship based on pleasure.”¹²⁸ So, because charity is a true friendship, it seeks the presence of the Friend and union with Him; though, because it is a true, and not a pseudo-friendship (as e. g., one based on pleasure), it does not seek this presence mainly for the sake of the enjoyment. St. Thomas states this explicitly: “. . . Because a happiness is promised us in which we shall be similar to the angels and which surpasses the power of man and angel alike . . . a happiness which is connatural to God alone . . . for that reason it is necessary, in order to attain this divine happiness that man share in the divine life. . . . And so there ought to exist some friendship with God whereby we live with Him: and this is charity.”¹²⁹ This friendship supposes that “we be made similar to God through some participation in spiritual gifts, and that we seek Him as He can be participated in by His friends in glory.”¹³⁰ It seems clear: charity is a friendship that seeks to share God’s own happiness: it can not but seek His presence.

According to the *Summa*, which treats the friendship of charity in a systematic way, the love of friendship for God, of its nature, seeks the return of love: “Charity signifies not only the love of God, but also a certain friendship with Him; which implies, besides love, a certain mutual return of love, together with mutual communion. . . .”¹³¹ It implies mutual benevolence or well-wishing, God’s initiative establishing the communion

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, ad 1, “Amicitia quaelibet concupiscentia et desiderium includit, et aliquid super eam addit.”

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, ad 11.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, a. 2.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, ad 4.

¹³¹ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 65, a. 5, “Caritas non solum significat amorem Dei, sed etiam amicitiam quamdam ad ipsum, quae quidem super amorem addit mutuam redamationem cum quadam communicatione mutua.”

which enables us to love Him in charity: "Accordingly, since there is a communication between man and God, inasmuch as He communicates His happiness to us, some kind of friendship must needs be based on this same communication. . . . The love which is based on this communication, is charity: wherefore it is evident that charity is a certain friendship of man for God."¹³²

Charity, then, of its nature, means union with God: "Now charity is love for God, whose good is unchangeable, since He is His goodness, and from the very fact that He is loved, He is in those who love Him by His most excellent effect, according to St. John (*I Epis.* iv, 16): 'He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him.'"¹³³ The friendship of charity causes a man to love all that is God's; consequently it implies a love of self: "Hence, among these other things which he loves out of charity because they pertain to God, he loves himself out of charity."¹³⁴ The friendship of God seeks union with God, yet this love of desire of God, although essential to charity, is subordinate to the love of benevolence. "That a man wishes to enjoy God pertains to that love which is love of concupiscence. Now we love God, with the love of friendship more than with the love of concupiscence, because the divine good is greater in itself than our share of good in enjoying Him. Hence out of charity, man simply loves God more than himself."¹³⁵ Both loves, however, originate from the same habit: "The same virtuous habit inclines us to love and desire the beloved good, and to rejoice in it."¹³⁶ The subordinate character of the love of desire appears in St. Thomas' answer to the query, "Whether

¹³² *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 23, a. 1, "Cum ergo sit aliqua communicatio hominis ad Deum secundum quod nobis suam beatitudinem communicat, super hanc communicationem oportet aliquam amicitiam fundari."

¹³³ *Ibid.*, q. 28, a. 1, "Ex hoc ipso quod amatur, est in amante . . ."

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, q. 25, a. 4.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, q. 26, a. 3, ad 3, "Magis autem amamus Deum amore amicitiae quam amore concupiscentiae, quia maius est in se bonum Dei quam participare possumus fruendo ipso."

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, q. 28, a. 4, "Habitūs virtutis idem est qui inclināt ad diligendum, et ad desiderandum bonum dilectum, et ad gaudendum de eo."

to be loved is more proper to charity than to love." He teaches: "To love is more proper to charity than to be loved, for that which befits a thing by reason of itself and its essence pertains to it more than that which is befitting to it by reason of something else."¹³⁷ But it remains that well-wishing alone does not constitute charity. Return of love is essential to it, and hence the wish for this return can never be excluded from charity. "Accordingly, to love, considered as an act of charity, includes goodwill, but such dilection or love adds union of affections (inasmuch as the lover deems the beloved as somewhat united to him, or belonging to him, and so tends towards him)." ¹³⁸ What, therefore, the *Summa* taught us to be essential to charity when considered as the volition of the last end, God (in the deduction of the theological virtues), namely, the wish of union with God, that again is required by the very nature of charity conceived as a friendship between man and God. Friends can not but wish their mutual union.¹³⁹

Little is to be added to this from the *De Caritate*. We find there the physical conception of love applied to charity. "It is of the nature of love or charity to unite in affections, namely, this union is to be understood in the sense that man considers his friend as another self, and wishes him good just as to himself."¹⁴⁰ So, communion in bliss is essential to all love of charity and it is the reason why all are to be loved. "There-

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, q. 27, a. 1. Cf. *ibid.*, ad 2, "Magis pertinet ad caritatem velle amare quam velle amari." To love flows from charity itself; to be loved supposes the return of the love by another. Hence the latter is subordinate to the former, but without it a love of God, of mere benevolence which is not mutual, would not be charity.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, a. 2, "In dilectione, secundum quod est actus caritatis, includitur quidem benevolentia, sed dilectio sive amor addit unionem affectuum."

¹³⁹ We note now that the love of desire included in charity is different from the imperfect love of desire which precedes hope, since it is a perfect love, "formed" and enlivened by grace, whilst the desire antecedent to hope (in one not in a state of grace) is "inform," not perfected by charity. The love of desire included in charity is what provokes the answer of mutual benevolence or well-wishing which completes charity as friendship. Cf. G. Gilleman, S.J. "Erôs ou Agapè," *Nouvelle Revue Théologique*, January and February, 1950.

¹⁴⁰ *Q. Disp. De Caritate*, a. 2, ad 6.

fore, out of charity we have to love God, as the source of beatitude, but every man must love himself out of charity, that he may share in that beatitude, and his neighbour as a companion in that bliss, and his own body inasmuch as bliss is extended to it."¹⁴¹

It seems certain then, that St. Thomas considers the wish for union with God as inseparable from and intrinsic to the friendship of charity. Provided, of course, the desire of sharing God's bliss be a theological act, whose formal reason remains God Himself, and not a self-regarding love that is purely human in its motive, the love of desire of God is charity. It is not its principal, but only its subordinate act; yet it is essential and inseparable from the friendly well-wishing towards God which is the chief and fundamental act of divine charity. The union of both loves, of benevolence and of desire, realised in mutual communion, properly constitutes the friendship which expresses the true nature of charity.¹⁴²

4. *Charity and its reward.* May then charity have a reward in view? The love of God which is charity should it not be disinterested? We remember St. Bonaventure's answer to this question: Charity may not seek a created reward, but the intention of seeking the uncreated reward, God Himself, is not against the purity of charity. St. Thomas faces the same objection in the *Sentences*: "It would seem that in the love of God there may be no regard for some reward." His answer is different from St. Bonaventure's, and brings in a distinction taken from the viewpoint of finality: "He who has charity may not have an eye on a reward, in the sense that he makes of anything the end of the Beloved, that is, of God, for this would be against the nature of charity as friendship, nor in the sense that he makes of any temporal good the end of his love itself, because this would go against the nature of charity as a

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, a. 7.

¹⁴² The *Summa* stresses perhaps more that the *De Caritate* the subordination of the love of desire to the love of benevolence. But it insists as much on the idea of communion in bliss. Moreover this difference in stressing divers aspects leaves unaltered the plain fact that the desire of union with God belongs to charity and that without it charity is not charity.

virtue. He may, however, have an eye on a reward, in the sense that he makes of the created beatitude the end of his love, but not the end of the Beloved, for this is neither against the nature of friendship, nor against the nature of a virtue, since the beatitude is the end of the virtues."¹⁴³ Charity, then, does not seek a reward in the sense that it does not make of the beloved a means to an end (that is, to what would be sought as reward). This would go against the very nature of the love of friendship; a friend is loved for what he is, and not as a means to an end. This is truer when the friend is God Himself, the last end in every respect, who evidently can never be subordinated to anything else. Charity does not intend either any temporal reward or profit as the aim of its love of God; this would make it mercenary and would go against the virtuous character of charity. This answer of St. Thomas is similar to St. Bonaventure's answer about the created reward. But charity may have in view the created happiness which its love produces, not, evidently, to make of the beloved a means to this end, but subordinately to the love of the Friend,¹⁴⁴ that is, as a help to this love of friendship. This is not against the nature of charity as friendship, and after what we saw about the union which friendship must needs seek, this is easily understood. God is not referred to anything else; He is the last end and is loved as such. This reward can not go against the nature of charity as virtue, for the end of all virtues is precisely the attainment of beatitude.

This text shows well, in St. Thomas' conception, what the disinterestedness of charity is and what it is not. It does not mean to abstract from or to forget about the happiness which the love of God implies and gives. It does mean that God is

¹⁴³ *III Sent.*, d. 29, a. 4, "Habens caritatem non potest habere oculum ad mercedem, ut ponat aliquid quodcumque finem amati, scilicet Dei . . . Potest tamen habere oculum mercedem ut ponat beatitudinem creatam finem amoris, non finem amati . . ."

¹⁴⁴ This, in other words, is what the *Summa* teaches about the necessary subordination of the love of desire (here, the intention of the beatitude found in charity or in the union with God) to the love of benevolence (here, God not made into a means to the created beatitude, but willed as last end).

loved for what He is, the last end who alone deserves to be loved for His own sake and who alone can give that happiness.

We do not find this teaching of the *Sentences* repeated in the *Summa* from the same point of view. Here St. Thomas speaks of the reward of charity only in passing and not from the viewpoint of disinterestedness. Yet his passing indication strengthens the position of the *Sentences*. In the *Summa*, we read, in answer to the question, "Whether it is more meritorious to love one's neighbor than to love God," the following statement: "The love of God is the more meritorious, because a reward is due to it for its own sake, since the ultimate reward is the enjoyment of God, to whom the movement of the Divine love tends; hence a reward is promised to him that loves God."¹⁴⁵ Charity bears an essential connection with the substantial reward of merit, that is, with the enjoyment of God, for the love of God tends to this union which has been promised to all who love God. If this reward necessarily follows on charity, can then its desire intention be contrary to the nature of charity? In the *Summa*, however, St. Thomas does not examine *ex professo* the interested or disinterested character of charity as a reward, but under the aspect of its motivation.

5. *Charity, love of God for His own sake.* How does St. Thomas conceive the love of God for His own sake which is essential to charity? The traditional phrase which states that in charity God is loved for His own sake (*propter seipsum*) can be and has actually been understood in two different ways: either (1) so as to mean, not for the sake of something else (*non propter aliud*) in the sense that nothing else than God Himself is sought or intended in charity, though the possession of God is actually desired and obtained in charity, or (2) so as to exclude from charity all self-regard on man's part who has to abstract from his own good, even from the possession of God and the enjoyment found therein. The first meaning, as we have seen, is the Augustinian conception of charity and was

¹⁴⁵ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 27, a. 8, "Ultima merces est frui Deo, in quem tendit divinae dilectionis motus."

traditional in the Catholic teaching until after St. Thomas. The disinterestedness or gratuitousness of charity was so conceived as to exclude from it all desire or intention of a reward except God Himself, but the desire of God was taken as an intrinsic element of charity. The other, as we shall show later, is the proper Scotist and Suarezian idea, and it is perhaps the more often implied in modern conceptions of the disinterested love of God—which is said to be identical with charity. In which of these two meanings does St. Thomas understand the *propter seipsum*? In the Augustinian sense or in the modern sense? His texts should give the answer.

In the *Commentary on the Sentences* we find sparse indications, but no express treatment of the point at issue. We read, for example, "True friendship wishes the sight of the friend and finds joy in mutual conversation. . . . It does not, however, make of the pleasure it derives from seeing and enjoying the friend the end of the friendship."¹⁴⁶ That is, though the pleasure of a friend's presence and conversation be not the end of the friendship, yet it is not excluded from it, but is a con-natural concomitant of a true friendship. "For his sake," not expressed but implied in our text, means "not in order to acquire something else than the friend." Another indication: "Although to every one, that is lovable which is good for him, yet there is no need for the loveable object to be loved for the very reason that it is good for him, and be directed to him as to its end, since friendship also does not twist back to itself the good it wishes another."¹⁴⁷ This means: friendship, as any other love, loves only what is good for the lover, but it does not place in the good of the lover the end of the friendship. In other words, only that kind of self-regard is excluded from friendship (and from charity) which makes of the lover's good

¹⁴⁶ *III, Sent. d. 27, q. 2, a. 1, ad 11*, "Amicitia desiderat videre amicum . . . non autem ita quod delectatio . . . finis amicitiae ponatur."

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, d. 29, a. 3, ad 2, "Cum etiam amicitia non retorqueat ad seipsum bonum quod ad alterum optat." Cf. *ibid.*, ad 3, "Amicabilia quae sunt ad alterum venerunt ex amicabilibus quae sunt ad seipsum, non sicut ex causa finali, sed ex eo quod est prius in via generationis."

the end of the friendship, and of the friend a means to this end. The phrase "for His own sake" when applied here, would mean that the final cause of charity is God Himself so that in the line of finality He be not referred to any other end.¹⁴⁸

The *Summa* explicitly asks the question, "Whether out of charity God ought to be loved for Himself." St. Thomas solves it by saying: "I answer that, The preposition *for* denotes a relation of causality. Now there are four kinds of cause, *viz.*, final, formal, efficient, and material, to which a material disposition also may be reduced, although it is not a cause simply but relatively. . . . Accordingly, as regards the first three ways, we love God not for anything else, but for Himself. For He is not directed to anything else as to an end, but is Himself the last end of all things; nor does He require to receive any in order to be good, for His very substance is His goodness, which is itself the exemplar of all other good things; nor again does goodness accrue to Him from aught else, but from Him to all other things. In the fourth way, however, He can be loved for something else, because we are disposed by certain things to advance in His love, for instance, by favors bestowed by Him, by the rewards we hope to receive from Him or even by the punishments which we are minded to avoid through Him."¹⁴⁹ From this important text we can see that in charity God is loved for Himself, that is, not for something else, or that He is the last cause of the love of charity in the line of a threefold causality. First, He is not a subordinate end which, although loved as end and thus to some extent loved for its own sake, yet is referred to another or made dependent on it (as every created love is subordinate to the love of God); still less is God loved as a mere means to an end. The aim of charity is to attain God in Himself and nothing else. Secondly, God is the last cause of charity in the line of formal causality, that is, since He is the embodiment of goodness or of the perfection which is the

¹⁴⁸ The moderns would no doubt say they subscribe to this doctrine of St. Thomas, exposed so far; it is only in the *Summa* that we find clearly the Thomist (Augustinian) sense of the *propter seipsum*.

¹⁴⁹ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 27, a. 3.

formal reason of love, He does not derive His lovableness from anywhere else.¹⁵⁰ Thirdly, God is the last cause of the love of charity in the line of efficient causality, in the sense that He is not loved because He would be the effect of some cause, as sons can be loved for the sake of their father; God is the Creator and the first efficient cause of all that exists. He can therefore not be loved as an effect. From this threefold viewpoint God is loved for His own sake. Yet, no opposition is insinuated here between this pure love of God and the desire or the intention of union with Him. Rather, this union is necessarily willed in charity, since God is sought as its last end, for His own goodness, because He is what He is. Moreover, inasmuch as this union with God means an enrichment of the man who loves God in charity, it belongs to the fourth kind of causality: the disposition on the part of the lover. Now, precisely from this viewpoint, St. Thomas states that God may be loved for something else, that is, men may be led to love God for His own sake (in the sense of the first three causes) by something else than God Himself. The disposition of love of God for Himself may be produced in man by subjective motives of different kinds. It is immaterial for the nature or the purity of the love of charity whether these motives look straight up to God, or only indirectly, through His mercies and gifts. The *propter seipsum* does not apply here.

Since this is so, then the love of desire of God, or the will of union with Him, which St. Thomas elsewhere (and even implicitly here, in its first causality) showed is included in the friendship of charity, is not barred by the disinterestedness expressed in the traditional phrase, "for His own sake." That desire properly regards the disposition of the subject of charity, of the lover, and here St. Thomas does not require that God be loved for Himself. Can we have a clearer proof to show that the modern meaning of the *propter ipsum* lies outside the horizon of the Angelic Doctor and that he does not see any

¹⁵⁰ Cf. II-II, q. 23, a. 5, ad 2, "Sola ratio diligendi attenditur in caritate, scilicet divina bonitas, quae est eius substantia."

opposition between love of God for His own sake and the will of union with Him? Accordingly, here as elsewhere, St. Thomas understands the traditional expression, "for His own sake," in the Augustinian sense, that is, charity loves God for Himself so that nothing else is sought to be acquired by charity but only God Himself. The gratuitousness or disinterestedness of charity does not require, according to St. Thomas, that man should leave aside or forget his need and desire for union with God.¹⁵¹

In the *De caritate*, an interesting explanation of the *propter ipsum* illustrates and completes this teaching. It reads as follows: "To love some one for himself can be understood in two ways. One way, so that some thing is loved as last end, and in this manner God alone is to be loved for His own sake. Another way, so that we love him to whom we wish well, as in the case of a virtuous friendship; but not as we love the good which we desire for ourselves, as happens in a pleasurable or useful friendship, where we love a friend as our own good, not because we desire usefulness or pleasure for the friend, but because we seek our own use and pleasure from the friend. . . . But when we love someone in a virtuous manner, then we wish him good, and do not wish him for ourselves. This is especially the case in the friendship of charity."¹⁵² What, therefore, is excluded from all virtuous friendship where a friend is loved for his own sake, is the love of desire which seeks something else than the friend himself, that is, which does not go together with the love of well-wishing that is essential to friendship or to the love of a person. All the more is this excluded from the

¹⁵¹ Perhaps some moderns would say that psychologically one can not and need not leave aside his desire of union with God, but that ontologically it has nothing to do with charity (but, no doubt, with hope). To this St. Thomas would not have agreed. The radical differences between the two conceptions lies in this: as can be seen from the text just quoted St. Thomas does not look for the purity or disinterestedness of charity in the subjective dispositions or in what leads or disposes a man to love, but on the deeper ontological level where the real finality plays. The modern conception, on the other hand, considers the interested or disinterested character of charity in its psychological motives.

¹⁵² *Q. Disp. De Caritate*, a. 8, ad 16, "Diligere aliquem propter se potest intelligi dupliciter. Une modo, ita quod aliquid dicitur finis ultimus; et sic solus Deus . . . Alio modo, ut diligamus ipsum cui bonum volumus . . ."

love of charity where God is loved for His own sake and as last End. But the union with the friend is not opposed to friendship; it rather fosters and constitutes the friendship. "Charity ignores a difference of degree between the lover and the beloved, because it unites both."¹⁵³

Conclusion. How does St. Thomas conceive *the disinterestedness of charity*? From all these texts we may conclude: The Angelic Doctor conceives charity as being essentially the love of God, man's last supernatural end. The volition of this end is identically the act of charity. It inseparably unites two aspects of love: the aspect of the object, God, who is willed for His own sake and to whom man, the lover, wishes well and surrenders himself; the aspect of the subject, man, who wills the union with the last end and the possession and enjoyment of God.

Charity, the friendship of man with God, necessarily implies mutual love of benevolence or well-wishing. It can not, therefore, but wish for the return of the well-wishing. It can not but wish for union with the Friend. Charity necessarily involves, as an intrinsic constituent element of friendship, the love of desire of God. Charity, then, does exclude from man's supernatural friendship with God the non-theological love of desire of God, that is, that love of desire which aims at some profit or enjoyment other than the union with God Himself, or which seeks a reward other than God Himself, or which does not really seek God as last End. In this sense charity is absolutely and totally disinterested. But charity can not but wish for God. And the more intense and perfect charity becomes, the more intense also and deeper grows the desire of union with God. For this union is in reality more truly and more deeply a self-surrender to God than an acquisition or possession of enjoyment of Him, for the last end is always loved more in itself than is loved what is acquired of it. St. Thomas' conception of charity remains faithful to the Augustinian tradition.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, a. 9, ad 3, "Caritas gradum nescit amantis ad amatum, quia unit utrumque."

His answer to our problem is that the desire of union with God (when it is theological) springs from charity and not from hope.

What then about the desire of God which is presupposed in hope? According to St. Thomas' explicit statements, both in the *Sentences*, "Hope presupposes desire and mediates between love and desire"; and in the *Summa*, ". . . Hope pertains to the second (imperfect) love, since he that hopes, intends to obtain possession of something for himself."¹⁵⁴ Hope is only possible when a desire of God is at its root. Is this love of desire for God charity? Since hope can exist in a soul without charity, although only as an imperfect virtue (*informis*), the desire of God that precedes it, can not, apparently, be an act of charity.

St. Thomas himself does not clearly answer this particular question. But we seem to be in the line of his thought when we say, with Fr. de Lanversin,¹⁵⁵ that this desire is an incipient charity which prepares the soul for its full entrance into it. The adherence to God by desire, even when only beginning and imperfect, is a move of charity. This explanation will seem less surprising if we remember that the same idea has been applied to the *pious credulitatis affectus*, the affection which is at the source of faith itself; this also would be a beginning and an anticipated effect of charity.¹⁵⁶

Several other explanations have been proposed by theologians and disciples of St. Thomas, which have been collected by Zimara in his study on hope.¹⁵⁷ Some say that, in men who are in a state of grace, the desire which precedes hope originates from charity (Medina, Petrus of Aragon, the Salmanticenses, Billuart); but when charity is absent from a soul, an actual grace makes the desire antecedent to hope possible (Medina, Contenson, Gonet, Billuart). Others hold that no habit is

¹⁵⁴ *III Sent.* d. 26, q. 2, a. 3, sol. 2; *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 17, a. 8.

¹⁵⁵ "Charité" in *Dict. de Spir.*, 2, 609.

¹⁵⁶ We may suggest a comparison with the famed *diligere incipiunt* of the Tridentine decree on justification; cf. Denziger. *Enchiridion*, 798.

¹⁵⁷ Zimara, *op. cit.*, 201 ff.

necessary as principle of this desire, since it is an easy act (Vasquez, Gabriel of Valencia). John of St. Thomas attributes the imperfect love of desire which precedes hope to the habit of the pious affection from which springs faith and, through the medium of faith, hope. But he does not call this affection an inchoative charity.¹⁵⁸

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(To be concluded)

¹⁵⁸ *Op. cit.*, 213-14.

PLATO AND THE POETS

“A tribe of imitators” (*Tim.* 19) *

THE apparent contempt in which Plato held the poets had slight apparent effect upon his influence over them in the history of human culture. Many a poet has drawn inspiration from the philosophy of Plato or justified his art along Platonic lines. On this score, it might seem that Plato's attitude toward the “tribe of imitators” has been misinterpreted. He does quote profusely from the poets and more than any other great philosopher uses the vehicle of the poetic art for the expression of some of his profoundest philosophical ideas. Yet, as a moral philosopher, he presents a reactionary attitude of unmitigated hostility to all poets and urges a complete subordination of their art to the good of the state. It might well seem, then, that his attitude is fundamentally contradictory or perhaps that he is both a poet and a philosopher.

It is the purpose of this paper to develop the thesis that Plato's attitude was a consistent one and that he is at all times a philosopher even though he often poeticizes his philosophy. In the development of the thesis we shall run over briefly the criticism that Plato offers of the poets, the justification of this criticism in the light of his own philosophy, and finally the resolution of the apparent contradiction of his position as philosopher and poet.

We may note briefly the criticism of the poets by Plato without attempting any complete and exhaustive abstraction from his writings. With respect especially to the ethical content of the poetic art we might cite some of the examples from the *Republic* which are familiar to all readers of Plato. Thus, the

* All citations are from the Jowett translation of Plato, Random House edition.

attempt of Simonides to define justice is shown by Plato to be inadequate (*Rep.* 332). The opinions of Homer and Hesiod, that virtue is painful and vice pleasant, and that the sins of men may be easily atoned and expiated by proper sacrifices to the gods, are condemned (*Ibid.* 364). The poets must not resort to any descriptions of the immoral behavior of the gods (*Ibid.*, 378 ff.), they must not give us false representations of the gods (*Ibid.*, 386 ff.), and they must not tell us that the wicked are happy (*Ibid.*, 392). And all passages in their poetry which conduce to the intemperance of youth will be prohibited (*Ibid.*, 390).

For Plato, all such descriptions of the poets about the gods and heroes, their virtues and vices, their way of life, must be censored and purged of any element that contradicts the standard of the good as conceived by the philosophers for the training of the citizens of the perfect state. Not only must the works of the poets be censored in this way, but in all their writings they must conform to the standard of art which Plato will impose upon them. The form as well as the content of their poetry must be controlled, for the poets use certain forms in presenting their art to us. They may resort to the narrative or imitative style, or a combination of both such as is present in the epic. The controlling principle in the art form here is that of imitation. And imitation in every instance must be brought under the standard of the good (*Ibid.*, 395 ff.). This does not mean that all forms of poetry or the poetic art will be excluded from the perfect state, but it does lead to such a fairly rigid control that Plato, when speaking of those poets who carry imitation to an excess, is led to say:

And therefore when any one of these pantomimic gentlemen, who are so clever that they can imitate anything, comes to us, and makes a proposal to exhibit himself and his poetry, we will fall down and worship him as a sweet and holy and wonderful being; but we must also inform him that in our State such as he are not permitted to exist; the law will not allow them. And so when we have annointed him with myrrh, and set a garland of wool upon his head, we shall send him away to another city. For we mean to

employ for our souls health the rougher and severer poet or storyteller, who will imitate the style of the virtuous only, and will follow those models which we prescribed at first when we began the education of our soldiers (*Ibid.*, 398).

Although these pantomimic artists may bring great pleasure to the spectator, we can not make pleasure our standard for measuring the value of poetry. The imitative arts are accompanied by pleasure and in a sense pleasure may be the measure of excellence, but only the pleasures of the well educated (*Laws*, 659). Here the real criteria of imitation will be the true, the beautiful, and the good (*Ibid.*, 668).

The maintenance of this strict control of the poets is necessary and significant in another way, for the poets are responsible or can be responsible for the disorders and revolutions that may convulse the state. Plato notes this very emphatically when he says: "this is the point to which, above all, the attention of our rulers should be directed—that music and gymnastic be preserved in their original form and no innovation made . . . for any musical innovation is full of danger to the whole state, and ought to be prohibited (*Rep.* 424). The same point is made in the *Laws* (657), where Plato praises the Egyptians for their statesmanship in preserving over a period of ten thousand years fixed forms of art expressive of true virtue. He also comments on the possibility of the poets introducing disorder into the state and notes that when the poets were able to submit their work to the pleasure of the spectator instead of the director of public instruction, "they introduced the reign of the vulgar and lawless innovation," and in this manner were responsible for the development of a "theatocracy" (*Ibid.*, 700). To prevent such lawlessness in the arts and in the state, Plato will plead for the supremacy of the law and "demand that the poet shall compose nothing contrary to the ideas of the lawful, or just, or beautiful, or good." (*Ibid.*, 801).

We may mark next another basic criticism of the poets by Plato. Not only do they lack a fundamental knowledge of good and evil and, for this reason, may threaten the good of the state

and the individual with the evils which have been described, but the poets also lack true wisdom and their claim to such wisdom and the method of attaining it is severely attacked by Plato. In the *Apology* Socrates informs his judges (by way of explaining the declaration of the Delphic Oracle) that he went to the poets to discover why the oracle had said that he, Socrates, was the wisest of men.

And there, I said to myself, you will be instantly detected; now you will find out that you are more ignorant than they are. Accordingly, I took some of the most elaborate passages in their own writings, and asked what was the meaning of them—that they would teach me something. Will you believe me? I am almost ashamed to confess the truth, but I must say that there is hardly a person present who would not have talked better about their poetry than they did themselves. Then I knew that not by wisdom do poets write poetry, but by a sort of genius and inspiration; they are like diviners or soothsayers who also say many fine things, but do not understand the meaning of them. The poets appeared to me to be much in the same case; and I further observed that upon the strength of their poetry they believed themselves to be the wisest of men in other things in which they were not wise (22).

The theme here—that the poets can not give us wisdom, that that is a task for the philosophers—dominates the whole of Platonic thought. The method of achieving such wisdom is explicitly set forth in the *Republic* where Plato describes the education of the guardians. We shall comment later upon the noetic discipline which Plato prescribes; at this time we need only remark that poetry is rejected as a way to wisdom because it does not submit itself to such noetic discipline, but rather relies, as Plato points out, upon a “sort of genius and inspiration.” The nature of this inspiration and its use is brought out very vividly by Plato in the *Ion* where Ion has been describing to Socrates the effect that Homer has upon him as a rhapsode or interpreter of Homer. Socrates says:

The gift which you possess of speaking excellently about Homer is not an art, but, as I was just saying, an inspiration; there is a divinity moving you, like that contained in the stone which Euripides calls a magnet, but which is commonly known as the stone of

Heraclea. This stone not only attracts iron rings, but also imparts to them a similar power of attracting other rings; and sometimes you may see a number of pieces of iron and rings suspended from one another so as to form quite a long chain: and all of them derive their power of suspension from the original stone. In like manner the Muse first of all inspires men herself; and from these inspired persons a chain of other persons is suspended, who take the inspiration. For all good poets, epic as well as lyric, compose their beautiful poems not by art, but because they are inspired and possessed. . . . For the poet is a light and winged and holy thing, and there is no invention in him until he has been inspired and is out of his senses, and the mind is no longer in him; when he has not attained to this state, he is powerless and is unable to utter his oracles (534).

The remainder of the dialogue is an attack on the art of the rhapsode and by indirection upon that of the poet. Ion is persuaded to admit that his art has no unique subject matter of its own and that when Homer speaks of military strategy, of medicine, of prophecy, music, and other arts, that Homer, and Ion his interpreter, have no art of their own for they are less qualified than the artist of the particular subject at hand. The conclusion of Socrates then is that Ion may be inspired but that he is not an artist, for he is unable to state what knowledge his art deals with.

Even more pointedly Plato notes the relation between what he terms the "divine madness" and poetry in the *Phaedrus*. Here he describes the four kinds of divine madness and after noting that the first is prophetic inspiration, the second religious exaltation, he comments on the third:

The third kind is the madness of those who are possessed by the Muses; which taking hold of a delicate and virgin soul, and there inspiring frenzy, awakens lyrical and all other numbers; with these adorning the myriad actions of ancient heroes for the instruction of posterity. But he who, having no touch of the Muses' madness in his soul, comes to the door and thinks that he will get into the temple by the help of art—he, I say, and his poetry are not admitted: the sane man disappears and is nowhere when he enters into rivalry with the madman (245).

Two points deserve notice here. First, there is the distinction

drawn between the individual who possesses mere poetic skill and the individual who has been touched by the divine madness. The mere ability to versify is not sufficient as a criterion of true poetic art, for this the poet must possess inspiration. Second, there is the implied distrust of the poetic vision based as it is on "the touch of the Muses' madness in his soul." The inspiration the true poet possesses lacks the sane, sober, and serious approach of the philosopher to the eternal truths. The very "madness" of the poet makes him suspect. Whether and to what extent the poetic vision can attain the truth of the philosopher we shall defer for later consideration. It is time now in the face of this indictment of the poets, to consider next what possible defense Plato can make of a position that has always shocked and rendered incredulous the lovers of poetry.

The extreme position taken by Plato in the *Republic* and the *Laws* is defended by him on the basis of his own ethical ideals. Convinced at least of the possibility of realizing the ideal state and the rule of the philosopher king, he will impose the philosopher's vision of the good upon his state for the purpose of attaining the common good. The attainment of such a good entails legislation governing all the activities of the citizens, and a rigid and detailed educational program embracing the training of the youth from their earliest years to maturity, for the virtuous life depends upon the subordination of the passions and appetites to the rule of reason. Education is to be the primary instrument in guiding the actions of the youth and bringing them under the rule of reason. By inculcating good habits in the youth, we enable them to achieve a virtuous way of life. If the wise man alone has the true vision of the good, then it is obvious that we must accept the rule of reason from him, for his laws will embody this vision of the good and the educational program he sets up will be an expression of these laws and the only true guide to the attainment of the good for the state and the individual alike.

From this it can be readily seen that the arts, comprising only one aspect of education, are subordinated by Plato to the idea of the good which is the controlling principle of the whole

educational program. It is in this way that Plato justifies on ethical grounds the subordination of the poetic art to a higher ethical standard. The definitive requirement of the art of the poet is that it be good, but the poets cannot determine what is good—this is a function of the philosopher king. So strong is Plato's conviction that the art of the poet must be subordinated at all times to the ethical standard, that it leads him at one point to demand that the poets chosen to celebrate the victors in contests should be men of good character even though their poetry might be inferior (*Laws*, 829).

To appreciate more fully the defense that Plato makes of his condemnation of the poets, it should also be noted that he is severely critical of what he considered their pretence to know all things. He indicates that he is willing to overlook Homer's (or any other poet's) lack of knowledge on matters of technical skill, such as medicine, or any of the other arts, but " 'Friend Homer,' then we say to him, 'if you are only in the second remove from truth in what you say of virtue, and not in the third—not an image maker or imitator—and if you are able to discern what pursuits make men better or worse in private or public life, tell us what State was ever better governed by your help.' " (*Rep.*, 599). The caution that Jaeger advises here will explain much of Plato's attitude. He (Jaeger) states: "We can not understand Plato's criticism of poetry unless we remember that the Greeks thought it was the epitome of all knowledge and culture, and that the poet's utterance was a standard for all men to admire."¹ Plato himself takes note of this attitude when he refers (*Rep.*, 606) to Homer as the educator of all Hellas.

We have already noted the conviction of Plato that the arts and, above all poetry, are capable of evil as well as good, and that the poets by their innovations can actually introduce a reign of disorder in the state and contribute to its overthrow. In light of what we have said, it is little wonder that Plato is so firm in dealing with the poets when he believes that their art is capable of corrupting even the best of states.

¹ Jaeger, W. *Paideia* (Oxford, N. Y., 1943), Vol. II, p. 214.

Another and a more basic defense by Plato is based on his contention that the poet's function is at best representative. Here he is taking a somewhat wider interpretation of *mimesis* and excluding from it the idea of mere imitation or copy. Just as the painter in relation to the carpenter merely represents by a painting what the carpenter has manufactured, so the poet does not perform nor create the actions of the hero; he merely describes or represents them. Both artists, Plato says, are thrice removed from reality. For the carpenter produces or makes particular instances of the universal idea (e. g., bed) which is the work of God. And the painter merely represents for us the particular production of the carpenter. Likewise, the hero in his actions is but an instance or particular example of the universal idea of courage, goodness, or whatever universal idea the hero is striving to particularize. And the poet, like the painter, merely represents for us the particular production. Thus the poet like all artists portrays for us merely a semblance of reality; he is concerned like the prisoner in the cave with the mere shadows of images and not with the real objects as they are in themselves. Or, as Plato puts it, the poet and the artist are concerned with a particular that is thrice removed from the universal. (*Rep.*, 597)

To observe more clearly this removal of the poet from reality, we should relate this whole problem to Plato's description of the divided line (*Rep.*, 509 ff.) where it may be said that the poet or artist is concerned with the lowest form of cognition in the ascent toward the Good. The poet apparently will possess mere conjecture rather than belief which is the higher stage of cognition in the world of appearances, or knowledge which is characteristic of the intelligible world.

The philosopher guardians alone can attain the highest knowledge. This highest knowledge or truth, that of the Good, cannot be attained by any ordinary intuition or perception, but can come only as the end result of a long process of education in which the future ruler moves upward from the sensible world to the intelligible world, and here he progresses gradually through a mastery of the sciences and mathematics and by a

study which is increasingly abstract the higher he goes, to the most abstract level of all—dialectic. Then after a rigorous training in dialectic lasting over a period of five years, plus fifteen years of practical administrative experience, he is prepared by this discipline of knowledge for that last step on the divided line—the intuition of the Good. By this means he attains truths which will enable him to unify all knowledge, understand the ultimate nature of reality, and with this wisdom be in a position to know the good and to guide men through legislation in the good life.

Here I believe we have the basic reason assigned by Plato for the superiority of philosophy over poetry, for the poet's intuitions are not preceded by any such rigorous noetic discipline. The poet as an artist, as an imitator, can give us merely representative copies of the ultimately real; dealing with particulars as he does, he has no real grasp of the true nature of things, i. e., of absolute beauty, justice, goodness, and truth. Yet this need not lead to the complete exclusion of the poets from the ideal state and Plato does not propose to effect the education of his guardians without some consideration of the function of the arts. In the early education of the guardians the arts can play a very important role, and poetry here is capable of great good as well as evil. If then, we can retain the good and persuade the poets to conform to the standard of the philosopher, we may admit them to the state and make use of their particular virtue. As Jaeger puts it:

And yet he never suggests for a moment that poetry ought to be abolished altogether as an educational force and replaced by the abstract knowledge which is philosophy. On the contrary, the bitter energy behind his criticisms arises ultimately from his knowledge that nothing can replace the formative power of the masterpieces of music and poetry which have been admired for hundreds of years. Even although philosophy may be able to find the redeeming knowledge of a supreme standard for all life; Plato would still feel that half its educational task remained unfulfilled until the new truth put on the vesture of new poetry, like a soul which gives form to a body.²

² *Op. cit.*, p. 224.

Yet as Plato remarks, truth will be the final criterion for the admission of the poets: "let us assure our sweet friend and sister arts of imitation that if she will only prove her title to exist in a well-ordered State, we shall be delighted to receive her—we are very conscious of her charms; but we may not on that account betray the truth" (*Rep.*, 607). He concludes that poetry may be defended and admitted to the state if there is a use as well as a delight in it, but that it must never be seriously taken as truth (*Ibid.*, 607).

It may be objected that this is all a very good defense, on Plato's part, for his rejection of the poets and their pretence to the attainment of truth, but that to conceive of the function of the poet solely on the basis of this principle of imitation and its relation to Plato's theory of knowledge is to do the poet an injustice. The poet might well contend that there is another way to truth. And he might say that Plato himself has taken specific recognition of this other way to truth when he spoke of the poet as possessed of a divine frenzy. Although Plato seems to mock this method by speaking of it as a form of madness, may not the poet argue that by this divine madness or inspiration, the poet too has his intuition of the truth? Does he not have a true grasp of the universal nature of things, when through his inspiration he is able to communicate to others his feelings and his vision of the ultimately real?

It seems that Plato's defense here would be that, although the poet is inspired, his inspiration lacks the content of true knowledge which is the result of the metaphysical vision of the philosopher. He would contend that the poet's vision is all too often vague and that the mere possession of a frenzy or inspiration is not in itself any criterion of truth. The great virtue of the poet is the fact that he is able to communicate his feelings to others, to inspire them with a belief similar to his own regarding the nature of things; but mere feeling alone falls short of the ideal of true knowledge. The vision of the poet may be persuasive through the medium of an aesthetic experience, but it is not persuasive noetically.

Yet if we suppose that the poet has attained the same truth

as the philosopher through this poetic vision of his, can he not say that through inspiration he has attained an intuition of the universally real, and that he differs from the philosopher only in the way of attaining such truth? And does not Plato himself seem to corroborate this when he says: "For indeed, in these verses and in what he said of the Cyclopes, he speaks in the words of God and nature; for poets are a divine race and often in their strains, by the aid of the Muses and the Graces, they attain truth" (*Laws*, 682)? Plato's defense, probably would run along the following line: Poets often attain the truth which philosophers have secured by the more laborious noetic discipline. Yet by avoiding this noetic discipline they lose all possibility of verifying their insights. And their margin of error here is great. "His art being imitative, he is often compelled to represent men of opposite dispositions, and thus to contradict himself; neither can he tell whether there is more truth in one thing that he has said than in another." (*Laws*, 719)

Inspiration cannot tell the poet that he has attained the truth, for inspiration is not an adequate criterion of truth. Any reliance upon the passional or emotional nature of man will be ineffective for the attainment of truth because the poet's imitative art is too far removed from reality. Only reason can obtain an adequate imitation of reality, and it is by means of reason that the philosopher is brought into relation with the divine pattern of things and thus can imitate reality directly. The poet would seem to be committing a double fault here. He is under an illusion that because his passional nature is stirred, he is possessed of a divine frenzy and is in immediate contact with the ultimate reality of things, transcending reason in this way by the emotions. From an ability to imitate the shadows of things, to delineate in fine fashion all the sensuous imagery of the sensible world, he makes an unwarranted leap into the upper regions of the intelligible world and confuses his frenzied inspiration for an apprehension of the truth, just as on the lower level he confuses his imitative ability and right opinion for knowledge. Then, on the upper level, he fuses this imitative ability with the frenzied feelings that possess him and arrives

at the illusion that he is no longer thrice removed from reality but is imitating directly the divine pattern and thus is fitted to impart truth to mankind. Like the false philosopher he is concerned with opinions, not with knowledge, and thus he is easily seduced by the multitude (whom he has charmed by his fine phrases) into a belief that he is a divine creature and can speak authoritatively on all matters.

Inspiration then is no adequate criterion for truth. And based as it is on the passional nature of man, it will result only in an inversion of the true hierarchy of the soul. In the *Republic* Plato teaches a tripartite division of the soul: reason, passion, and appetite. In the individual, as well as in the state, order must be preserved, otherwise we get a disordered and unhappy individual—the unjust man, and a disordered and unhappy state—the unjust state. True harmony or order within the individual as well as within the state will be best preserved only if reason continues as the controlling principle over passion and the appetites. The fault of the poet lies in the fact that he disrupts this order and, subordinating his rational nature to his passional nature, mistakes his feelings for an intuition of the truth. The more intense his feelings, the more convinced he becomes that he has been touched by the muses and thus confuses further the divine frenzy which possesses him as a sign that he has obtained truth.

By communicating his feeling to others through his imitative art, the poet, “awakens and nourishes and strengthens the feelings and impairs the reason” (*Rep.*, 605). After showing in some detail how poetry leads us to give way to our feelings, Plato concludes: “And the same may be said of lust and anger and all other affections, of desire and pain and pleasure, which are held to be inseparable from every action—in all of them poetry feeds and waters the passions instead of drying them up; she lets them rule, although they ought to be controlled, if mankind are ever to increase in happiness and virtue” (*Ibid.*, 606).

For this reason poetry has a power of harming even the good (*Ibid.*, 605). How, then, can we accept the teachings of the

poets and believe that they can instruct us in order, harmony, truth, and beauty, when they subordinate in this manner reason to passion in themselves and in others? How can the poet have a true vision of the beautiful when there is no inward beauty in his own soul? He lacks the tranquillity of the philosopher, who subordinates the appetites and passions to reason, possesses an ordered soul and an inward beauty and goodness, and through the activity of the noblest part of his nature can imitate the divine pattern and thus attain that vision of the eternally true, beautiful, and good.

For he, Adeimantus, whose mind is fixed upon true being, has surely no time to look down upon the affairs of earth, or to be filled with malice and envy, contending against men; his eye is ever directed towards things fixed and immutable, which he sees neither injuring nor injured by one another, but all in order moving according to reason; these he imitates, and to these he will, as far as he can, conform himself. Can a man help imitating that with which he holds reverential converse? (*Ibid.*, 500)

Turning now to the last major theme of this paper, we may consider what has appeared to some as a contradiction in the attitude of Plato toward the poets. Plato constantly refers to the divine nature of the poets, he admits that at times the poet attains the truth, and above all his own writings possess a poetic quality which has endeared him to many.

We have shown that for Plato the content of poetry has no justifiable claim to truth, that the inspiration which accompanies the poetic expression has no inherent claim to truth and as a method of attaining truth is inadequate. But may it not be contended that the philosopher may use the poetic art as a means to supplement his basic philosophical convictions and to make the truth known to those who lack the conviction or the insight that the philosophical discipline ought to bring? This, it seems, is the justification that Plato would give for his employment of the poetic art. This role of Plato as philosopher-poet is implicit in many of his writings and constitutes an important means that he uses to persuade his readers of the truth of his doctrines. It appears in a twofold manner throughout

much of his work. First, there is the figure of Socrates who, as much by the magic of his words as by the effectiveness of his dialectic, is able to weave a spell over his listeners. As Alcibiades expresses it in the *Symposium*:

When we hear any other speaker, even a very good one, he produces absolutely no effect upon us, nor not much, whereas the mere fragments of you and your words, even at second-hand, and however imperfectly repeated, amaze and possess the souls of every man, woman, and child who comes within hearing of them . . . and I am conscious that if I did not shut my ears against him, and fly as from the voice of the siren, my fate would be like that of others,—he would transfix me, and I should grow old sitting at his feet (*Symp.*, 215-216).

If the effect that Socrates had upon Alcibiades is typical of the experience of the youthful Plato in his association with his beloved master, we have here a motive which led Plato to use Socrates as the central figure in the majority of his dialogues. Through the medium of the dialogue as an artistic form, Plato is able by his own artistic skill to create philosophical conversations similar to those which he experienced with Socrates. Through the spell of his own words and dialectical ability he achieves an effect upon the reader similar to that described by Alcibiades and his "voice of the siren." Has not Plato perhaps felt that just as Socrates possesses a divine voice within him, so too, he Plato, possesses within his soul a similar quality that will enable him by the sheer beauty of his prose, his dramatic instinct, his irony and wit, and the story-telling ability which is expressed time and again in his myths, to entrance his readers and inspire them with a belief in his philosophy? Does he not tell us that in early youth he fancied himself a poet and had written many dramas only to burn them after he had come under the influence of Socrates who first taught him the superiority of the philosophical vision? Yet his dialogues show us that this original poetic impulse was never destroyed but remained a forceful vehicle for the expression of his philosophy.

A more overt means of persuasion used by Plato is his employment of myths. There is of course, much diversity of

opinion on the interpretation and function of the myths in the Platonic dialogues, and no claim to finality of judgment is intended here. But everything points to Plato's use of myths as a means of poetic persuasion to enforce and supplement what he regards as the truths attained by a philosophical vision and based upon the noetic discipline. The myths may be regarded as enabling those who fail to follow the dialectic argument, to achieve the truth by "reasons of the heart," to use a phrase of Pascal. But, unlike Pascal, Plato would never admit the supremacy of the heart over reason. His analysis of the soul shows only too well the relation of mind to spirit or passion, and hence it is evident that any appeal to the "reasons of the heart," to the passional nature of man, is purely supplemental for Plato to the metaphysical vision of the philosopher.

In Plato's philosophy, the value of the myth as a supplemental instrument for the revelation of truth can be seen in many ways. For one thing, it utilizes the basic principle of all poetic art of communicating a feeling to the reader or listener through the sheer beauty of the artistic medium. The myths of Plato possess this aesthetic quality and, although we may not be equally impressed by all the myths he employs, the beauty of several is outstanding, and they convey to the reader through the beauty they possess the conviction that the author has attained a true insight. Thus toward the close of the *Republic* (608 ff.), Plato submits proofs for the immortality of the soul, and then as though realizing that argument alone is insufficient, he proceeds to tell a very moving and beautiful story of the journey of Er, and he hopes in this way to captivate his readers into conviction. He endeavors to achieve in this way what Housman considers the function of the poet: "And I think that to transfuse emotion—not to transmit thought but to set up in the reader's sense a vibration corresponding to what was felt by the writer—is the peculiar function of poetry."³ (And note here *Ion*, 533.)

Again, toward the close of the *Phaedo* in which we have an

³ Housman, A. *The Name and Nature of Poetry* (Cambridge, 1933), p. 12.

even more expanded and detailed argument for the immortality of the soul, Plato resorts to myth. At the conclusion of his philosophical argument for the immortality of the soul, Simmias is asked for his reaction and replies:

But I have nothing more to say, replied Simmias; nor can I see any reason for doubt after what has been said. But I still feel and cannot help feeling uncertain in my own mind, when I think of the greatness of the subject and the feebleness of man.

Yes, Simmias, replied Socrates, that is well said: and I may add that first principles, even if they appear certain, should be carefully considered; and when they are satisfactorily ascertained, then, with a hesitating confidence in human reason, you may, I think, follow the course of the argument; and if that be plain and clear, there will be no need for any further enquiry. (107)

Then, as if to bolster this hesitating confidence of Simmias, Plato proceeds with his myth of the life of the soul in the world to come, and concludes the myth with the statement:

A man ought not to say, nor will I be very confident, that the description which I have given of the soul and her mansions is exactly true. But I do say that, inasmuch as the soul is shown to be immortal, he may venture to think, not improperly or unworthily, that something of the kind is true. The venture is a glorious one, and he ought to comfort himself with words like these, which is the reason why I lengthen out the tale. (114)

But it is not the myth alone that moves the reader of this dialogue toward a willingness to accept the beliefs of Plato. Moving with all the splendor of a Greek tragedy toward the close of the life of the great Socrates, and concluding with those memorable words: "Such was the end, Echebrates, of our friend; concerning whom I may truly say, that of all the men of his time whom I have known he was the wisest and justest and best," (118) even the sceptic may be moved momentarily to accept the words of Socrates:

Wherefore, I say, let a man be of good cheer about his soul, who having cast away the pleasures and ornaments of the body as alien to him and working harm rather than good, has sought after the pleasures of knowledge; and has arrayed the soul, not in some foreign attire, but in her own proper jewels, temperance, and justice, and courage, and nobility and truth—in these adorned she

is ready to go on her journey to the world below, when her hour comes. (115)

In addition to the myths we have just cited there are several others scattered throughout the dialogues in which similar accounts are to be found concerning the nature and life of the soul in its immortal existence. Not only does Plato strive in this manner to persuade us of his doctrine of the soul, but very often at the same time and in the same myths he endeavors by this medium to convince us of the truth of his theory of knowledge as recollection and of his doctrine of Ideas.

The last named deserves a little more comment because of the signal importance it has in the philosophical system of Plato and on that account for the additional weight it may give to our thesis. The theory itself, the reasoned arguments and the attempted demonstrations are sufficiently well known and need not be repeated here. We need only note that although there is some persuasiveness to them, the demonstrations have not been accepted as valid from the time of Aristotle to the present. Plato seems to have experienced some difficulty himself with the doctrine (see his *Parmenides*), but it represented a fundamental belief on his part and when he failed to establish the doctrine satisfactorily along logical lines he resorted to myth as a medium for expressing this belief and endeavoring to persuade others of its truth.

Singling out some of the best examples of Plato's shift to the poetic medium, we might observe that in the *Phaedrus* (246 ff.) we have a highly colorful account of the journeys of the soul throughout the heavens in her pre-earthly existence and of the vision of the soul of the ideas of beauty, goodness, justice, and truth. Here Plato seems to combine two kinds of divine madness, poetic inspiration and love, to set forth his doctrine of ideas. In the myth which he relates he is apparently endeavoring to communicate to us by means of feeling and imagery his belief in the Ideas. The culmination of this poetic flight in the vision and love of Absolute Beauty might seem to indicate that perhaps the vision is primarily a poetic one and that Plato has abandoned the role of philosopher for that of poet. Some

credence is given to this possibility when Plato speaks of the rebirth of souls and notes that "the soul which has seen most of truth shall come to birth as a philosopher, or artist, or some musical and loving nature." (248). Yet he will go on to say that the soul of the poet has seen truth in the fifth degree. And he remarks that in the return of the soul to the plain of truth, only the soul of a philosopher or the "soul of a lover, who is not devoid of philosophy" is not subject to judgment and can make the return in three thousand rather than ten thousand years. (249)

In view of the account given in the *Phaedrus*, it is difficult to credit Plato with a second and radically different theory of art which would raise the poet or the artist to a higher level from which he might be said to attain truth through a vision of the eternal essence of Beauty itself. Such a vision is reserved for the philosopher alone, for only he has the ultimate wisdom to know the truly beautiful. Some of the confusion and seeming contradiction that may arise from a reading of the *Phaedrus* apparently results from Plato's use of the sort of poetic imagery that may help him to explain his doctrine of ideas. He remarks that beauty has its tangible counterpart here on earth and the vision of such tangible beauty enables the soul to recollect true beauty. So when he speaks of the love of the beautiful and the recollection by the soul of the essence of beauty, he enables us through an imagery that is based upon something as tangible as sight and earthly beauty, to obtain a clearer insight into his doctrine of ideas. For the other ideas as he notes would be equally as lovely if they had their visible counterparts. We should also observe here that the love of true beauty is not the result of poetic inspiration but of that fourth and highest type of divine madness—of that madness of love "which is the greatest of heaven's blessings." (*Phaedrus*, 245) Finally, it might be noted that Plato has been compelled to use these poetical figures because *Phaedrus* would have them (*Ibid.*, 257).

In the *Symposium*, the greatest dramatic achievement of Plato, the myth of Diotima develops again the theme of the vision of absolute beauty by the soul. In a remarkable manner

this tale brings together the dialectical method of the philosopher with the vision of the poet and the religious inspiration of the prophet. As a matter of fact, all four kinds of the divine madness mentioned in the *Phaedrus* may be said to culminate here in the tale of Diotima, for the story told by Diotima is the creation of Plato's poetic genius, Diotima is possessed with prophetic inspiration, the reader or hearer ostensibly receives an experience of religious exaltation, and the subject of the entire discourse is the "Love by which the immortal soul is winged for her flight to Heaven." Yet Diotima assumes the role of philosopher, and by means of the dialectic method, reveals to Socrates the eternal truth. That truth does not seem to be any poetic vision of the Beautiful, but rather—and essentially—the metaphysical vision of the highest and eternal reality, presented here under the aspect of Beauty and in the *Republic* under the aspect of the Good. In either case the vision does not come easily and is attained only by the philosopher.

The parallel between the two dialogues on this point is markedly close. In the *Republic* the ascent of the soul toward the Good is subjected to a rigorous noetic discipline based upon the philosophical exposition of the divided line. This purely philosophical exposition is immediately followed by the famous allegory of the cave in which Plato's poetic art is used to render more concrete, clarifying, and persuasive the difficult philosophical analysis that precedes. The poetic account here is a mere interlude. Once the analysis of the Ideas and the ascent of the philosopher toward the Good has been taught by means of allegory, Plato returns again to his more strictly philosophical exposition and in the remainder of Book VII gives a detailed analysis of the various levels of the intelligible world culminating in dialectic which lifts upward the eye of the soul. But note that the discipline of education imposed by Plato upon his future rulers is a difficult one. Ten years study of the sciences and five of dialectic are not sufficient to achieve the vision of the Good. To education must be added experience of life covering a period of fifteen years—only then does the process of knowledge reach consummation and "The time has now arrived at

which they must raise the eye of the soul to the universal light which lightens all things, and behold the absolute good." (*Rep.*, 540)

A reading of the *Symposium* (210-212), will reveal essentially the same thesis, although the expression here is entirely poetical and in place of education, knowledge, dialectic, and the vision of the Good, we have the imagery of the Love of Beauty. The *Symposium*, of course, is a much briefer dialogue. It presents several different themes on the nature of love and develops only by way of a climax the significant discourse between Socrates and Diotima, in which is compressed in a few pages a reiteration of Plato's teaching on the nature of the soul, the ideas, and the vision of truth. But, although the essential doctrine is much abbreviated, there is the same emphasis on the vision of eternal reality, here presented as Absolute Beauty. It is attainable only by a long and arduous process of ascent from the perception and love of concrete and individual forms of beauty to the perception and love of universal beauty, from the beauty of laws and institutions, to the beauties of the sciences, until "at last the vision is revealed to him of a single science, which is the science of beauty everywhere." (210) Or again:

And the true order of going, or being led by another, to the things of love, is to begin from the beauties of earth and mount upwards for the sake of that other beauty, using these as steps only, and from going on to two, and from two to all fair forms, and from fair forms to fair practices, and from fair practices to fair notions, until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty is (211).

And note that this final grasp of true Beauty is with the eye of the mind just as in the *Republic* it is the eye of the soul that grasps the Good.

The imagery of Love and Beauty in the *Symposium* should not detract then from the central thesis of Plato, which is the same here as in the *Republic*, that the vision of eternal reality, whether under the guise of Beauty or the Good, is essentially a noetic process, difficult of attainment and reserved for the philosopher. The imagery that is used in both dialogues, or in any of the dialogues that touch on this theme, is used to

clarify, to suggest, and to express more persuasively the central ideas of Plato's philosophy. It will be a matter of opinion whether Plato's poetic genius reached its height in the *Symposium*, but few will deny the fact that in the tale told by Diotima we have a brilliant example of that use of concrete imagery to suggest and enable the mind to recall that knowledge of the eternal ideas which it formerly possessed. Is not Plato attempting here, and perhaps even more vividly in the *Phaedrus*, not merely to clarify a philosophical analysis by resorting to poetic description, but also to justify his whole theory of knowledge by maintaining that through this apprehension of the particular and tangible we may be able to recall that former knowledge of the abstract and universal which we possessed in a previous existence? And the better the imagery, the more vivid the story, the greater the appeal to feeling, the more successful does his enterprise become and the more inspired the faith of the reader in the truth of his story and his philosophy.

The opposite effect seems to be achieved in the *Timaeus*.

Here we no longer have the high poetic qualities of some of the earlier dialogues; the writing has become dull, confused, and obscure. There is an allegorism present that virtually obliterates the philosophical insights. As a consequence, in this dialogue which ought, by its very subject matter, to have completed the metaphysics of the earlier dialogues, we find an obscurity that tends to confuse and weaken the metaphysical structure of Plato's thought. A hazardous guess might be that Plato has been deliberately obscure simply because he was not sure of his ideas, or that he became so entangled in the allegorizing trend of his thought that the poet almost displaces the philosopher. There is an irrationalism and a dogmatism here that is missing from the other dialogues. These deficiencies are revealed not only in the obscurity of the thought but also in the manner in which the dialogue develops into a monologue. Dialectic is abandoned and with it the usual effort toward philosophical clarification. In this dialogue the use of allegory and the myth does not yield any poetic insight into truth and it weakens the metaphysical insights. Clearly the *Timaeus* is not as persuasive as the *Symposium* and the *Republic*.

We might continue in this manner to analyze all the myths as well as the allegories, parables, fables, and other forms of poetic expression Plato uses, but a sufficient number of instances have been given to establish a reasonable thesis: Although Plato often assumes the role of poet and appears to possess a poetic vision of the truth, he is always first and foremost the philosopher and what appears to be a poetic vision on his part is in reality a metaphysical vision expressed at times for the purposes of persuasion and conviction in the poetic medium.

Finally, to those who would still cling tenaciously to their interpretation of Plato as supremely the poet in such dialogues as the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus*, it should be shown that we must judge Plato on the basis of all his writings and not merely on those which please us most. Thus there is much in the *Republic* and the *Laws* which may be displeasing to the poetically minded, but it would be illogical and prejudicial to dismiss the greater bulk of Plato's writing, and his sincerity in such works, to judge the man solely on those works which appeal to our own fancy or belief. On the relation of the poet to the philosopher, T. S. Eliot says, "I believe that for a poet to be also a philosopher he would have to be virtually two men: I cannot think of any example of this through schizophrenia, nor can I see anything to be gained by it: the work is better performed inside two skulls than one. . . . A poet may borrow a philosophy or he may do without one. It is when he philosophizes upon his own poetic insight that he is apt to go wrong."⁴ We may paraphrase the last line here with respect to Plato and say that it is when he poeticizes upon his philosophical insight that he is so apt to persuade us of the truth of his convictions. Yet even when he resorts to poetic expression he is never "two men"; his insight and his attitude is fundamentally that of the philosopher.

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⁴ T. S. Eliot, *The Use of Poetry* (Harvard University Press; Cambridge, 1933), p. 90.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy. By H. J. PATON. London: Hutchinson, 1947. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948. Pp. 283, with index. \$4.00.

This book, by one of the foremost Kantian scholars of our day, is a most valuable addition to the already extensive literature dealing with Kant's moral philosophy. The author, who is White's Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford University, has already treated of this subject in his *The Good Will*, and *Can Reason be Practical*, and has dealt authoritatively with Kant's theoretical doctrine in his well-known *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience*. The present work is the fruit of some twenty years of reflection, and is far from being a repetition of what he has already written. It treats principally of the *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals* (*Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*), in which Kant seeks to discover, formulate, and justify the supreme principle of morality in so far as it can be gathered from an analysis of the moral judgments on which good-living men seek to act. The main purpose of Prof. Paton's work is to help the reader to understand Kant's text and arguments; and if this were his sole purpose, his book would be as opportune as it is successful. But he found that "a whole series of misinterpretations has become traditional and stands in the way of an unprejudiced approach" to the text (p. 15), so that his book has the added aim of defending the thought of Kant against such misconceptions. "Thus Kant is commonly supposed to maintain that no action can be moral if we have any natural inclination towards it or if we obtain the slightest pleasure from its performance; and again that a good man must take no account whatever of the consequences of his actions but must deduce all the manifold duties of life from the bare conception of moral law as such—without any regard for the characteristics of human nature or the circumstances of human life (*ibid.*).” Prof. Paton sets out to show that such views, though they may find some support in a cursory reading of the text, are not advanced by Kant. Other criticisms may be levelled against him, and Prof. Paton does frequently draw attention to flaws in Kant's arguments, but he cannot be accused of views so contrary to morality and common sense. "Such interpretations are a distortion of his actual teaching, which is always reasonable, even if it may not always be correct (*ibid.*).”

The great value of this work as an exposition of the *Grundlegung* will perhaps be fully appreciated only by those who have tried to understand Kant by direct and unaided study of the text. Reading Prof. Paton after

such an experience is like being presented with a key after having tried in vain to open a locked door. I do not know of any other treatise which presents Kant's doctrine with such clarity and objectivity, and with such detailed references, not only to the text, but also to the other works of Kant. This is a truly scholarly work, in which the author draws on that extensive knowledge of Kant's whole system which only a lifetime of study can give and which is indispensable for the proper understanding of particular works. Thus, from this book alone, the beginner would acquire quite a comprehensive outline of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and many a more advanced student will find new light thrown on several of the knotty problems of Kant's theoretical philosophy. The first chapter is an admirable description of the critical method as employed by the founder of Criticism; the function of reason is clearly explained (pp. 96-102), as also are analytic and synthetic propositions (pp. 120-123), the spontaneity of mind (pp. 143, 4), the function of *schemata* (pp. 143, 4; 158, 9) and the meaning of laws of nature (pp. 69, 146 ff.). Chapter 22, in particular, on the intelligible world, and the following chapter on membership in this world, have much to say on the relation between intellect and sense, between noumenon and phenomenon, on inner sense and knowledge of the ego, as well as of apperception. To complete the setting of Kant's moral doctrine, Prof. Paton adds some remarks on the historical background and personality of Kant (pp. 195-198). For the benefit of the English reader, Prof. Paton, who follows the text of the Berlin Academy edition, adds the corresponding references to Abbott's translation, which he does not hesitate to correct when, in his opinion, it does not faithfully render the original.

The work is divided into four parts. The first, "The Approach to the categorical imperative," corresponds to section one of the *Groundwork*, and deals with the fundamental notions involved in ordinary moral judgments, namely the good will, duty, the maxim of morality, reverence, and the law, and ends with a consideration of the misunderstandings of Kant's real views. Kant's second section is covered by books two and three of Prof. Paton's work. In the second he treats of the background of the categorical imperative, considering practical reason and its principles, both subjective and objective, the notion of good, and finally, imperatives in general, ending with a statement of the problem to be faced in Kant's final section. In the third book, he discusses the categorical imperative in its various formulations which he reduces to three, with a subordinate formula for its first and third statements. These subordinate formulas are described as more precise determinations of the imperative with a view to its application to practice. The fourth book, corresponding to the final section of the *Groundwork*, treats of the justification of the categorical imperative by means of the idea of freedom as necessarily presupposed in connection with membership of the intelligible world. These considerations allow us

to explain the possibility of the categorical imperative and to defend the doctrine of freedom without which morality is both impossible and unintelligible. Though Kant's arguments are often very involved, and the line of his thought difficult to follow on account of his habit of passing brusquely from one consideration to another, Prof. Paton succeeds admirably in keeping the main trend of the argument before his reader, and his brief recapitulations of the various stages of the argument are extremely helpful in this respect.

The exposition and interpretation of Kant's thought in this book are undoubtedly authoritative. However much one may disagree with Kant's teaching, one can seldom, if ever, object to Prof. Paton's statement of it. Where the meaning is ambiguous, he tries to determine the genuine mind of Kant either in the light of passages in other places or in other works, or by conjectures that are always well-founded and in keeping with Kant's system as a whole. The Professor rarely enters into controversy on such points, and is content to state his reading and the reasons for it. It is clear that he himself accepts Kant's position in general, and regards the main line of the argument as valid; and he maintains that the traditional misunderstandings have arisen primarily through failing to remember the limited purpose which Kant set himself in the *Groundwork* and in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. He is there concerned with discovering and justifying the supreme principle of morality on which rational beings should act; he is not concerned with the application of that principle, or of its various formulations, to particular and changing circumstances. The method of such application is treated in the neglected *Metaphysic of Morals*; but even in the *Groundwork* there is evidence that Kant, in such application, does take into account the "desires and purposes and potentialities of man, and indeed it is on a teleological view of man and the universe that his application of moral principles is based" (p. 17). A short resume of Kant's argument may help to indicate how such misunderstandings could arise and why they are to be corrected.

Accepting the common judgments of men on the morality of actions, Kant seeks to formulate the supreme principle on which they are based; justification of this principle will then be the justification of such common judgments of morality. He maintains that only a good will can be absolutely and in all respects good; and that a good will, for men at least, is one which acts only for the sake of duty, not, for instance, in order to satisfy desire or inclination. A fully rational being, without a sense complementary to its nature, would spontaneously and necessarily be good without the obligation which we experience. The moral value of an action does not therefore depend on the results sought or attained; it is due to the fact, that it is done in conformity to an a priori and formal subjective principle, or maxim, the maxim of duty, as opposed to the material maxim of inclination. On the emotional side, this means acting purely out of

reverence for the law. Thus the motive of the good man is to obey law as such, law that is universal, valid for all and objective. His morality is formal, in the sense that universality is the form of law; he endeavours to make his actions conform to law as such, in so far as he seeks to be guided by principles that are universal and objective and valid independently of the particular actions they may enjoin. We can thus formulate the supreme principle of morality in a general way: never act except so as to be able also to will the maxim of your action to be a universal law. To act thus is to act reasonably, because it is to act for the sake of acting reasonably, according to the purely formal principle of following universal law as such; the action is good, not because it has this or that as object, but because this objective and unconditioned principle is embodied in it. Such a principle is in fact the unconditioned of practical reason.

From this summary it is easy to see how Kant can be accused of formalism and legalism; and Prof. Paton's attempt to defend Kant on these charges seem to us to be the least successful of his criticisms of the common misunderstandings. Before treating of that, however, it may be well to speak of other no less common interpretations which he does, with success we think, show to be false and unfounded. Kant is supposed to maintain, for instance, that an action can have no moral worth if any inclination to perform it is present, or if any pleasure results from the satisfaction of this inclination or from the consciousness of doing one's duty. What he does, in fact, teach is quite different. He insists that for an action to be moral it must not merely accord with duty, but must be done for the sake of duty; and that if it is done *only* from inclination, or from desire of happiness, that as such it has no moral worth. He does not say that an action is not moral if inclination is present as well as the will to do one's duty; but he does say that we can hardly be certain that duty alone is our motive except when inclination is absent, since the inclination can be present without any definite end in view of the agent. In other words, he teaches that even when inclination is present, the motive as determining factor of our action should be duty alone. Neither are we called upon to renounce our natural inclination to happiness; we have a right to pursue our happiness so long as it is not incompatible with the moral law. In fact, my happiness is included in the complete good which it is my duty to seek. And as regards the pleasure and satisfaction that sometimes accompany action, Kant holds that action performed merely for their sake would be self-centered and immoral, but that they are quite legitimate if they follow on the recognition of acting merely for the sake of duty. The moral life does normally bring its own peculiar satisfaction and inner content (cf. pp. 48-50, 56, 57). These misinterpretations arise, says Prof. Paton (p. 50) "from misunderstanding two quite different doctrines of Kant: (1) that virtue is most easily and surely recognized where duty is opposed to inclinations, and (2) that inclination must not be taken into account when we are trying to determine what our duty is."

Another common interpretation of Kant is that in determining our duty we must take no account of the results sought or attained by our action, that we must not consider the consequences of our actions. In fact, however, as Prof. Paton points out (pp. 49, 56, 76, 182, 183), Kant's formulation of the moral law supposes that we consider the consequences, just as it supposes that inclinations are to be taken into account. Morality means acting in accord with subjective maxims which we can *at the same time* will to be valid as universal and objective laws. In reality, every maxim has regard to an action that has certain consequences and that is suggested by our inclinations, so that our sensuous motives are lifted up into our maxims, which in turn are drawn into the rational volition of law as such. Neither the inclination nor the consequences should be the motive for acting; we must act for duty alone, and this we do when we determine our action by asking if our maxim can be willed as a universal law, binding others as well as ourselves. To answer that question we must know, to some extent at least, what the consequences of our action will be. As Prof. Paton puts it, "in judging any particular case it is always well to consider the concrete action, to formulate the principle manifested in it, and then to ask whether this principle can be regarded as a moral law or a moral code. . . . In dutiful action, the material maxim, which may embody both consequences aimed at and motives for arriving at them, is present *at the same time* as the formal maxim. The formal maxim is present if we would have rejected the material maxim had we thought it incompatible with universal law (p. 136)." We cannot accuse Kant of being unreal and absurd on these heads in his moral teaching; we may indeed reproach him for not having provided us with a set of rules governing the application of these principles to concrete cases, but to do so is to forget that Kant, in the *Groundwork*, is treating only of the formal principle of morality, and that he postpones the question of application for consideration in a later work.

As remarked above, one of the commonest accusations levelled against Kant is that of formalism and legalism, of subordinating activity to a vague abstraction called the law, which we are called on to reverence and to prefer to all else. Prof. Paton seeks to justify Kant against this charge, by pointing out that his treatment is necessarily formal, since he is dealing with the form of morality; that he does not deny that action must have matter as well as form, an empirical element as well as an a priori one, an object as well as a subjective principle, since all actions aim at a certain end or result. Moral action is that which, while aiming at certain results, is an embodiment of the moral law, and in which we take an immediate interest, so that it is not just a means towards an empty abstraction called the law (pp. 74-76). This reply, however, does not touch on the formalism of which Kant is accused, at least by many moralists. It is not an accusation—one which would be absurd—of con-

centrating on the form of morality, but of making morality consist formally in agreement with the mere form of law, and of treating the moral law as a pure form, independent of all objects proposed to the will and of all empirical elements. We may adapt Lord Nelson's famous phrase to express this morality, and say: "Kant expects every man to do his duty." The moral law which he sets at the basis of morality is an empty form, abstract and ethereal, demanding obedience in virtue of itself alone; and we maintain that this cannot be the ultimate ground of morality. We may omit the arguments drawn from the insufficiency of this formula to determine the morality of countless individual acts, as outside the scope of the *Groundwork*, although such consideration is of great practical importance, and concentrate on the essence of morality as taught by Kant. The main criticism is that the Kantian law really presupposes morality, and so cannot constitute it. We have to distinguish clearly the consciousness of the fact of obligation from the recognition of the fact that it is good to do that which the law enjoins. However imperatively a law may impose itself upon our conscience, man does not obey it just because it is a law, but because it is good to submit to law. Prof. Paton seems to recognise this, saying that "goodness is more fundamental than obligation. Apart from some kind of goodness there is no kind of obligation" (p. 116). This pre-eminence of goodness over obligation is not confined to completely rational beings, as he seems to suppose, but is universal, for one does not submit to law unless he regards the law as good and obedience to the law as also good. And is Prof. Paton not inconsistent when, having stated that goodness is more fundamental than obligation, he goes on to say: "this general principle holds in the case of moral obligation. The moral imperative enjoins moral goodness: it bids us to act morally—that is, as we have seen, to act for the sake of the law or for the sake of duty" (ibid.). If goodness is more fundamental than duty, it can scarcely be made to consist in acting for the sake of duty; it must mean that we act for the sake of duty because it is good to do so, that is, because it is moral to do so. If my supreme duty, in the practical order, is to act morally (p. 121), then it can hardly be affirmed that to act morally is to act for the sake of duty. The Kantian formalism is precisely this, that it bases morality on the supreme duty of doing one's duty.

The various formulations of the categorical imperative do not enable us to escape this formalism; in fact, they also presuppose the morality which they are meant to establish. We are to act only on maxims that can at the same time be willed as universal laws valid for all rational beings. But when we ask how we are to determine those maxims in particular we find that the answer given by Kant really presupposes morality. There is no reason why a man cannot act on a maxim which is evil, and which he at the same time desires to be valid as a universal law; he could, for instance, wish the destruction of all human society, including himself. If

we ask why he should not desire such maxims to hold as universal laws, we are told that actions performed according to them would conflict with human nature, or with the harmony of human society, or with the dignity of persons as ends in themselves. In other words, we are told that such actions are immoral because their consequences are harmful to man; and this supposes that there is an obligation to seek the conservation and perfection of human nature, so that morality is reduced to an ontological foundation, in human nature. Prof. Paton tells us that "in judging any particular case, it is always well to consider the concrete action, to formulate the principle manifested in it, and then to ask whether this principle can be regarded as a moral law or a moral rule" (p. 136). One must always do that; but we can only decide whether it can be regarded as a moral principle by considering the object and effects of the proposed action, thus basing the morality on the object, on the objective relations between beings. We fully admit, with Prof. Paton, that we must distinguish the object from the motive; but the object of the internal act of the will—which alone is formally and intrinsically moral—is precisely its motive or end, which need not necessarily coincide with the object of the external act.

Kant seems also to be guilty of inconsistency in supposing us to be able to judge of actions through knowledge of their consequences on human nature and society, while his *Critique of Pure Reason* denies us all theoretical knowledge of nature in itself. Prof. Paton realises this difficulty, and admits the obscurity of Kant, who seems to fall back on some kind of intuition of the moral worth of actions. It helps very little to invoke some kind of conviction, as Prof. Paton himself does (p. 138), for a conviction that is not rationally founded cannot serve as a basis or criterion of rational morality. Nor is it sufficient to set before ourselves the harmony of men in society as the ideal that may serve as a criterion. For if we consider only that which actually promotes such harmony we cannot avoid an empiricism and utilitarianism as insufficient as those which Kant himself denounces; and if we ask what men should ideally strive after, what the conditions of society should be ideally, we again presuppose morality since men should strive after only that which is good.

Prof. Paton's answer to these, and similar objections that might be urged against the doctrine which he defends, is that the categorical imperative is an unconditioned moral law, similar to the ideas of pure reason (pp. 249, 250). "If we suppose that we can understand a necessity only by stating its condition, then manifestly we cannot understand an unconditioned necessity: to explain it by stating its condition involves us in direct contradiction. . . . Those who ask why we should do our duty are falling into this contradiction. . . . They are asking what is the condition under which we should obey an unconditioned imperative." But this is not "merely to deny that there can be an unconditioned imperative," as he asserts. It is one thing to decide what the supreme basis of morality

is, *once we accept the Kantian critique of pure reason as valid*. On that supposition, one would have to agree with Prof. Paton that "it is manifestly impossible to deduce moral obligation from purely metaphysical or epistemological considerations which have nothing to do with morality" (p. 226). It is an altogether different thing to establish the principles of morality on a realistic basis, on a metaphysics radically different from that of Kant, and according to which the supreme principle of morality is neither an a priori idea of practical reason, nor an assumed unconditioned necessity of the purely subjective order. We can fully agree with Prof. Paton that such an ethics is the only possible one on the basis of Kant's speculative philosophy, and that Kant has gone nearer than any other philosopher towards establishing an independent ethics. In fact, the Thomist can accept the Kantian ethic up to a certain point, in so far as it enshrines principles and ideas of morality drawn from common sense and the Christian tradition. He would admit the essence of Kant's doctrine as stated by Prof. Paton: "the primary aim of the good man is not to satisfy his own inclinations, however generous, but to obey a law which is the same for all, and only so does he cease to be self-centered and become moral" (p. 77). But he would not rest content with Kant's foundation or justification of that law. Kant's ethics seems to be a transposition of the Christian morality to the subjective order, where it is made to center round the bare idea of law. For us, morality centers round the objective, because it centers on God. We obey the moral law because it is God's law; and we obey God because He is infinitely perfect, and worthy of our love and obedience. He alone is absolutely and in all respects good; the will is good through its attitude towards Him and His law, and towards other things in relation to Him. The difference between Kant's formalism and our ethics based on natural theology and ontological principles is fundamentally a difference between conceptualism and realism, and a discussion of this is obviously beyond the scope of a review.

From these remarks it should not be thought that Prof. Paton accepts Kant's teaching in its entirety, or regards it as flawless. He draws attention to several defects, such as his hedonistic conception of happiness (p. 85), the failure of the attempt to connect free will and law through the concept of causality (p. 211) and the difficulty of explaining evil actions performed freely if acting freely means acting in accord with rational principles (pp. 275, 276). He moreover stresses the inconsistency between Kant's denial of the power of speculative reason to know reality in itself and the rather complete knowledge which he here assumes us to have of the idea of absolute goodness (p. 85) and of the intelligible world (p. 268). To this we would add the surprising knowledge which he supposes us to have of human nature, of the nature of our acts and their effects, and of human persons as ends in themselves. His main criticism, however, turns on Kant's attempt to justify the moral law through the

independent presupposition of the idea of freedom. Having shown that the categorical imperative is expressed in the principle of autonomy, that morality implies autonomy, he shows that autonomy implies freedom and is derived from it. He then claims to prove that a rational agent must necessarily conceive himself as acting under the idea of freedom, and thus freedom is the third term which connects the extremes of the synthetic a priori proposition: every rational agent ought to act in accordance with the principle of autonomy. This justification of morality, however, is not valid, since Kant makes the presupposition of freedom rest on the necessity of man's conceiving himself as a member of the intelligible world, and hence as acting under laws which are principles of reason and of which he is the author; while at the same time he states that it is because we know ourselves as free that we can consider ourselves as members of the intelligible world. Further, as Prof. Paton points out (p. 245), Kant is trying to justify a synthetic a priori proposition by means of the assertion that a rational being must as such think and act under the presupposition of freedom. This itself is another synthetic a priori proposition, and requires a third term; and if this is sought in membership of the intelligible world, we still have to connect rational being and the idea of membership in the intelligible world by means of another idea, and so on *ad infinitum*. Prof. Paton's treatment of this question (pp. 21-24) is very instructive, and throws much light on Kant's grounding of morality, especially in relation to Kant's later work on the same subject, in which he reverses his position and bases freedom on the independent presupposition of morality. If we cannot claim an independent insight into our membership of the intelligible world, we cannot justify freedom apart from morality, nor would the idea of freedom itself suffice to justify morality. For Prof. Paton, the required justification of morality rests on the self-consciousness of reason in its own activities, whether theoretical or practical. We have a rational insight into the principles manifested in the activity of reason as such, and therefore into the objective principles of practical reason in accordance with which a rational agent, *qua* rational agent, would necessarily act if reason had full control over passion (p. 220). We must conceive ourselves as capable of acting in accord with those principles, and we must conceive those practical principles to be valid for all rational beings as such. "To say this is to say that a rational agent as such will necessarily act on a principle universally and unconditionally valid for all rational agents as such. This principle is identical with the principle of autonomy (p. 245)," so that we have an independent and necessary presupposition of the categorical imperative. Morality is thus justified through rational insight, and freedom is inferred from morality. This is the position adopted by Kant in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, and the only one consistent with itself and with the conceptualistic basis of his theoretical philosophy, and is well summarized by Prof. Paton on pp.

262-264. This summary, moreover, allows us to understand why Kant has been accused, not without reason, of being fundamentally an empiricist in his ethics, though that is obviously not the view of Prof. Paton.

There are many other points of doctrine in this book on which the Thomist differs from both Kant and Prof. Paton which cannot be touched on here; but there can be little difference of opinion on the value of this book as a presentation, explanation, and defense of Kant's basic moral position. Prof. Paton is always clear, learned, and thought-provoking, and brings to Kantian studies a freshness and a common sense that are very much absent in so many commentators. His commentary will be of great service to all, be they Kantians or not, who are concerned with establishing and defending the foundations of morality and who regard this task as one of the most pressing duties of our day.

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The Love of God and the Cross of Jesus. By REGINALD GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, O. P. Translated by Sister Jeanne Marie, O. P. Vol. I. St. Louis: Herder, 1947. Pp. 399. \$4.00.

The Three Ages of the Interior Life. By REGINALD GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, O. P. Translated by Sister M. Timothea Doyle, O. P. Vol. II. St. Louis: Herder, 1948. Pp. 657, with index. \$7.50.

In the early pages of *The Dialogue of St. Catherine of Siena* it becomes immediately evident that God wanted this energetic mystic to learn two basic lessons. Those lessons were summed up in a pair of definitions inexhaustibly profound—"I am He Who is; thou art she who is not."

Father Garrigou-Lagrange has a predilection for these pages of the *Dialogue*. He refers to them in both the volumes being reviewed. And understandably so. For this great Thomist's theological writings are constantly reaffirming the utter gratuity of God's grace, the far-reaching efficacy of divine causality, the sheer supernaturality of the life of faith, and the inevitable necessity of passive purgations before the Christian soul can have that humble self-knowledge which is a prerequisite for the savory contemplation of God. Intent upon disclosing the full significance of the traditional formula, "grace is the seed of glory," the learned Dominican sees the Christian life as a prelude to the beatific vision and, while the goal of the interior life is the perfection of charity, the goal can never be gained without an ever more searching knowledge of God and an ever more revealing knowledge of self. This twofold knowledge comes to the Christian soul through the revelation of faith and the contemplation of the

mysteries of God, as Our Lord Himself indicated when He said to His Father on the night before He died, "Now this is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, Whom Thou hast sent" (John 17:8).

The first volume of *The Love of God and the Cross of Jesus* aims at giving us a deeper insight into the nature of God's love for us and the role of the cross in our return of love. Inasmuch as God's love for us was most perfectly manifested in the redemptive death of His Incarnate Son and is increasingly communicated to us through the indwelling of the Blessed Trinity in the souls of the just, Father Garrigou-Lagrange offers provocative chapters on the mystery of the cross and on the divine indwelling. Then mindful of his initial contention that "it is only by the royal road of the cross that the Christian soul truly enters into supernatural contemplation of the mysteries of faith and lives lovingly and deeply by them," he investigates the need for active purification, or mortification, and lays the groundwork for a better grasp of the traditional thesis that only passive trials can complete the purging of egoism which remains in the wounded nature of man even after Baptism.

If humility is the foundation of the Christian's spiritual edifice, as St. Augustine has so forcefully reminded us, it could hardly have a better safeguard than the mysterious Thomistic principle: "no one thing would be better than another did not God will a greater good for one than for the other" (*S. T.*, I, q. 20, a. 3). Unlike a human lover, He does not find goodness in us and love us for what we are: He puts it there and loves us for what He has made us. As Father Garrigou-Lagrange puts it, "All that makes us lovable in God's eyes comes from Him and is given to us only by His sovereignly free and gratuitous love. . . . Even what seems most exclusively our own—the free determination to choose good rather than evil—comes to us from Him" (p. 41).

And this love of God for man, which is the source of all our good, did not content itself with remaining inaccessibly aloof from the beneficiaries of its mercy. It would not let itself be lost on a mankind too overawed by God's majesty to understand His love. It would express itself in terms of human self-immolation which even short-sighted humanity could grasp and understand. "He chose to descend, in a sense, to our level that He might lift us up to His. . . . He willed to empty Himself," so St. Paul put it, "that He might be found according to our measure" (p. 43). In so doing He not only taught us the splendor of humility, but His "excess of love" became forever the pattern of every truly Christian love. For every truly Christian love must bear the stamp of authenticity; it must be imprinted with that "folly of the Cross beyond and above reason" which is "the remedy for another very real folly which falls far short of reason, the folly of sin" (p. 44).

Just as soon as we mention the "folly of sin," we are in a position to

understand that Christ was not laying down an arbitrary condition for discipleship in His school of wisdom when He said, "If any man will come after Me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross daily, and follow Me" (Luke 9:23). Our Lord did not bring the cross into the life of man; He simply gave it a new meaning. The cross is as native a possession of fallen man as his head or his heart; and just as inevitably his, as long as he is still only on his way to heaven and not already there. Father Garrigou-Lagrange puts this truth under penetrating light when he assigns four reasons for the necessity of mortification. It is necessary "(1) to destroy the consequences of original sin in us, (2) to do away with the results of our own personal sins, (3) to subordinate our natural activity perfectly to the life of grace, never losing sight of the infinite sublimity of our supernatural end, (4) to imitate Christ crucified and be associated with Him in the work of redemption" (p. 263).

In thus tracing the necessity of the cross to fallen man's own interior conflict and to the demands of supernatural charity, our Dominican guide is following in the footsteps of St. Paul and St. Augustine, who with the Angelic Doctor, are his chief masters after Christ. The plight of our nature still wounded with ignorance, malice, weakness, and unruly desire could hardly be described more pathetically than the Apostle put it when he wrote, "For the flesh lusteth against the spirit; and the spirit against the flesh; for these are contrary one to another: so that you do not the things that you would" (Gal. 5:17). And commenting upon the Apostle's remark that they who belong to Christ must crucify their flesh with its passions and desires, the great Bishop of Hippo wrote, "On this cross, indeed, throughout the whole of this life which is spent in the midst of trials and temptations, the Christian must continually hang. For there is no time in this life to draw out the nails of which it is said in the psalm, 'Pierce thou my flesh with the nails of fear;' the flesh is the carnal concupiscence; the nails are the commandments of justice; with the latter the fear of the Lord pierces the former and it crucifies us as an acceptable sacrifice to Him" (*PL*, 38, 1039).

Again it is from the pen of Augustine inspired by Paul that we find a beautiful expression of the idea that the cross in Christ's life and ours is a symbol of the demands of supernatural charity. The Apostle prayed that the Ephesians "may be able to comprehend with all the saints what is the breadth and length and height and depth, to gain, that is, an idea of the love of the Christ which surpasses knowledge" (Eph. 3:18-19—Spencer Translation). And St. Augustine, alert to find a significance in every detail of God's marvelous revelation on Calvary, wrote, "By it (the cross) is rightly understood to be symbolized that which the Apostle speaks of, 'what is the breadth and length and height and depth.' To be sure it is broad in the transverse beam on which the hands of the Crucified are extended, and thus in its breadth is signified the good works of charity; it

is long from the cross-bar to the ground on which part the body and the feet are fastened, and so in its length is signified perseverance even unto the end of time; it is high in the top piece by which the upright extends above the cross-bar, and it signifies the lofty end whither all the works are referred. For all things that are done well and perseveringly by the breadth and the length ought to be done for the sake of the loftiness of divine rewards. It is deep in that part by which it is fixed in the earth; there it is certainly hidden, nor is it able to be seen, but all its eminence arises therefrom; so too all our good works proceed from the profundity of God's grace which is able neither to be comprehended nor thoroughly discerned" (PL. 35, 1949-50). To love God and the things of God universally, perseveringly, supernaturally, and with a humility grounded in the mysteriousness of divine election is the purpose of every Christian's earthly existence; and in the face of the seemingly perennial hardness of self love and all its deceits, such an existence is inevitably a career on a cross.

When Father Garrigou-Lagrange sets out to dissect and analyze the various species of naturalism which can ruin the splendor of this supernatural charity, he shows himself a keen student of souls who has observed the foibles of spiritual men too long to be easily fooled by tricks of temperament masquerading as fruits of the spirit. Here we encounter some of the shrewdest observations in his book.

But perhaps the most illuminating pages in this work on the Love of God and the Cross of Jesus are those which deal with the redemptive love of Christ and the harmony within His holy soul which was simultaneously steeped in grief yet caught up in the flawlessly blissful joy of a beatified Saint of saints. To this reviewer it seems regrettable, however, that the renowned theologian occasionally (pp. 49, 188, 235) uses phraseology which suggests too close a kinship with the penal substitution theory of redemption. Even a cursory glance at his *De Christo Salvatore* will be enough to assure one that his orthodox meaning is certainly beyond questioning, but no aid toward a better understanding of the redemption can be gained from saying that Christ was "covered with our sins" or that "the sins we have committed have been transferred to our Saviour's head." Not even the energetic language of Isaias or St. Paul can ever make such phraseology desirable, especially in view of the rhetorical and oratorical exaggerations which have befogged popular notions of the redemption since the days of the Reformation.

English readers are indebted to Sister Jeanne Marie for an eminently readable and almost uniformly accurate translation of this volume of *L'Amour de Dieu et la Croix de Jésus*. It is unfortunate that for seemingly no reason at all there is an occasional omission of valuable footnotes contained in the French text. Apparently too, either Sister Jeanne Marie or the publishers do not share Father Garrigou-Larange's enthusiasm for

the pedagogic value of italicization. For most readers the failure to carry over the kindly guidance of Father's suggestive italics will, I think, be a real loss.

It is significant that on a very early page (p. 5) of his second volume of *The Three Ages of the Interior Life* the eminent Dominican author quotes one of his favorite passages from St. Thomas' Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews. It is a passage in which the Angelic Doctor with beautiful clarity gives utterance to the law of accelerating motion in the realm of the spirit: "A natural movement," he writes, " (e. g., of a falling stone) increases in proportion as it draws near its goal. The opposite is true of a violent movement (e. g., of a stone hurled into the air). Grace, moreover, inclines by a sort of analogy with what nature does; therefore those who are in the state of grace ought to grow so much the more as they more nearly approach the end " (*In Ep. ad Hebraeos*, 10:25). The life of grace consequently ought to follow a normal pattern of growth; supernatural love, which St. Augustine called "the weight that draws me," ought to carry the soul toward God with such an unswerving flight that death would enable it to gain immediate entrance into heaven. So it is fitting that Father Garrigou-Lagrange should recall this profound Thomistic law of the spirit at the very beginning of this second volume of his masterful work on the interior life; for therein he delineates the pattern of growth and traces the course of love as it moves the proficient and the perfect soul to become increasingly Christlike in the practice of virtue. In line with the traditional thesis that infused contemplation is the normal culmination of the Christian life, he explains why the passive purifications of sense and spirit are aimed at making the Christian undergo his purgatory here on earth while meriting, rather than after death without meriting. And he so harmonizes the teaching of St. John of the Cross with the doctrine of St. Thomas that it becomes clear that the trials described so graphically by the mystics are attributable to the merciful actualization of the gifts of the Holy Ghost by Him who is the Guest of our souls and the Moulder of Christian holiness.

In face of this spiritual law of gravity enunciated by St. Thomas, one naturally wonders why "spiritual growth often resembles the slowing motion of a stone thrown into the air." Father Lallemant, S. J., whom Father Garrigou-Lagrange quotes with admiration, gives the answer thus: "The reason why some reach perfection only very late or not at all is because they follow only nature and human sense in practically everything. They pay little or no heed to the Holy Ghost whose appropriate work is to enlighten, to direct, to warm " (*Spiritual Doctrine*, Principle 4, ch. 2, art. 2).

This neglect of the Holy Ghost and preponderance of naturalism is the baneful formula for producing a stunted soul. The early generosity of religious life gives place to a calculating egoism which lives by the prudence

of the flesh. Father Garrigou-Lagrange expresses the plight of such victims of faintheartedness when he writes, "They neglect a number of their obligations and gradually, in place of the radical simplicity of a gaze that was already lofty, a simplicity which should become that of contemplation, they find themselves in the quasi-learned complexity of a waning knowledge" (p. 27).

Such knowledge was never meant to wane. And the very waning of it is the earmark of a spiritual monstrosity. Following the great masters of spirituality, Father Garrigou-Lagrange adduces three reasons to fortify his contention that a distinctly mystical knowledge is the *ordinary* outcome of a soul's fidelity to the gentle yet firm leading of the Holy Spirit: 1) "the basic principle of the mystical life (characterized by infused contemplation) is the same as that of the common interior life, namely, the grace of the virtues and the gifts," 2) "in the progress of the interior life, the purification of the soul . . . is not complete except by the passive purifications," 3) "the end of the interior life is the same as that of the mystical life, namely, eternal life or the beatific vision and the inadmissible love resulting from it" (pp. 319-321).

Theoretically this is an optimistic thesis. Why is the author of "The Three Ages" less enthusiastic when he looks for the results of this optimistic theory in the lives of average religious or ordinary Christians? He would agree wholeheartedly with the answer given by *The Imitation*: "There are found so few contemplative persons because there are few that know how to sequester themselves entirely from perishable creatures" (Bk. III, ch. 31). But the realism which faces the fact that God's work is slowed up in our souls by our own negligence and pusillanimity does not degenerate into a pessimism which sees such retardation as inevitable. And while one might maintain, as Father Garrigou-Lagrange does, that "the full normal actualization of the gift of wisdom deserves the name of infused contemplation, properly so called, and that without this contemplation the full normal actualization of this gift does not exist" (p. 339), a distinctly mystical knowledge proceeding more immediately from the lesser gifts is nonetheless compatible with many human shortcomings which a soul might go on battling for a long, long time. Hence the author's emphasis on the fewness of those souls who reach the normal heights of contemplation held out to them should not be mistaken for a denial of St. John of the Cross' encouraging observation, "The night of the sense is common, and the lot of many: these are the beginners" (*The Dark Night of the Soul*, Bk. I, ch. 8). And even these beginners taste a transient contemplation which proceeds according to the superhuman mode characteristic of the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Father Garrigou-Lagrange says of them, "The soul will then receive, at least for a time, a greater facility for prayer. Not infrequently there is at this stage the infused prayer of quiet in which the will is captivated for a short time by the attraction of God. Persons dedicated

to the apostolate have also in this period a greater facility to act in the service of God, to teach, direct, and organize works" (p. 70).

Pages which deserve careful reading in view of current discussion of the relative merits of the "purely contemplative" and of the "mixed" life are those in which the author treats of the influence of infused contemplation on the perfect apostolic life and the life of reparation (pp. 489-510). Using St. Thomas' principle that the end of the apostolic life is *contemplari et contemplata aliis tradere*, he defines his terms with unmistakable precision and clears the air of the not infrequent confusion occasioned by those who treat contemplation as a *means* to action rather than as its "*eminent cause*." Hence those who overstress apostolic activity to the detriment of contemplation are reminded that "there is nothing more sublime on earth than union with God through contemplation and love." And those who overstress the merit of a "purely contemplative" life come face to face with the wise Thomistic thought that it is better to illuminate than simply to be enlightened.

It is impossible in any review to suggest the wealth of profound spiritual guidance available to souls in a work of this calibre. If true knowledge of the things of God is a matter of integration and unification, then suffice it to say that we owe a debt of gratitude to God who inspired Father Garrigou-Lagrange to produce this great synthesis of spiritual doctrine and guided Sister M. Timothea Doyle, O. P. in the exacting labors of her competent translation.

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Family and Civilization. By CARLE C. ZIMMERMAN. New York: Harper & Bros., 1947. Pp. 839, with index. \$6.00.

The Family of Tomorrow. By CARLE C. ZIMMERMAN. New York: Harper & Bros., 1949. Pp. 267, with index. \$3.50.

Known earlier for studies in rural sociology, Professor Zimmerman of Harvard wrote his first book in the sociology of the family: *Family and Society*, in 1935, in collaboration with M. E. Frampton. This work was distinguished by the presentation of the theories of the outstanding nineteenth century Catholic sociologist Le Play, whose influence is evident in the types, and familism ideas, of these two later volumes.

Family and Civilization strikes a new and welcome note in the long list of recent publications for college "marriage and family" courses. The interest is clearly sociological rather than the giving of advice on matrimonial behavior, which distinguishes so many current works. The author's

purpose is to provide an analysis of the various family systems in western civilization from early beginnings to the present day, with an eye to predicting the family type of tomorrow.

Having demolished in the first few chapters the earlier theories of the evolution of the family, unilinear and otherwise, most of which have not, in any event, been held by scholars within recent years, Zimmerman proceeds to advance a theory of his own. This is, that his extensive study of history and literature from early Greek civilization to the present day shows the western family system to have moved in cycles through three family types: the trustee family, the domestic family, the atomistic family. The idea of cyclical change in terms of three is no novelty to the philosopher or sociologist; Zimmerman's types resemble respectively LePlay's patriarchal, quasipatriarchal, and individualistic categories, and were graphically portrayed in their modern form in the July 26, 1948 issue of *Life*; but his sequence of types seems to be wholly original.

In the trustee type there is extensive control over the individual by the family, which assumes much of the responsibility for the individual's guidance and protection now taken over by the state and public agencies. The family is considered perpetual, family solidarity is important, the head of the family receives authority as family head, not as of personal right. In time, this type, in Zimmerman's theory, develops into the domestic family, the middle type, where the trustee family's functions are considerably abbreviated or changed, where members have a certain amount of mobility and freedom though at least a minimum of familism or family influence remains over the individual. The atomistic family is the type in which the individual is very largely freed from the family; it is "essentially the one found in societies where law and custom bring the individual, as far as possible, out from under the *couvert*, the *manus*, the *potestas* of the family and make him the agent of the government, the one responsible directly to the law, and bound least to family obligations" (p. 137).

Zimmerman ends his *Family and Civilization* with the idea that the decay of family life which he sees in our modern civilization can only be averted by "scholarship and teaching." He says: "There is a greater disparity between the actual, documented, historical truth and the theories taught in the family sociology courses, than exists in any other scientific field," and he concludes that the answer to this great family social problem is to recreate the conception of familism and its basic meaning to society not by legal means but by the *voluntary* "making of familism and child-bearing the primary social duties of the citizen. . . . The solution will prove to be not in *fides* alone but in the strong union of *proles-fides*—children and familism" (p. 810). Catholics will immediately miss the important *Sacramentum*!

There is a vast display of erudition in both books under review. Yet it is

not always well organized, nor does one get from these works a clear understanding of the reasons for Zimmerman's conclusions. At times he seems very confused, and the amateurish illustrations by his daughter in the second work, *The Family of Tomorrow*, do not add any clarification to his strange mixture of erudition and prophecy.

The purpose of *The Family of Tomorrow* is to "seek to show tomorrow's family by explaining the immanent principle between family and civilization and by giving the backgrounds and thoughts of prominent leaders who have contributed most to the understanding of the process and its control" (p. x). The "great men" singled out by Zimmerman as instrumental in shaping our family system are Augustus, Livia his wife, Theodora the wife of Justinian, St. Jerome, St. Augustine, Jovinianus the monk, Erasmus, Luther, and Milton. Erasmus is given especial importance as having initiated our modern family system (p. 179). The decay of family systems is said to be demonstrated from the writings of Jerome, Justinian, Erasmus etc., and the experience of the past shows the direction of the trends of today. Yet Zimmerman thinks that precisely because of the history of the past we do not have to drift. Just as his nine great leaders were largely responsible for the development of family influence and organization, so we in our time can re-create and impress family value systems. We cannot make people civilized, he says, but we can tell them how to make themselves civilized. By this he means especially the re-introduction of familism. He ends *The Family of Tomorrow* with a plea for the financing of an *American Family Institute*, both by large contributions from the well-to-do and by small contributions from the "many who believe in the family but who, possibly because they have families to raise, can not give in large amounts" (p. 245).

One cannot always agree with what Zimmerman says in his somewhat confused manner, but Catholics will welcome his attempt to understand Catholic family thought in both books, and they will wholeheartedly endorse any foundation formed for the purpose of understanding trends in family life and considering methods of helping to establish worthwhile family aids of all kinds. Sociologists will raise eyebrows at many points, including such terms as Jovinian's and Milton's "Family Sociology." Cultural determinists will be opposed to any idea of the possibility of consciously turning trends in any direction which might seem desirable, but those whose belief in man's intelligence and free will causes them to be less wedded to a pessimistic mechanistic viewpoint will see the good points in Zimmerman's theories, even though they will hardly subscribe to all that he seems to be trying to say.

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Immortal Diamond: Studies in Gerard Manley Hopkins. Edited by NORMAN WEYAND. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1949. Pp. 451, with indexes. \$5.00.

Gerard Manley Hopkins: A Study of Poetic Idiosyncrasy in Relation to Poetic Tradition. By W. H. GARDNER. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948. Pp. 304, with index. \$4.00.

Gerard Manley Hopkins: A Critical Essay towards the Understanding of his Poetry. By W. A. M. PETERS. New York: Oxford University Press, 1948. Pp. 213, with index. \$4.50.

Immortal Diamond, a phrase drawn from one of Hopkin's poems, is a collection of studies by eleven American Jesuits. It is a very uneven book not in the sense that some of the chapters are sound while others are superficial, but in the sense that the separate studies are suitable to different levels of readers. Several of them serve as an introduction to the poet for those making a first acquaintance while others presume an audience which is already initiated. Herein lies both the strength and weakness of *Immortal Diamond*.

Among the very general introductory studies is, for instance, a biographical sketch of Hopkins in his relation to the Society of Jesus which in a very rounded and balanced manner gives the story of his life from the time of his conversion until his death. It draws heavily on primary materials, especially on the letters, as indeed it should. Occasionally there is some facet which needs illumination. When, for instance, Hopkins at Oxford was considering Rome he wrote in his diary: "Note that if ever I should leave the English Church the fact of Provost Fortescue is to be got over." This is quoted but without any attempt to determine just what "the fact of Provost Fortescue" was, and it would seem to be a not unimportant hurdle in the story of his conversion.

From the essay we do learn one very important new fact: that Hopkins' spiritual diary which has not survived was mistakenly returned to his family after his death and that acting on instructions written on the fly-leaf, his two sisters burnt the diary without reading it. For the past two decades critics have speculated—and sometimes very wildly indeed—as to its whereabouts or the reasons for its destruction, and it is good to have the matter finally settled.

A further general essay is devoted to Hopkins as a poet of nature and of the supernatural and still another to him as a poet of ascetic and religious conflict. The writer of the latter does not underestimate the gravity and acuteness of such "conflict" but he concludes that all sad portraits of Hopkins cramped by the stern discipline of Jesuit life and living out dismal days of broken hearted frustration among the Jesuits

may be viewed with a smile of gentle, not to say profound, incredulity.

In contrast to these introductory essays is such a study as that entitled "Greco-Roman Verse Theory and Hopkins" which presupposes far more than a superficial knowledge of the theory and practice of classical prosody. Hopkins believed that there were strong similarities between his rhythms and those of the Greek choruses. The writer's thesis is that Hopkins' misunderstandings of Greek and Latin rhythmic usages, which derived for the most part from mistakes of scholars of his age, led his speculation on classical meter over unsafe ground. The essay is challenging and can finally be evaluated only when one takes into consideration Hopkins' own experiments in Greek poetry which were very recently—certainly too recently for them to be considered here—printed for the first time in the third edition of his poems.

The longest study—some eighty pages—is also one of the most valuable. In "Sprung Rhythm and the Life of English Poetry" Walter Ong attempts to account for Hopkins' sprung rhythm and his practice against a general pattern of development in English verse. Aware of the tremendous intricacies of the problem, he demonstrates very persuasively that interpretive or sense-stress rhythm demands alliteration, assonance, internal rhyme, dramatic suppression of words, telescoping of grammatical structure as invaluable and necessary helps in bringing out the intended meaning. One concludes that all these devices were not mere adventitious ornament but the stuff which "gathers to a greatness" to form the substance, the organism which is Hopkins' poetry. The essay has many other important things to say, and it is one of the very best in the volume.

Three of the studies are devoted to the kind of analysis which is especially helpful for the beginning student of Hopkins: careful exegesis and explication of individual poems, "The Windhover," "The Loss of the Eurydice," and "The Wreck of the Deutschland." The first is the most detailed and takes into consideration the numerous critical studies which have been made of that poem.

In an appendix the various newspaper accounts and press reports relating to the historical basis of "The Wreck of the Deutschland" and "The Loss of the Eurydice" are reprinted and made available for the first time. They suggest that in the hands of a very sensitive critic a significant study might be made of the transmutation of these materials into Hopkins' poetry, just as a contribution could be made by studying the creative process through an examination of the materials in Hopkins' *Note-Books and Papers* in relation to his actual poems.

An interpretive glossary of difficult words, rather than being placed among the appendices, is located at the center of the book for the convenience of readers who may wish to keep this section open while reading Hopkins' poems. Two factors especially render Hopkins' diction difficult:

coinage of new words and employment of provincial or dialectical usage. These are especially indicated in the glossary and several interesting conclusions emerge: what appear at first sight to be archaisms are not usually so. They are but borrowings from the living dialect of the common people of particular regions of whose speech Hopkins made booty in his eager search for the precise, the living, the more colorful word. They are very seldom studied revivals of truly archaic language.

The glossary is not absolutely complete (for instance, "random" certainly has a special meaning as Hopkins uses it in "Felix Randal"), and sometimes the explanations do not explain (as in the case of "unchanceling" from "The Wreck of the Deutschland.") Probably the greatest difficulty is that when Hopkins uses a word he often intends it to mean several things at once; "leafmeal" (from "Spring and Fall") is here defined as "leaf by leaf" by analogy with "piecemeal." But does not Hopkins also intend the sense of the autumn leaves being ground underfoot into meal, "leafmeal"? The glossary is perhaps too exclusive in the meanings it gives in such cases. It remains, however, an extremely needed and useful aid for the beginner as well as the person who thinks he knows Hopkins' vocabulary well; even the latter will discover in Hopkins a precision that he may have missed.

The volume closes with a chronological Hopkins' bibliography which is presented as comprehensive but not exhaustive. Without being completely definitive, it is easily the most inclusive bibliography of Hopkins in print and it forms, as its compiler says, a working basis for further work in Hopkins' bibliography.

Immortal Diamond is enhanced by a frontispiece which presents for the first time a newly discovered photograph of Hopkins toward the close of his life. It is far superior to the other portraits which we have.

Because of its varied nature, *Immortal Diamond* offers something of significance to the general reader as well as to the more advanced student, and the book fulfills therefore a diversity of need.

Hopkins in a letter to Coventry Patmore once wrote:

Every true poet, I thought, must be original and originality a condition of poetic genius; so that each poet is like a species in nature (not an *individuum genericum* or *specificum*) and can never recur. That nothing should be old or borrowed however cannot be.

It is the object of W. H. Gardner to study the revolutionary and traditional elements in Hopkins. His purpose is precisely—if somewhat awkwardly—indicated in the subtitle of his book: *Gerard Manley Hopkins: A Study of Poetic Idiosyncrasy in Relation to Poetic Tradition*.

In chapters devoted to his "two vocations" (those of poet and priest),

"The Wreck of the Deutschland," sonnet morphology, diction and syntax, themes and imagery, his critics and reviewers, and finally his relation to modern poetry, the author seeks to show that Hopkins, at first sight so odd, eccentric, even revolutionary in matters of style and rhythm, is actually and eminently as legitimate an offspring of the great European tradition as any English poet before him.

This purpose is carried out with varying success in the different chapters of the book. Some of them are more closely related to the central objective of the volume than others. Indeed some of them tend to break off and to become brilliant individual critical essays which only peripherally touch on his central thesis. The chapters, in other words, need to be more carefully integrated to make this a single study rather than a collection of studies.

One of his most valuable contributions is his chapter on sonnet morphology in which his thesis may be seen worked out in detail. Gardner holds that Hopkins' most significant contribution to English verse forms consisted in the number of variations played upon the traditional Petrarchan or Italian sonnet-form. Hopkins called the majority of his poems sonnets and his object was to infuse a new spirit into the old form without destroying its identity.

What Hopkins was really trying to do was to produce sonnets more like the original Petrarchan sonnet than the other English sonneteers who thought they were following Petrarch. "The main reason," he held, "why the sonnet has never been so effective in England as in Italy I believe to be this: it is not so long as the Italian sonnet; it is not long enough. . . ."

Such iconoclasm Hopkins supported by an analogy from architecture: in the Doric order, the Parthenon is the standard of perfection; its proportions are the *typical* proportions. But wrote Hopkins:

If a building is raised on a notably larger scale, it will be found that these proportions . . . must be changed or the Order abandoned. Now if the Italian sonnet is one of the most successful forms of composition known, as it is reckoned to be, its propositions, inward and outward, must be pretty near perfection.

But although the English sonnet proper conforms to the Italian type in all other respects, the English decasyllable is shorter than the Italian *endecasillabo*, not by one syllable only, but frequently by three or four, owing to the slurring of final and initial vowels. Hopkins also remarks that in the Italian the syllables themselves are longer. The English sonnet, therefore, suffers from want "not of comparative but of absolute length."

By various means, therefore, Hopkins aimed at extending the English sonnet to the size of the Italian. When he rejected the iambic decasyllable in favor of his own counterpointed, outriding and sprung rhythms, he did so not in ignorant caprice but in the full knowledge of what he was doing. He wanted the maximum length and weight of the Italian sonnet.

In this way Hopkins' sonnets, which appear to be so unconventional and

such a break with tradition, are shown to be in truth far more traditional than those of Wyatt or Surrey or Milton. The same may be said for his sprung rhythm, his prosody, his diction, themes, and imagery to which Gardner devotes separate chapters.

His book, therefore, reverses the common critical opinion that Hopkins' work is that of one who broke almost completely with the past and brings the body of his poetry into a finely balanced synthesis of the old and the new. The writer has promised a second volume which every student of Hopkins will eagerly await.

The sections on the Scotist elements in Hopkins (pp. 21-31) are not entirely satisfactory. The most serious error—which I take to be an unintentional slip—is the statement: "Scotus offered the poet an aesthetic sanction and the priest a moral justification for his inordinate attachment to poetry and the other arts. That is perhaps why Scotus so swayed his spirits to peace." It would seem difficult to see how Scotus—or any one else for that matter—could justify an "inordinate" attachment. Fortunately Gardner has made revisions in the American edition (the present volumes) which does not rely for support, as does the English edition, on citations from Scotus' *De Rerum Principio* as quoted in C. R. S. Harris' rather unfortunate *Duns Scotus* (Oxford, 1928).

W. A. M. Peters in his *Gerard Manley Hopkins: A Critical Essay Towards the Understanding of His Poetry* makes the Scotist element the master key to all of Hopkins' poetry. Hopkins himself referred to inscape as "what I above all aim at in poetry," as "the essential and only lasting thing," and as "the very soul of art."

One may thus well believe that inscape is the key to all his art, and Peters finds in it the explanation for all that is baffling to the ordinary reader of Hopkins.

The Jesuit poet nowhere defined exactly what he meant by the term "inscape" but Peters formulates very carefully—and I think accurately—a definition drawn from all the instances in which the poet employs the term. Inscape is, then, the unified complex of those sensible qualities of the object of perception that strike us as inseparably belonging to and most typical of it, so that through the knowledge of this unified complex of sense-data we may gain an insight into the individual essence of the object.

Hopkins was never satisfied unless he had caught the inscape of things and it led him to deviate from the generally accepted practice of writing poetry. His was therefore no irresponsible playing with language, no wilful destruction.

Peters works out his thesis in great detail, with an abundant wealth of illustration, and with a closeness of reasoning that throws fresh light on many aspects of the poetry of Hopkins.

Hopkins was faced with a difficulty at first sight insurmountable. In-

scape is individually distinctive and unique, and as such it cannot be expressed in words which, with the exception of proper names, by their very essence as lexical elements of the given language are universal terms. How is he to express the individual in terms which are representative of universals when inscape is a denial of universality? He resorted to a number of methods. He was driven towards impersonation, a personifying that is, of irrational selves so that, identifying individuality and personality, he presents irrational objects as persons. Indications of impersonation are, for instance, the frequent absence of the article which has the effect of making the common noun into a kind of proper name, or his habit of addressing the objects he contemplates, or his constant attribution of activity and life (each mortal thing "deals out that being indoors each one dwells.")

His coinages clearly point to his intense awareness of what is individually distinctive in every object and to his consciousness of the objects as independent in being and activity.

His new compounds (making generic terms into specific ones), his reformation of such compounds by splitting them up, taking them to pieces, and then reassembling them, his use of long adjectival groups in frontal position to fulfill a restrictive rather than merely descriptive function, his frequent employment of homophones, even the omission of the relative pronoun—all these are modes of inscaping and it is inscape that accounts for both the matter and the form of his poetry.

The language used by the poet must have the same individualizing touch as the matter of his poetry. The poetic experience, no matter how distinctive and how "served" will lose its individuality if it is expressed in conventional form.

The book is very carefully ordered and the progression is very logical. Its chief difficulties come at those points (as on pp. 64-65 for instance) where the enthusiasm of the author is so great that he insists that inscape be the explanation for everything in Hopkins and as a result he sometimes forces his material into the pattern of his thesis. But that the thesis is in general sound no reader may easily doubt and all future students will have to rely on this study even it is to be qualified it by relating it to other elements in the sensibility of Hopkins.

The author sees, as do other critics of Hopkins, that the reason why the philosophy of Scotus attracted him even more strongly than that of Aristotle or St. Thomas is given by Hopkins himself in a passage in his diary where he says that the inscape of things made him think of Scotus. This argues that Scotus' philosophy gave the philosophical basis to his inscape. Even more than the epistemology of Scotus it was his theory of individuation that made Hopkins turn to him, for inscape covers what Scotus called *haecceitas*, of which inscape is the sensible manifestation.

Hopkins' own theories found, then, a philosophical justification and confirmation in the system of Scotus.

Of course Peters is aware that Hopkins was in a sense a Scotist before he was aware of it; he practiced Scotism, so to say, before he knew the system of Scotus. Many of the instances of his use of the term *inscape* in his journal date from before the time he first picked up a volume of Scotus in 1872 (indeed he first used the term in 1868 in connection with Parmenides). Yet Scotus did exercise a decided influence on him, for once he had found that his own views paralleled so nearly those in Scotus' philosophy, he adhered to them with an added confidence.

The Scotist elements in Hopkins' thought bring up a host of important problems which should be further explored. As Peters presents the view of Hopkins, it would seem that he made every existent thing into a separate species, that in a sense the world for him was peopled by nothing but angels. Or another way of stating this would be to say that the unity of the species is sacrificed in order to protect the particularity of the individual. Yet when one reads the poetry of Hopkins he is aware that this is not entirely true. Indicative is Hopkins' own exegesis of his sonnet on Henry Purcell who "uttered in notes the very make and species of man as created in him and in all men generally."

But before such questions should be taken up it would seem that even more fundamental historical problems must be treated. Preliminary to a study of the Scotist element in Hopkins would have to be a careful study of exactly how and what philosophy was taught in the early 1870's when Hopkins was in the Jesuit seminary. What theory of individuation, for instance, was taught? What were the texts and textbooks? Was it the theory of Suarez? Of St. Thomas? If the latter, how was it presented? What aesthetic was to be found in the books which he studied?

Hopkins, of course, did not have a good text of Scotus—we know the edition he used. In 1874 he made the acquaintance of David Lewis and Brande Morris to whom he referred as the "two and I suppose the only two Scotists in England." It would be interesting—and I think significant—to know the extent to which Hopkins' own interpretations of Scotus were valid.

Further, an artist is not always so consistent with his own theory as Peters suggests. This was often true of Hopkins because he frequently theorized after the accomplished fact and hunted for parallels in a kind of process of rationalization.

Eventually there must come a time for an assessment of the strength and weakness of an aesthetic which would derive from the metaphysics and epistemology of Scotus.

I do not wish to imply that Peters should have attempted answers to all these problems—and a number of others that will suggest themselves.

He defines carefully his plan and pursues it with tenacity. But I am suggesting that there is still work to be done on the Scotist element in Hopkins and that further study of it will bring forth answers to questions which are very relevant not merely to a final evaluation of Hopkins but to the very nature of poetry and art itself.

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Le Sens de l'Histoire. By NICHOLAS BERTIAEFF. Paris: Aubier, Editions Montaigne, 1948. Pp. 221.

Meaning in History. By KARL LÖWITH. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1949. Pp. 267 with index. \$4.00.

The chapters of Bertiaeff's book consist of lectures delivered by the author at the Liberal Academy of Spiritual Culture in Moscow during the first days of the Soviet regime (1919-1920). To these chapters are added two later lectures: "Vouloire-vivre et volonté de culture," and "Histoire et eschatologie." This French edition is not of great importance for the English reading scholar, inasmuch as all the above material except the lecture on "history and eschatology" appeared in English in 1936 under the title *The Meaning of History*. The lecture on history and eschatology was delivered by the author to a French audience in 1942 and published here for the first time. Bertiaeff's preface to the French edition, written shortly before his death, is a neat summary of what he has tried to accomplish by his writings on the philosophy of history.

This book, Bertiaeff tells the reader, is an attempt to treat of "the fundamental problems of the philosophy of history." His contribution to our understanding of history is now well known: his distinction between culture and civilization; his insistence on the religious element in man's life and in history; his "personalism" with its stress on human freedom and the dignity of man; his presentation of the unique contribution made by Christianity to Western culture; and his analysis of the decadence of the West in modern times. In the preface to this French edition, Bertiaeff explains that his "philosophy is permeated more and more with personalism," and that he has become more and more convinced "of the necessity of defending the dignity and the freedom of man," of developing a Christian humanism in the face of modern positivism and materialism.

His chapter on "History and Eschatology" restates his basic theory that modern theories of progress are secularizations and perversions of the Judaeo-Christian concept of salvation and the coming of the Kingdom of God. Any meaningful philosophy of history, Bertiaeff insists, must necessarily be messianic and eschatological. Its end must lie outside history,

not in it, for salvation is not found within history. He therefore dismisses the modern theories of progress for seeking the end of history at some future time within the historical process. In this chapter Berdiaeff also makes some enlightening, though for him not new, remarks on the other two "capital problems" of modern philosophies of history: time and freedom.

The contribution of the late Nicholas Berdiaeff to our thinking about the philosophy of history is best summed up in *Le Sens de l'Histoire*. The single new chapter in the French edition reviewed here, however, adds nothing new to the Berdiaeff literature already in English.

Whereas Berdiaeff's thought on this subject has been brought to a close, Karl Löwith's promises to be just beginning. His *Meaning in History* is his first work to appear in English, but he has done several studies in German in this general field. Löwith uses the device of analyzing critically the thought of masters in the field from early Christian times through the nineteenth century, but this method does not prevent him from presenting his own ideas effectively, both in his introductory and concluding chapters and in his analysis of each of the fourteen "philosophers of history" he treats.

Meaning in History is curiously organized. Because the author sees in modern historical thought "a more or less inconsistent compound of both traditions [classical and Christian]," he thinks it well to start with modern thinkers and work backward through history to "the Hebrew-Christian understanding of history by faith." Thus he starts with Burckhardt and works through Marx, Hegel, Proudhon, Comte, Condorcet, Turgot, Voltaire, Vico, Bossuet, Joachim of Floris, Augustine, Orosius, and the Bible. These are all well-known names except for Joachim and Orosius. Löwith included the former, it would seem, in order to have one millenarian in his study—for the problem of salvation assumes an even greater importance with him than it does with Berdiaeff. It is not so easy to justify the inclusion of Augustine's pupil Orosius, who differed from his master only in adapting himself better to the new barbarian element in the Roman Empire.

In this single volume the author can devote only from ten to twenty pages to each thinker he analyzes. Generally speaking, his study on each individual is penetrating. This is the most valuable and the soundest part of his work—especially his comments on the eight figures selected from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The most important part of the book, however, is Löwith's own thesis, found principally in the introduction, the chapter on the Biblical view of history, and the conclusion, but also scattered through his other chapters by way of tangential discussions.

The sub-title of *Meaning in History* is "The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History." This is significant, for Löwith holds that a

philosophy of history is impossible, inasmuch as the ultimate meaning of history cannot be found immanently.

"The problem of history as a whole is unanswerable within its own perspective. Historical processes as such do not bear the least evidence of a comprehensive and ultimate meaning. History as such has no outcome. There never has been and never will be an immanent solution of the problem of history, for man's historical experience is one of steady failure. . . . As a transcendent principle, the will of God can never become the subject of a systematic interpretation, revealing the meaning of history in the succession and fortunes of states or even in the history of the church."

Löwith therefore maintains that the ultimate answers to the questions history raises can be given only by faith. For the "meaning" of history to him is its end, which lies outside history, and can therefore be understood only through a non-empirical approach to the problem.

Löwith agrees in the main with Berdiaeff in his critique of modern philosophies of history. The classical view of history was cyclical or circular, he claims, with the idea of eternal recurrence based upon the classical knowledge of the universe and the seasons. Judaism and Christianity, however, took a linear view of history, seeing it as progression from creation to the coming of the Kingdom of God. The doctrine of salvation, therefore, became the basis of the Christian view of history. Modern theories of progress, with Löwith as with Berdiaeff, are a secularization of the Christian doctrine of salvation, but "salvation" to the moderns is made an immanent thing, realizable within history. The definite, transcendent goal of the Christians has been replaced by the moderns with an indefinite, future, immanent goal. Thus, modern "progress" theories of history are derived from Christianity and turned against it.

The author of *Meaning in History* sees all modern thought on this subject as a combination of the classical circular theory of eternal recurrence and the Christian linear theory of creation and salvation. Thus, he sees Spengler's organic theory of growth and decline as patterned on the classical tradition. Thus, he sees Toynbee "much more under the spell of naturalistic and secular thinking than he realizes." Löwith errs here in not wanting to see what Toynbee is about, for it is the old story of the theologian condemning the philosopher for not being a theologian. "Toynbee," he complains, "is neither an empirical historian nor a good theologian."

Meaning in History sets up a sharp distinction between the "history of salvation" on the one hand and "profane history" on the other. He holds that the latter is meaningless except in terms of the former. In this respect he differs from Berdiaeff, who uses Christian knowledge to interpret and to give pattern to the history of human beings living their lives in the world. Berdiaeff is thus more helpful to the historian who seeks

guidance from the philosopher and the theologian in finding the ultimates in history, which historical data of themselves cannot give. Löwith reacts quite properly to the historicism of men like Dilthey and the fatalism of "philosophers of history" like Spengler and Marx; but his reaction seems too strong, insofar as secular history is treated as a profane subject that is a useless, even dangerous, study.

Löwith is right in claiming that history cannot answer the problem he raises of "the meaning of history," which is properly a theological problem. The general tenor of his book is to dismiss "philosophies of history" as illegitimate studies. This is too slick a trick. One can agree with Löwith that only a theology of history can answer the question of the end of history, and of individuals, but one can still have room for the sort of thing Berdiaeff and Toynbee have done—which is generally referred to by that loose phrase "philosophy of history."

The problem of salvation, which is the central concern of *Meaning in History*, is twofold. There is the problem of the end of each historical person, of each man who lives in history. There is also the problem of the end of society, of the coming of the Kingdom of God. Both of these are theological rather than historical problems, and both of them are realized outside the course of history. Löwith handles them well, but he creates a certain amount of confusion for the reader by not keeping distinct these two "salvations." It is the wise historian who will agree with him in admitting that the ultimate meaning of history must be found in theology rather than in history. But Löwith has not presented a convincing case to show that the antithesis between the Christian view of history and any conceivable "profane" history is necessary.

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Whitehead's Philosophy of Time. By WILLIAM W. HAMMERSCHMIDT.
New York: King's Crown Press, 1947. Pp. 108. \$2.00.

Those who are interested in Mr. Whitehead's philosophy of Space-Time will find in this study a very helpful and scholarly collection of material. The intention of Mr. Hammerschmidt is to "give a reader a manageable basis for a criticism of Whitehead's writings on Space-Time" (p. 1). He traces faithfully the philosopher's thought on the subject through three general periods. The first extends from his earliest publications through 1924. It will be remembered that Mr. Whitehead joined the faculty of Harvard University in the department of philosophy in that year. The second period is the transitional one starting with the publication of *Science and the Modern World* (1926) and continuing to the appearance of *Process*

and Reality (1929). The publication of the latter book introduces the final period of Whitehead's thought.

The arrangement of the book is calculated to make the reading as easy as possible. Chapter headings are significant, sub-headings are expressive of the material contained in the smaller sections, and at the close of each chapter the writer summarizes the thought analyzed in that chapter. Notes and references are accurate. The glossary of terms is a necessary aid to those who are unaccustomed to the terminology of the philosophy of organism, although the definitions sometimes are as difficult to understand as the terms defined. For example, a mental pole is defined as "that aspect of an actual occasion which includes an aim at an aesthetically and morally harmonious nature as the result of the self-creation of the actual occasion." Of course, it is not the fault of Mr. Hammerschmidt that he must give such a definition. He is only repeating the words of the philosopher. To criticize him on this point is to show a lack of appreciation of the monumental work which he has actually accomplished—a reasonably coherent presentation of a system of thought which is not in itself noted for coherence.

There are four chapters in the book. The first is a preliminary account of time and nature. It includes a study of the general aspects of the philosophy of organism in relation to those topics. The second chapter is a consideration of "Temporal Transition and Atomic Events." This is a description of Whitehead's polemics against simple real points of Time and Space. As might be expected, Mr. Whitehead is opposed to the theory that Time and Space are made up of simple, indivisible points. For him, the characteristic flow of time is best explained in the flux of becoming.

After considering Whitehead's doctrine that all real entities are extended in space and time, the author in the third chapter examines the extended aspect of events in the light of the theory of Extensive Abstraction. This leads to the study of the order of Durations in the following chapter. The last chapter is a very instructive estimation of the reality of Space-Time in Whitehead.

In any reasonable consideration of truth and being, a writer is using as his instrument a mind, the proper object of which is *being*. He necessarily speaks in terms of being, of substance and accident. According to Mr. Hammerschmidt, Mr. Whitehead rejects the Newtonian theory that Time is "self-subsistent," real in its own right, involving no dependence on matter or substance, and in itself something rather than an aspect of something (p. 75). One can readily agree with him that time is not a substance but an accident of a substantial being. He then continues with the thought that time is the intrinsic expression of the sole reality which is creative advance in nature (p. 85). This doctrine comes very close to the assertion that there is an absolute time which is the actual existence of a

changing being. It is necessarily expressed in the terminology of being, implying that time is an accident. Mr. Hammerschmidt wisely notes that "Whitehead's insistence that time must inhere in real entities is equivalent to saying that a theory of absolute time, in which time is a set of unsupported relations, occupied by eternal objects, would not give a satisfactory account of nature" (p. 76). Mr. Whitehead had too much native good sense not to avoid a lapse into a doctrine which he explicitly rejects in his philosophy of becoming.

Probably the greatest problem which faced Mr. Hammerschmidt in writing his summary is the lack of coherence in the very system itself. He realizes that any explanation of nature and reality will necessarily depend on the theory of creativity (p. 74). This creativity generates time by a series of successive and contiguous epochal durations (p. 27). In *Process and Reality* (p. 30) "the conception of an actual occasion represents Whitehead's final effort to merge creativity and the creature. To him an actual occasion is an act of self-creativity, the creativity creating the creature yet just an aspect of the creature."

The contradiction inherent in the last sentence is obvious. The present problem, however, is to understand what creativity is. The glossary gives a definition taken from *Process and Reality*: "Creativity is the pure notion of activity; that ultimate notion of the highest generality inherent in all actuality." Mr. Hammerschmidt does his best to make the concept clear. In fact, he makes it more understandable than it is in Whitehead. In *Process and Reality* (p. 42), we find the remarkable statement that creativity is Aristotelian "matter" divested of its passive receptivity. This can mean that it is in no way potential but actual. It comes close to the affirmation that creativity, the matter of Aristotle, is pure act! In the same book (p. 302), creativity is incapable of receiving a form. Yet every entity is a particular form capable of infusing its own particularity into creativity. The latter must, therefore, be passive, at least in the sense that it is capable of receiving this particularity of form. In *Process and Reality* (p. 42), Mr. Whitehead denies categorically that creativity can be characterized but it is found under conditions and is "described as conditioned." He writes (pp. 317-318) that God is the "aboriginal condition" which qualifies the action of creativity and the primordial character which characterizes what he has previously called uncharacterizable what is only *described* as conditioned.

In the light of such statements we might well marvel that Mr. Hammerschmidt has managed to make such an understandable summary of Whitehead's notion of Time and Space. He is to be congratulated upon his painstaking and scholarly synthesis of a very difficult subject.

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